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 EMBODIED ACTING: COGNITIVE FOUNDATIONS OF PERFORMANCE 
Richard J. Kemp, PhD 
University of Pittsburgh, 2010 
 
This dissertation applies current thinking in cognitive science to elements of the actor’s process 
of preparing and performing a role. Findings in the fields of neuroscience, psychology, and 
linguistics radically challenge the dualistic concepts that have dominated acting theory since the 
early twentieth century, and suggest more holistic models of the actor’s cognitive and expressive 
activities. Chapter 1 suggests how a vocabulary for nonverbal communication (nvc) drawn from 
social psychology can be used to analyze and describe actors’ communicative behavior. Chapter 
2 examines the relationship of thought, language and gesture by considering Lakoff and 
Johnson’s (L & J) analysis of how conceptual thought is metaphorically shaped by the body’s 
experiences in the physical world. This assessment is combined with David McNeill’s theory 
that gestures are key ingredients in an “imagery-language dialectic” that fuels both speech and 
thought. Elements of both analyses are applied to Jacques Lecoq’s actor training exercises. 
Chapter 3 investigates the actor’s concepts of self and of character. This is supported by L & J’s 
analysis of the metaphorical construction of self and of different selves, a description of the 
connectionist view of mind, Merlin Donald’s proposition that mimesis is central to cognition, 
and Fauconnier and Turner’s theory of conceptual blending. Aspects of Michael Chekhov’s 
approach to character are considered in the light of theses findings and theories. Chapter 4 
addresses the actor’s sense of identification with a character. I refer to work on proprioception, 
LeDoux’s exploration of the neural foundations of self, and Gallese and others’ work on “mirror 
 v 
mechanisms” in the brain that provide an experiential dimension to action and emotion 
understanding. I suggest that these findings validate the effectiveness of Stanislavski’s Method 
of Physical Actions. Chapter 5 describes the findings of Antonio Damasio, Joseph LeDoux and 
psychologist Paul Ekman on emotion, and applies them to exercises created by Stanislavski, 
Strasberg, Jerzy Grotowski, Jacques Lecoq, and Susana Bloch. The Conclusion proposes a model 
of the theatrical act, and suggests ways in which actor training can be remodeled in the light of 
the information described. 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
… imagination bodies forth / The form of things unknown … 
A Midsummer Night’s Dream
 Our sense of what is real begins with and depends crucially on our bodies … 
, V 1 14 
George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, 
 
Philosophy in the Flesh 
It all happens at once. It has to. The impulse, the breath, the speech, the gesture, the walk, the 
awareness of the guy in the fifth row who’s nodding off, so I punch the end of the line that bit 
harder. And because I punched harder, my partner is surprised and jolted into her response with 
that extra calorie of spontaneity, which crackles the air, and the audience almost imperceptibly 
sits up, drawn in, more alert. 
It all happens at once. 
And then it’s gone. 
It’s the nature of live performance. Beautiful, ugly, embodied, ephemeral, frustrating, 
blissful, gone… but living in people’s memories (when we’ve done our jobs well). And we hope 
that the memories are strong enough to get us the next job. Naturally, we want to do the best we 
can, but even more perplexing than the nature of performance itself is the question of training for 
it. How on earth does one train in a process that simultaneously combines all the features of 
living real life? Even thought? The obvious answer would be to live life, but the vast majority of 
 2 
people placed in front of an audience and asked to “be themselves” have the utmost difficulty in 
behaving naturally. They stammer and mumble, their muscles stiffen, they move awkwardly. 
Clearly, the ability to perform is a specialized one, incorporating features beyond those used to 
live everyday life. What is the relationship of acting to real life? What features do they share? 
What distinguishes them from one another? I’m going to attempt to answer these questions 
through combining my own professional experience as an actor and director with insights gained 
from the field of cognitive studies. 
The germ of the idea for this dissertation appeared when I was studying English 
Literature at Oxford. At that time in England, training in acting was considered a vocational 
activity, and didn’t merit a degree of any sort. Inspired by Peter Brook’s The Ik, and Tadesuz 
Kantor’s Wielopol Wielopol
I had a sort of theatrical epiphany when I saw a performance by a group called Moving 
Picture Mime show. They performed three long mime pieces, one with full-face ‘larval’ masks, 
and two in a cartoon mime style. I was thrilled to see what could be done without costumes, 
props or… words!  - and had a vision of what could happen if this level  of physical expertise 
could be applied to scripts. In a state of fervor, I sat down to write a manifesto for this new 
, The Marx Brothers, Max Wall, and Morecambe and Wise, I was 
sure at that point that my future lay in theatre, but I had been persuaded by my teachers and 
parents to take up my Oxford place instead of going to drama school. Oxford didn’t have a 
theatre program (and still doesn’t), and the study of drama was considered a component of 
Literature. The prevailing attitude towards live performance was that it offered an interesting 
perspective on a written text, but wasn’t worthy of study in its own right. Although I was heavily 
involved in university ‘dramatic societies,’ performing and directing both contemporary and 
classic plays, I felt dissatisfied with my studies, and didn’t really know why.   
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theatre that would use body language to make plays vibrant and accessible – but couldn’t get 
beyond three sentences. This was puzzling and frustrating –the idea felt so real and evident, but 
resisted being put in to words. Looking back, I realize that I just didn’t know enough about 
theatre. Following urgent but inchoate intuitions, I steadfastly ignored missives from the Careers 
Office about a future in publishing or the Foreign Office, and on graduating, started to work as 
an actor. 
In the four years following my graduation I was involved in a wide range of performance 
styles, giving myself a practical apprenticeship.  I started a street clown trio with Simon 
McBurney, who was then studying at Jacques Lecoq’s school in Paris, and who went on to start 
Theatre de Complicite. This was a crash course in physical communication: we learned what 
worked by counting up our takings at the end of the day. We toured around the UK in an ailing 
Alfa Romeo, and got picked up to be the opening act for a gothic punk band called Bauhaus. 
Which was the end of us as a trio! I performed in the first show by the new Almeida theatre 
company, played percussion in a pop band, and did a yearlong tour of an agitprop piece about 
unemployment. I started the 1982 Theatre Company with Neil Bartlett, who later went on to run 
the Lyric Theatre, Hammersmith. We performed Brecht and Shakespeare in an imagistic and 
deconstructionist way, touring the UK, Europe, Canada, and the USA, before being invited to 
become company in residence at the University of Essex.  
During this period I attended a workshop run by Dario Fo, and as a result went to train at 
his summer school in Italy, subsequently being invited back to teach. Through my association 
with Fo, the 1982 Company was invited to present the English language premiere of his solo 
show Mistero Buffo. This was based on the historical figure of the giulare  - a minstrel clown 
who performed comic versions of stories from the bible. I adapted the show for ensemble 
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performance, performed in it, and directed it. The show did very well at The Riverside Studios, 
and then transferred to The Tricycle Theatre before touring the UK. Having the opportunity to do 
many performances of the same piece alerted me to my limitations as a performer, and the need 
to get a thorough physical training. 
Fortunately, I won an award from the French government that allowed me to go and train 
in Paris for a year. On Simon McBurney’s advice, I trained with Philippe Gaulier and Monika 
Pagneux, two teachers who had just left Lecoq’s school and set up their own studio. The 
yearlong course was structured as a sequence of “Stages” focusing on topics such as clown, 
commedia, melodrama, and tragedy. Each day started with physical training, and was followed 
by improvisatory exercises in the relevant style. This training was foundational for me. I 
discovered the value of play and fundamental rules of physical performance –Lecoq’s principle 
that everything moves, that one’s body changes according to factors such as physical 
environment, levels of emotion, degree of will, and that, in a reflexive relationship, the skilled 
actor can use his or her body to create the illusion of these elements for the audience. I learnt that 
physical principles inform different styles of performance, and that stillness, rhythm, and tempo 
can create dramatic shape. Monika was at that time Peter Brook’s Movement Director, and 
relayed many of his working practices to us as well as the key principle that she learnt from him 
- that theatre is the art of making the invisible visible. All of this wonderful information fed into 
the conviction that I had formed at Oxford, that the body is central to the communication of 
meaning in performance.  
On my return to London from Paris, I created a solo theatre show about a Polish Count 
who lived in a cupboard, which I performed in England, Europe, North Africa, and the Middle 
East over a period of three years. I did more Shakespeare, and also started working with Theatre 
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de Complicite, which by this time was established enough to be invited to mount a season at the 
Almeida theatre, and to bring a production of Durenmatt’s The Visit
Throughout these different experiences, I was looking for ways to make theatre vital and 
accessible, to discover how words could be credibly expressed and integrated with movement to 
create visceral responses in audiences. Concurrently with my professional career, I had been 
teaching in a variety of contexts, from impromptu sessions with Moroccan street children to 
running workshops in conjunction with my company’s shows, teaching at colleges in England 
and Europe, leading master classes with Monika Pagneux, training clowns at London’s Circus 
Space, and actors on courses in conservatory programs in London. Moving beyond one-off 
workshops into longer courses made me reflect on what I was discovering in performances and 
my own training, and deepened my conviction that there were certain basic principles that 
underlie multiple styles of performance, and that these could be identified through the activities 
of the body. For example, it is true of both the Commedia performer and the actor working in the 
style of psychological realism that particular gestures can be expansive or contractive, their 
movements direct or indirect, postures closed or open. It is also true that audiences receive 
 into the National Theatre. 
While I enjoyed working with them, I wanted to start my own company, and did so in 1991. 
Over the course of seven years we created seven original shows, devising scripts through 
improvisations based on archetypal stories such as Don Quixote, Don Juan, the Fall of Lucifer. 
With support from the Arts Council, regional Arts Associations, and The Foundation for Sport 
and the Arts, we were able to create a new show each year and tour it in the UK before runs in 
London and at the Edinburgh Festival. During this period I also had the opportunity to train with 
Yoshi Oida and Master Nakamura in Noh theatre, Keith Johnstone in Improvisation, Antonio 
Fava in Commedia and Augusto Boal in the format that he called The Rainbow of Desire. 
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information from these physical traits and make meaning from them, sometimes consciously, but 
generally through an unconscious process. 
Moving to the States for the new millennium introduced me to a different world of 
theatrical knowledge. In the professional realm, I found a great reliance on Stanislavski and 
Method acting, and this emphasis on “internal” process helped me to explore the links between 
thought, feeling and expression. In the last nine years, I’ve directed fourteen productions, and 
acted in thirteen. These pieces have ranged from Shakespeare through psychological realism to 
multimedia image concerts. Similarly to my experience in Europe, I’ve recognized common 
principles that are present in a variety of styles, and also that among practitioners there is a lack 
of a practical vocabulary to talk about performance. We don’t have terms to describe elements 
of, or differentiations in, posture, gesture, tempo or the use of space, but these features are 
essential in communicating meaning, and are inextricably linked with the conceptual thought that 
Stanislavskian analysis deals in. Theatre is, of course, more than just saying the words… how we 
say them is just as much a communicator of meaning.  
This brings me to the knowledge that helps to tie all of this together, and which gives a 
theoretical structure to the principles of performance that I have been uncovering in my practical 
experience. I realize that the focus on physical communication thus far may suggest a lack of 
attention to the “internal” elements involved in the acting process. However, in my own acting, 
I’ve been constantly aware of a reflexive relationship between physicality and thought and 
feeling. This phenomenological experience is one that many of my fellow performers have 
mentioned, yet has little acknowledgement in training methods, be they physically or 
psychologically oriented. (A significant exception is the program run by Stephen Wangh at 
NYU, beautifully described in his book An Acrobat of the Heart). The first clues that I had that 
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this phenomenon was being addressed by scientists came from reading Daniel Goleman’s 
Emotional Intelligence and Antonio Damasio’s The Feeling of What Happens
The last thirty years have seen major changes in the scientific understanding of the brain, 
the mind, and its mechanisms. These have been prompted by increasing sophistication in brain 
scanning technology that has provided a wealth of neurobiological data about the brain at work. 
This information was simply not available before because the workings of the brain are for the 
most part unconscious, and therefore not available to conscious inquiry. Findings in fields such 
as neuroscience, psychology and linguistics have radically altered the suppositions that have 
informed many areas of inquiry. George Lakoff and Mark Johnson (L & J) present an overview 
of these discoveries in 
, but it was not 
until I was introduced to cognitive studies in my doctoral work at the University of Pittsburgh 
that I realized the full extent of the potential of cognitive science to illuminate the process of 
acting. Here at last is a range of empirically based research that acknowledges the centrality of 
physical experience in perception, cognition and expression, and offers insights into the 
mysterious processes of emotion, empathy and imagination that an actor engages in when 
preparing and presenting a role. How has this come about? 
Philosophy in The Flesh
1) the mind is inherently embodied,  
, stating that the three major findings of cognitive 
science show that  
2) thought is mostly unconscious, and 
3) abstract concepts are largely metaphorical.  
 
One of the most radical conclusions to be drawn from these findings is that conceptual thought is 
not separate from the body in the way posited by the Cartesian concept of reason. This 
fundamentally alters the foundation on which theories of acting have rested since at least the late 
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eighteenth century and French philosopher Denis Diderot’s seminal analysis Paradoxe sur le 
comédien
 It was Diderot who crystallized the concept of “outside in” or “inside out” to 
characterize the ways in which the actor creates the appearance of being affected by emotion. 
Puzzling over the issue of whether the actor has to be moved in order to move an audience, 
Diderot described seeing the famous English actor David Garrick do a party trick in which he 
rapidly altered his facial expression to convey a wide range of emotions: “Can his soul have 
experienced all these feelings, and played this kind of scale in concert with his face? I don’t 
believe it, nor do you.” 
 (written in 1773, but not published till 1830). 
1
Diderot defined the two possible approaches available to an actor as having to do with the 
level of “sensibility” –the capacity to feel “genuine” emotion – or the use of technique. Although 
Garrick himself considered that he used a combination of both, Diderot decided that it must be 
that case that the actor uses physical technique to affect an audience. Although much of 
Diderot’s analysis was prescient when viewed in the context of cognitive science, the conceptual 
division of “psychological” and “physical” approaches to actor training continues to this day. As 
many actors have acknowledged, it is not an “either/or” phenomenon, and cognitive science now 
provides the empirical research that supports a holistic understanding. Of course, Diderot is not 
solely responsible for the conceptual division – the tendency to differentiate “internal” from 
“external” processes results from a fundamental feature of human perception –a feature that I 
will talk about later on. 
 
Despite the tendency to separate physicality and psychology, there is a widespread 
recognition that the actor’s body is central to any consideration of the acting process. As Joseph 
                                                 
1 Diderot, 60 
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Roach points out in The Player’s Passion; “The actor’s body constitutes his instrument, his 
medium, his chief means of creative expression –this is a commonplace on which performers and 
spectators alike have readily agreed.” 2 Roach goes on to make the point that “conceptions of the 
human body drawn from physiology and psychology have dominated theories of acting from 
antiquity to the present”3
A detailed consideration of the slowness to adapt would form a dissertation in itself, but 
briefly, and from my own perspective as a theatre professional who is also a professor, a number 
of reasons present themselves. The twentieth century saw the growth of specialized training 
programs for actors, replacing the ad-hoc apprentice system that had prevailed in earlier 
centuries. Alongside this, the founding of the Actors’ Equity Union in the early part of the 
century (1913 in America, 1930 in Britain) gave further legitimacy to the idea of acting as a 
profession with its own lore and traditions.  
 and makes it the focus of his book to trace the historical relationship of 
these changing conceptions to changes in acting theory. From a historical perspective, it would 
seem inevitable that as understanding of the body develops through scientific research, so 
theories of acting will alter to accommodate new information. It would be reasonable to expect 
that the changes in understanding of the mind/brain that have occurred in the last thirty years 
would have provoked alterations in acting theory and training. This process has, however, been 
very slow, and few would argue that actor training in the West is still dominated by 
Stanislavski’s work and the fundamentally nineteenth-century concepts that informed it.  
 Within that profession, there is considerable suspicion of written theory, probably 
because so much knowledge about acting is held and communicated in a sort of oral tradition - 
the lore of the studio. This suspicion is strongly influenced by the tendency towards a kinesthetic 
                                                 
2 Roach, 11 
3 ibid. 11 
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learning orientation in actors and is further reinforced by the oft-repeated exhortation of “Show 
me, don’t tell me!” in actor training, which prioritizes embodied experience over narrated 
information. While this is necessary in realistic acting styles, it can create an unconscious 
prejudice against theory. This prejudice is manifested by the tendency of twentieth-century 
writing about acting to fall in to one of two categories: 
 a] Practitioners who outline a specific practical approach, generally claiming uniqueness, 
and 
b] Theorists who view acting from a cultural, social, historical or political perspective. 
In this dissertation I intend to bridge the gap between these two categories, and apply 
some of the most significant discoveries of cognitive science to the practice of acting, drawing 
on my three areas of experience; as a professional actor and director; as a teacher and trainer of 
actors; and as a researcher. To do this, I will approach acting as an experiential process that is a 
seamless expression of psychology and
Writers in both the categories mentioned above tend to frame their considerations of 
acting in a way that depends on the Cartesian duality of Reason separate from Body. This 
separation is now empirically disproven by recent discoveries in the field of cognitive science 
and I intend to draw on these to show the centrality of embodied experience in cognition, thought 
and communication. I believe that training the body must be a central feature of an actor’s 
 physiology, using the term “psychophysical” to express 
this meld. While Roach’s focus was historical, mine is forward looking. I hope that the 
information in this dissertation will be part of a significant shift in both the theory and practice of 
actor training. I know that this is an ambitious goal –I feel that it is justified by the magnitude of 
the changes in the understanding of the mechanisms of the human mind that have led to the 
concept of the embodied mind. 
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preparation, no matter what style she or he is involved in. While many programs incorporate 
activities such as Alexander Technique, yoga, or dance, these do not directly address the 
relationship between verbal and non-verbal communication. For example, L & J point out that 
many abstract concepts are metaphorically shaped by our physical experiences in the material 
world. This means that many words and phrases have a latent gesture or spatial tendency 
inscribed in them. A training method that incorporates this principle will feel intuitive and 
holistic, and equip the actor with an integrated physical expressivity that makes text vibrantly 
alive in performance. Equally important are discoveries that have a bearing on non-verbal 
communication, character, empathy and emotion. I will link these discoveries to core elements of 
the acting process by using examples of practical exercises drawn from the work of 
Stanislavski,4
 This analysis will reframe the debate about the nature of acting by going beyond 
dualities such as body/mind or emotion /reason to describe acting in a holistic sense, a sense that 
recognizes the way that meaning is both made and expressed in movement as well as language in 
 (the Method of Physical Actions), Michael Chekhov, Jerzy Grotowski and Jacques 
Lecoq. These practitioners have been chosen primarily because each focuses on physical activity 
as a means of exploring and expressing dramatic action –both improvised and textual. As 
practitioners who have independently formulated a process of actor training, they have each 
created a body of work that is illustrated by practical exercises. Despite the wide range of styles 
that are associated with these practitioners, I hope to show that when examined through the lens 
of cognitive studies, certain foundational processes underlie the varying exercises, and that they 
fit into a coherent process that can be described by criss-crossing the border between the lore of 
the studio and the world of theory. 
                                                 
4 In common with more recent translations, I use the “i” at the end of Stanislavski’s name, except where referring to 
a published work that uses the alternative “y”.  
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an environment defined by space and time. This approach provides an environment for the 
cultivation of the visible expression of invisible processes and will serve practitioners, teachers 
of acting, theorists and historians by creating a vocabulary of performance that is drawn from 
empirically based analyses of mental and physical processes. The benefits are wide ranging; 
teachers will have a sound conceptual structure for their work, practitioners a more precise 
vocabulary for communicating with one another. Scholars will have more reliable tools for 
talking about authorship through action, or distinguishing between styles of acting in relation to 
genre and period, or screen and stage. Closest to my heart are the benefits to actors. So much of 
what we do is intuitive, with success hard to repeat, and the reasons for failure difficult to define, 
and this information will enable us to peer in to the mystery with greater clarity. 
1.1 REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Recent years have seen an increase of published works that acknowledge the holistic nature of 
acting by using the term “psychophysical”, but there are comparatively few that seek to apply the 
findings of cognitive science to the practicalities of acting. An early example was Glenn Wilson, 
who writes from the unusual perspective of a social psychologist who also has professional 
performance experience. His goal in The Psychology of the Performing Arts is to benefit both 
life scientists and performers by reviewing what psychology, as “the science of behavior and 
experience”, has to say about performance. In a wide-ranging survey he refers to many essential 
features of an actor’s activity, including training and role preparation, characterization and 
motivation, and posture and gesture. Principles of psychology are linked to these activities, with 
some specific examples. These examples are limited in their usefulness by their origin in a 
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singular acting style, which Wilson apparently assumes is universal, or holds true in all 
circumstances, a notion that is contradicted by most recent performance theories. Also, his 
understanding of the principles of Stanislavski’s teaching has been superseded by more recent 
scholarship. His book, published in 1985, is based on information that precedes many of the 
discoveries in cognitive science that form the theoretical foundation of this dissertation. This is 
exemplified by his reinforcement of the notion that “external” and “internal” approaches to 
creating a role form a legitimate duality. It is a fundamental assertion of my approach that 
cognitive science disproves this duality, both conceptually and practically.  
In Action Reconsidered: Cognitive Aspects of the Relation between Script and Scenic 
Action (2008), Erik Rynell investigates the way in which recent findings in cognitive science can 
be applied to the process of translating a written script into action on stage. Working in a similar 
area as this dissertation, Rynell recognizes fundamental similarities between those findings and 
certain theatre practices. Our paths diverge, however, in the intent of our investigations. While 
this dissertation is concerned with examining key psychophysiological aspects of an actor’s 
process in order to improve actor training, Rynell’s focus is to make an argument for the 
centrality of intentional action in drama, a position that he feels has been challenged by much of 
20th Century experimental and avant-garde theatre. In making this argument he creates a useful 
model of dramatic process that he refers to as Background, Situation and Intention (BSI). This 
model is informed by the timeframes of Past (background) Present (Situation) and Future 
(Intention) as communicated by a play’s script, and a character’s intended, and subsequently 
executed, actions. Rynell creates this new terminology in order to disassociate the process from 
any one practitioner, and applies it both to drama “with action” and “without action”, concluding 
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that the renewed emphasis on action as a subject of cognitive studies will have an effect on 
contemporary theatre. 
In a publication that applies psychology to acting processes, Dutch psychologist Elly 
Konijn investigates actors’ emotions in Acting Emotions: Shaping Emotions on Stage
An approach that does engage with contemporary neuroscience to some extent in its 
consideration of emotion in acting is Susana Bloch’s Alba Emoting, described in Phillip 
Zarrilli’s 
. In this 
study she draws on the history of acting theories, interviews with actors, and her own experience 
as an actor-in-training. The central feature of her work is a four-tier schema that purports to 
describe actors’ emotions. This work uses the self-reporting of the actors that are interviewed 
without any material corroboration, and as Rhonda Blair points out in her critique of Konijn’s 
work, this does not approach the empirical standards of normal scientific research. A significant 
difference between Konijn’s work and this project is that Konijn does not refer to the available 
neurocognitive research on emotion, thus restricting herself to analysis of the conscious mind. As 
many researchers in the field of cognitive science point out, the vast majority of mental activity 
happens below the level of consciousness, and is not available through conscious reflection 
alone. 
Acting (Re)Considered 5
                                                 
5 Zarilli  219-238 
. Bloch, an experimental psychologist, began a multi-
disciplinary research project in 1970 to investigate the links between the psychological, 
subjective, and expressive features of emotion. Her work identifies correlations between 
voluntarily controlled muscular activity (called the effector pattern) and what would colloquially 
be called the “internal” experience of emotion (the “subjective-feeling component”). These 
findings correlate well with psychologist Paul Ekman’s findings about the relationship between 
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facial expression and emotion, and neuroscientist Antonio Damasio’s differentiations between 
emotion as a physiological state, and feelings as the conscious registering of the emotion. Bloch 
uses her findings to propose a psychophysiological approach to training actors in the simulation 
of emotions, using consciously chosen breathing patterns, muscular activity and facial 
expressions. Although I would not agree with her distinction between “real” and “simulated” 
emotion (the difference she posits is contextual rather than essential), and find other aspects of 
her methodology to be out of step with current thinking on emotion, there is useful information 
in this article. Bloch’s application of behavioral psychology to actor training is very much in 
accord with the focus of this project. I will refer to Bloch’s work in the chapter on emotion, but 
go beyond it in that I consider other areas of acting from a neurobiological basis. Bloch, for 
example, does not consider issues of character, imagination or empathy in her writing. 
In The Nature of Expertise in Professional Acting: A Cognitive View, psychologists 
Tony and Helga Noice investigate the mental processes that are involved as actors memorize and 
then retrieve verbal and behavioral material.6
                                                 
6 Noice xviii 
 Using a wide range of data from behavioral 
experiments they identify certain principles that are empirically shown to benefit retention of 
material. These include: plan recognition (identifying a character’s intentions); use of prior 
knowledge (linking newly learned material to knowledge held in long term memory); reduction 
of arbitrariness (identifying a specific narrative of character intention); distinctiveness 
(segmenting the text into idea units - ‘beats’); self generation (the autonomous decision making 
of the actor in analyzing text); self referencing (the connections made by the actor between the 
character and him or herself); causality (using the idea unit segmentation to construct a causal 
chain); mood congruency (matching their own affective state to the fictional circumstances); 
 16 
context effects (the reciprocal effects of other actors and fictional circumstances); overlearning 
(repetition); and practice effects (consolidation through trial and error). 
The Noices’ own research, and summaries of other studies, provides very useful 
information in identifying effective memorization strategies. However, they identify what they 
consider to be the essence of acting as “to use the memorized text to actually do anew, at every 
performance, what the character would do within the particular dramatic situation.” 7
In 
 From a 
perspective based on neuroscientific evidence, the distinction between memorized speech and 
behavior and “doing anew” is not as cut and dried as the Noices’ statement implies. This 
definition of the essence of acting would seem to be drawn from acting lore rather than 
psychology. The Noices’ reliance on behavioral experimentation and self-reporting also means 
that they cannot take advantage of the ability of fMRI based research to identify unconscious 
brain processes. The focus of their book is on memorization, and while the information it 
provides is extremely helpful in identifying effective memorization strategies, the authors’ 
insistence that this is the central feature of acting expertise seems limited in scope. Little 
attention is paid to phenomena such as empathy, imagination, or emotion, aspects of the actors’ 
process that would certainly seem to be as important as memorization, and which are considered 
in detail in this dissertation.  
The Actor, Image and Action, Rhonda Blair looks at how “developments in cognitive 
neuroscience…might be used…to help the actor, in Stanislavski’s words, reach “‘unconscious 
creativeness through conscious technique’” 8
                                                 
7 Noice, 35 
. She surveys twentieth-century developments in 
science that have a relevance to acting theory, the twentieth- century heritage of actor training, 
and aspects of cognitive neuroscience “that have implications for the way we think about 
8 Blair, xii 
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acting.” 9 Although Blair identifies her goal as to provide “practical tools for the actor”, as well 
as information for “performance studies research” 10
                                                 
9 ibid, xiii 
 the structure, organization, and content of 
her book serves the latter far more than the former, serving as a valuable overview of the 
information in the field. I suspect that most readers would need more explicit guidance to use the 
information in practice. Chapter 4, “Applications”, consists mostly of case studies of Blair’s own 
directing approaches. One activity is given the title of “exercise,” but as Blair herself 
acknowledges, it incorporates many of the questions that an actor might normally ask about a 
dramatic speech, without any explicit application of cognitive science, and is a description of a 
mental analytic process rather than a studio activity. In the case studies, the techniques that she 
describes are directorial, rather than actor-centered, and encourage imaginative visualization of 
the text through close reading, a not uncommon approach in contemporary theatre practice. The 
distinctive feature is the insistence on imagined sensory stimuli, rather than the Stanislavski-
derived psychological analysis of “Objective” and “Obstacle”. While Blair’s overall focus area is 
similar to that of this project, she does not provide clear and specific links between cognitive 
science and particular, actor-centered training exercises. That activity is a central feature of this 
dissertation, helping us to better understand those aspects of acting that are not accessible 
through conscious reflection. 
10 ibid, xiv 
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1.2 EMBODIED ACTING 
Through the examination of fundamental features of the acting process from a cognitive 
perspective, I hope to show that cognitive studies can offer an explanation of the way in which 
an actor creates effective performances. The definition of effective will of course vary from style 
to style, and genre to genre, but one of the perennial questions of any enquiry into the acting 
process in Western culture is how the actor discovers “truth” in performance. While this is not 
the singular and instantly recognizable feature that is suggested by the use of the word in Method 
training, it is probably safe to say that most productions require actors to be credible as fictional 
characters, or as themselves in fictional circumstances. Method acting expands upon a feature of 
Stanislavski’s early work to demand that the actors use autobiographical experience to create 
credibility in characterization, while other approaches depend more on imaginative 
transformation. The contrast between these two approaches is vividly illustrated by a story about 
Stanislavski and Michael Chekhov, recounted in Mala Powers’ introduction to Chekhov’s On the 
Technique of Acting. Despite its apocryphal nature it offers a revealing glimpse of the way in 
which many practitioners characterize the difference: “Asked by the teacher to enact a true-life 
dramatic situation as an exercise in Affective Memory, Chekhov recreated his wistful presence at 
his father’s funeral. Overwhelmed by its fine detail and sense of truth, Stanislavski embraced 
Chekhov, thinking that this was yet another proof of the power of real affective memory for the 
actor. Unfortunately, Stanislavski later discovered that Chekhov’s ailing father was, in fact, still 
alive…Chekhov was dropped from the class owing to an ‘overheated imagination.’” 11
 The findings of cognitive science show that the distinction between memory (and 
 
                                                 
11 Chekhov, 1991, xiii 
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indeed, reason) and imagination are less distinct than the story would suggest, and that 
imagination is an important feature of many of our thought processes. Clearly, as a spectator, 
Stanislavski experienced an emotional truth in Chekhov’s performance, but was stung to 
discover that Chekhov had arrived at this through a process that was different from the one that 
Stanislavski was teaching at that point in his career. Towards the end of his life, he developed a 
way of working that he called The Method of Physical Actions that brought his conceptual 
framework much closer to Chekhov’s way of working. Both of these approaches use physical 
experimentation to stimulate the imagination so as to create performances that seem emotionally 
and psychologically truthful to an audience. The holistic process through which this occurs is the 
subject of this dissertation. 
 To investigate this topic, I’m going to pose five basic questions: 
1 How does the actor communicate meaning non-verbally?  
2 What is the relationship between thought, physical action and language? 
3 How does the actor create a character? 
4 How does the actor identify with the character? 
5 How does the actor embody emotion in fictional circumstances? 
Each of these questions will be addressed in a chapter that will investigate specific 
aspects of the relevant cognitive processes, and then apply them to practical exercises drawn 
from the pool of practitioners mentioned above. The material will be foundational rather than 
comprehensive in nature, and inevitably, there will be overlaps in the information –hopefully 
these will be considered by the reader to be useful paths of connection rather than redundancies.  
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1.3 WHY SHOULD THEATRE PEOPLE BE INTERESTED IN COGNITIVE 
STUDIES? 
A simple answer would be that the scientific investigation of the mind and brain offers theatre 
people better ways of understanding the psychophysical processes involved in performance. 
Cognitive science also offers us tools with which to describe the distinctions between different 
approaches as well as to recognize fundamental similarities amongst them. Not only that, but as 
Bruce McConachie points out in his preface to Performance and Cognition, “the sciences of the 
mind and brain offer conclusions that are based on years of experimentation and research” 12
Different approaches to actor training tend to fall into categories of physical and 
psychological, even when it is widely acknowledged that it is the physical that communicates the 
psychological. This separation reflects not only historical factors, but also, more fundamentally, 
a feature of our “commonsense” understanding of ourselves that is based on unconscious 
concepts. As philosopher Mark Johnson points out: “Mind/body dualism is so deeply embedded 
in our philosophical and religious traditions, in our shared conceptual systems, and in our 
language that it can seem to be an inescapable fact about human nature.” 
 and 
consequently have a validity that rests on an empirical base. Furthermore, the understanding that 
cognitive science offers us is one that acknowledges the central role of the body, and helps us to 
better understand the relationship between thought and expression, a subject that is at best hazily 
expressed in most theories of acting, and is generally known by the imprecise term “action”.  
13
                                                 
12 McConachie (2006) x 
 That this notion of 
dualism is mistaken might seem to contradict our phenomenological experience, and certainly 
requires an adventurous mental stance to acknowledge. A useful analogy is our experience of the 
13 Johnson 2007, 2 
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sun. Our perception shows us that the sun moves in the sky, but we know from the work of 
astronomers and physicists that it is the earth that is moving. Similarly, our perception of our 
bodies suggests a split between mind and body, but empirical research in fields such as biology, 
neuroscience, and psychology show otherwise. Johnson traces this phenomenon to its root in the 
“many ways in which the successful functioning of our bodies requires that our bodily organs 
and operations recede and even hide in our acts of experiencing things in the world.” 14
Another feature of what is called “the recessive body” is the way in which we experience 
emotion.  Much recent research (with neuroscientists Antonio Damasio and Joseph LeDoux 
prominent) takes a biological rather than psychological approach to emotion, revealing the neural 
and endocrinal processes that stimulate the physiological symptoms that we interpret as emotion. 
A part of the brain called the amygdala responds to neural information and releases hormones 
that result in features such as increased heart rate, perspiration or changes in breathing patterns. 
We are sometimes aware of these, but cannot sense the activity of the amygdala or our endocrine 
system. So it often seems to us that the experience of emotion is something that is part of a 
disembodied consciousness rather than the processes of the body. The tendency to separate mind 
from body is, paradoxically, a result of the particular nature of our physical existence. Johnson 
stresses the difficulty of avoiding dualism in both our thinking and our language: “In short, the 
idea of a fundamental ontological divide between mind and body –along with the accompanying 
dichotomies of cognition/emotion, fact/value, knowledge/imagination, and thought/feeling – is 
 Our 
organs of perception are designed to hide themselves from consciousness so as not to impede our 
fluid and instantaneous experience of the material world. For example, we are aware of what we 
see, but not of our eyes doing the seeing.  
                                                 
14 ibid. 4 
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so deeply embedded in our Western ways of thinking that we find it almost impossible to avoid 
framing our understanding of mind and thought dualistically.”15
In an earlier work, 
 
Philosophy in the Flesh
The term “cognitive unconscious” refers to the 95 percent of thought that occurs below 
the level of conscious awareness and is involved in shaping conceptual systems, meaning, 
inference, and language through metaphorical thought. Significantly, the understanding that 
arises from cognitive science is one that contradicts a number of commonly held beliefs, in 
addition to that of mind/body split mentioned above. For example, L & J demonstrate that our 
commonsense understanding of the self is based on a metaphoric concept that is buried in 
unconscious processes. When we think of our “true self”, or encourage someone to “just be your 
self”, we are characterizing personality traits through the use of unconscious metaphors and 
schema. Clearly, this has implications for the actor’s creation of an alternate fictional self, and I 
will look at this process in more detail in Chapter 3.  
, Johnson teamed up with linguist George 
Lakoff to discuss the implications for philosophy of the discoveries of cognitive science. The 
recognition of the crucial role of the body in perception and conceptualization leads to the 
concepts of the cognitive unconscious, the embodied mind, and metaphorical thought. The study 
of philosophy may seem an esoteric pursuit for an actor, but L & J point out that everyday life is 
composed of activities that are based on unconscious concepts such as causation, the nature of 
the self, and morality, to name a few – all topics of philosophical inquiry. As human behavior is 
the raw material of any acting, an understanding of the processes involved in perception, 
understanding, and the creation of meaning is of great value to the actor.  
                                                 
15 Johnson 2008, 7 
 23 
The concept of the embodied mind is one that fundamentally alters the mind/body split 
on which twentieth century approaches to actor training are based. Training that is primarily 
physically oriented, such as that of Grotowski and Lecoq, is considered exotic by the 
mainstream, and to be tied to a particular style of non-realist performance.  Training methods 
that stress psychology tend to neglect the mechanics of expression beyond vocal work in the 
belief that these will take care of themselves, and that “technical” training will lead to non-
naturalistic behavior in performance.  I propose that the two approaches are in fact representative 
of positions on a continuum, rather than being mutually exclusive or necessarily oppositional. I 
hope to show how physically based work can stimulate the imagination to create performances of 
subtlety and nuance in both behavioral and linguistic expression. The empirically based concept 
of the embodied mind provides a foundation that explains the effectiveness of approaches to 
training and rehearsal that consciously link physicality and environment in the expression of 
meaning. This feature is shared by all the practical exercises that I investigate. 
Given the dualistic tendencies of Western thought, many theatre practitioners associate 
actor training that focuses on the body to be tied to a particular style of “physical” theatre. My 
own experience as a performer and director has encompassed many styles and genres, from 
Shakespeare to post-modern imagistic performance, from stand-up to Ibsen, from farce to 
psychological realism. This personal perspective reflects a wider phenomenon; theatre in the 
West is in a unique historical period where a multiplicity of styles jostle with one another, and 
are increasingly combined or juxtaposed in performance. This situation makes it all the more 
important for actors to develop skills that enable them to move from one style to another. I 
believe that the questions I have posed will lead to information that is foundational in nature, and 
that will support a wide range of styles. Some styles will demand more from certain areas of the 
 24 
range of information that I present than others. For example, farce tends to represent characters 
with little psychological complexity, but relies greatly on tempo, rhythm and clarity of physical 
expression for its comedy. In contrast, acting Ibsen will draw more heavily on the information on 
self, character, empathy and emotion.  
 
1.4 CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
1.4.1 2.0 How does the actor communicate meaning non-verbally?   
In this chapter I seek to demonstrate the equality of physical behavior to language in 
communicating meaning. That there is a need to do this in a consideration of acting is a 
reflection of another duality within contemporary Western theatre. Various training methods 
prioritize either the psychological or the physical, but few are systematically structured in a way 
that consistently acknowledges the holistic, reflexive relationship of these two elements. 16
                                                 
16 Notable exceptions being Lecoq’s school in Paris, and the work done by Stephen Wangh in the Experimental 
Theatre Wing of NYU. Neither of these, however, explicitly integrate cognitive science as a theoretical foundation 
of their work. 
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would seem to reflect the traditional view within psychology that language and non-verbal 
communication are two separate systems, devoted to different subject matters. Recent research 
has suggested that this view is limited and imperfect. I’ll refer to the work of experimental 
psychologist Adam Kendon and others that demonstrates the close relationship between 
language and nonverbal behavior. This research suggests that gestures are closely linked to 
speech, and are equal conveyors of meaning in many contexts. I’ll investigate the way in which 
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psychologists analyze and codify communicative physical behavior so as to provide an 
empirically based vocabulary for theatre practitioners, and then describe some training exercises 
that can assist actors in developing their skills in this area. 
The importance of this information for actors is that it gives us ways of understanding 
and defining behavior and gesture, elements of performance that we frequently employ 
intuitively or unconsciously to communicate the thoughts and feelings that are not explicitly 
expressed in speech. Even when a character’s speech is a sincere and full expression of her or his 
thoughts, the integration of non-verbal communication is essential in creating performances that 
appear credible to an audience.  
1.4.2 3.0  What is the relationship between thought, physical action and language? 
In this chapter I will investigate the relationship between written and spoken language. I will 
draw on the work of David McNeill, a cognitive linguist, who writes about the difference 
between the ways our brains process written and spoken language in his 1992 book, Hand and 
Mind
McNeill argues for a new conception of language, viewing it as an imagery-language 
dialectic, in which gestures provide imagery. Gesture is an integral component of language in 
this conception, not merely an accompaniment or ornament. I will apply McNeill’s analysis to 
the work of Jacques Lecoq, whose theatre school in Paris has been highly influential in British 
. He demonstrates that written language is linear, segmented and hierarchically structured, 
whereas speech incorporates gesture, which is basically experienced as image, and is processed 
by the brain in a global, synthesized and simultaneous way. Bad acting, I suspect, often arises 
because the actor hasn’t made the mental leap from the linear nature of written language into the 
gestural imagery of spoken language.  
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and European theatre since the 1960’s.While Lecoq’s work largely predates the findings 
described above, and was developed independently of this scientific research, much of it displays 
remarkable synchrony with the mechanisms that L& J and McNeill identify. Lecoq’s founding 
principle was  “Tout bouge” – everything moves. His fascination with, and analysis of movement 
enabled him to develop a highly sophisticated repertoire of physical exercises. Given the 
foundational nature of sensorimotor experience outlined by L & J, it is evident that such a 
repertoire is more than a simply physical experience for the actor, and provides a rich resource 
for the embodiment of thought in language. 
After giving a brief history of Lecoq and his school, and a survey of his methods, I will 
examine some of his exercises in detail, linking them to the cognitive processes outlined by 
McNeill, and showing how their physical nature parallels cognitive processes, and extends the 
range of the actor by establishing neuronal patterning that is beyond the normal everyday range 
of behavior.  
1.4.3 4.0 How does the actor create a character? 
In this chapter I will investigate the relationship between the actor’s concepts of self and of 
character, and how the two inter-relate. I’ll start by surveying the prevalence of the conceptual 
dichotomy that leads theatre practitioners to talk of  “inside out” or “outside in” approaches to 
the creation of character. Several aspects of current cognitive studies offer a better understanding 
of what is actually happening when an actor embodies a character. I’ll describe L & J’s analysis 
of the metaphorical construction of the concepts of self and of different selves, and Paul Ekman’s 
work on the way in which consciously chosen muscular activity can affect the autonomic system, 
and thence the experience of emotion. This is followed by a description of the connectionist view 
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of the brain, which offers hypotheses about the ways in which abstract concepts can be linked to 
motor activity, and a consideration of Merlin Donald’s proposition of the way in which mimesis 
is central to cognition. I then outline the theory of conceptual blending that was developed by 
Fauconnier and Turner (F & T), and show how it undercuts Stanislavski’s notion of the 
possibility of complete identification between self and character, before tracing the close 
conceptual fit between F & T’s hypothesis and character exercises designed by Michael 
Chekhov.  
1.4.4 5.0 How does the actor identify with the character? 
This chapter investigates the ways in which actors discover a sense of identification with the 
characters that they embody, considering the supposed distinctions between “persona” acting, 
and “transformational” acting. I’ll describe the way in which proprioception –the physiological 
process by which information about where the body is and what it is doing is relayed back to the 
brain – might operate in creating a sense of altered self in the actor, proposing that not only is 
character expressed by action, but also that actions create character. I refer to work by 
philosopher Shaun Gallagher and psychologist Andrew Meltzoff that describes how 
proprioception is more than kinaesthetic awareness, and Joseph LeDoux’s exploration of the 
neural foundations of self, and consider the implications of this information for the concept of 
the “essential self” that is used in some acting discourse. I propose that the idea that an actor can 
achieve authenticity in a role by identifying the “essential I” with it is misguided. As an 
alternative, I suggest that embodying a character involves expressing a range of behavior that 
reflects the actor’s understanding of an author’s intent, that seems credible in the fictional 
circumstances, and that forms a temporary situational self through the imagination, with feelings 
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that arise from a combination of physical actions and empathetic stimuli in the fiction. To 
support this analysis, I draw on philosopher Robert Gordon’s Simulation Theory and the work of 
Vittorio Gallese and others on identifying “mirror mechanisms” in the brain that provide an 
experiential dimension to action and emotion understanding. I also refer to the work of 
experimental psychologist Jonathan Schooler who has identified a phenomenon that he calls 
“verbal overshadowing” in which verbal descriptions of visual stimuli compromise visual 
memory. I then trace Stanislavski’s progression from linguistic analysis of a script to the “active 
analysis” that he used in the later stage of his life, suggesting that the cognitive research that I’ve 
described validates the efficacy of The Method of Physical Actions. 
1.4.5 6.0 How does the actor embody emotion in fictional circumstances? 
As with the other areas that I have covered, there have been significant advances in the 
understanding of emotion in the last thirty years. Nevertheless, approaches to emotion in 
contemporary actor training are still dominated by the nineteenth century ideas that influenced 
Stanislavski’s earlier work, and by Lee Strasberg’s insistence on “emotion memory” as the sole 
path to authentic feeling in performance. In this chapter I describe the findings of neuroscientists 
Antonio Damasio and Joseph LeDoux and psychologist Paul Ekman that articulate the current 
understanding of emotion. This is that emotions are brain representations of body states; while 
the senses of vision, hearing, touch, taste and smell function by nerve activation patterns that 
correspond to the state of the external world, emotions are nerve activation patterns that 
correspond to the state of the internal world. These autonomic responses occur automatically and 
unconsciously, and it is only after the brain becomes aware of these physiological changes that 
we experience an affective state. In a neuroscientific understanding of this process, there is an 
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important distinction between emotion (physiological reactions to stimuli) and feeling (conscious 
awareness of affective state). The implications for the actor are that consciously controlled 
physiological actions, such as breathing rapidly and shallowly, or tightening one’s muscles, not 
only communicate an emotional quality to the audience but can also generate a feeling within the 
performer. Additionally, Ekman’s experiments show that it is possible to evoke the feelings of 
specific emotions by voluntarily changing one’s facial expression. I investigate the implications 
of these findings by examining exercises created by Stanislavski, Jerzy Grotowski, Jacques 
Lecoq, and psychologist Susana Bloch. The chapter closes with an example from my own 
teaching of a way in which scientific knowledge can be integrated with studio techniques to 
provide effective training in the specifics of psychophysical behavior. 
1.4.6 7.0 Conclusion 
In the conclusion I describe some of the exciting implications for theatre and for actor training of 
the research that I have described. I draw on this research to propose a model of the theatrical 
act, and suggest possible ways in which a cognitive perspective could be integrated into actor 
training, and also inform the creation of a holistic vocabulary of performance. This vocabulary 
would acknowledge the embodied nature of meaning described by L & J, and link the theatrical 
elements of Time, Space and Story that meet in, are defined by, and expressed through the body. 
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2.0  HOW DOES THE ACTOR COMMUNICATE MEANING NON-VERBALLY? 
This chapter deals with what actors don’t say, how they don’t say it, and how this communicates 
meaning to an audience. I realize that this may sound perverse –after all, the vast majority of 
theatrical presentations originate with a script, which is comprised mostly of dialogue.  Most 
theatre practitioners, however, recognize that how one says the dialogue is vitally important, 
since the “how” also communicates. In a novel the author can describe the unspoken thoughts, 
feelings and motivations of a character. The playwright however, is restricted largely to the 
words that a character says, and it is up to the actor to contextualize those words by deciding on 
motivations that drive the words, to create facial expressions and physical behavior, to make the 
speech sound life-like through the use of vocal tone, varied emphases, tempo and cadence of 
speech. As Peter Brook points out, speech is the end result of an impulse. In most script-based 
productions, a process that derives from Stanivslavski’s early work is used to discover those 
impulses. The actor and director in rehearsal investigate the dialogue in the context of the given 
circumstances and the narrative to determine what impulses produce the words - a process that is 
generally called table work or analysis. The decisions that arise from the analysis generally get 
called interpretation, and lead to behavior that confirms, modifies, or contradicts the explicit 
meaning of the words of the script. It is, of course, this behavior, or nonverbal communication, 
that we focus on when rehearsing a script. The words, after all, already exist –it is our job to 
make them come alive through choices that are communicated through the behavior. 
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Given that this activity is so central to the practice of making theatre, it is a curious 
paradox that we don’t have a developed vocabulary for behavioral communication, and that few 
training programs, if any, offer courses in nonverbal communication (nvc). This suggests that the 
approach to teaching physicality is unfocused, if not haphazard, especially when considered in 
the light of recent evidence about the centrality of nonverbal cues in communicating meaning. 
Several studies show that adults rely more heavily on nonverbal than verbal cues in determining 
meaning in personal interaction, and also that nonverbal cues are trusted more than verbal if the 
two are in conflict. 17
The codification of nvc in the field of psychology is comparatively recent. As 
experimental psychologist Adam Kendon points out in 
 Clearly, if an actor does not integrate his or her physicality with the 
meaning of a script’s verbal content, an audience runs the risk of being confused or unconvinced. 
In this chapter I’m going to investigate the way in which psychologists analyze and codify nvc so 
as to provide an empirically based vocabulary for theatre practitioners, and then describe some 
training exercises that can assist the actor to develop her or his skills in this area. 
Gesture: Visible Action as Utterance, the 
modern concept of nvc originates in the 1940’s, as developments in audio-visual technology 
allowed for the recording and study of movement as meaning. The films of Gregory Bateson, an 
ethnographic consultant, alerted psychiatrists to the way in which interpersonal communication 
uses far more than words: “It was soon realized that tones of voice, modes of hesitation, styles of 
talking, patterns of intonation, vocal quality, bodily posture, bodily movements of all sorts, 
glances, facial expressions, were all playing a very important role…” 18
However, this period of analysis of nvc was characterized by a belief that nvc used 
devices quite different from speech and dealt with different areas of meaning, specifically, that it 
  
                                                 
17 Argyle (1970), Birdwhistell (1970), Mehrabian (1968), Philpott(1983) 
18 Kendon 2004, 69 
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was concerned only with interpersonal relationships, and that language was the only form of 
communication that could convey abstract ideas and complex information. This position is 
typified by Bateson’s observation that “…nonverbal communication is precisely concerned with 
matters of relationship…From an adaptive point of view, it is therefore important that his 
discourse be carried only by techniques which are relatively unconscious and only imperfectly 
subject to voluntary control.” (Bateson 1968 pp.614-615, quoted in Kendon, 71) Ten years later, 
a very similar view is expressed by Peter Trower, Bridget Bryant and Michael Argyle in their 
book Social Skills and Mental Health (1978): “In human social behavior it looks as if the 
nonverbal channel is used for negotiating interpersonal attitudes while the verbal channel is used 
primarily for conveying information.” 19
Obviously, if this attitude is applied to actor training, nvc is something that actor training 
need hardly pay attention to, since meaning is conveyed by words, and nvc, being “relatively 
unconscious” can’t be controlled. This rationale, whether through conscious deliberation or just 
by default, seems to underpin those actor-training programs that focus on a psychological 
approach and let the body take care of itself. However, Kendon’s, and others’, recent research 
shows that this approach is misguided and incomplete, and offers a more holistic account of the 
way in which speech and nvc complement each other in communicating meaning. 
 
Kendon’s research focuses on the use of gesture that accompanies speech, and the ways 
in which the two are not separate as previously thought. He suggests that gestures are closely 
linked to speech, and yet present meaning in a form fundamentally different from that of speech, 
and that through hand movements, people (often unconsciously) communicate thoughts:  
Gesture contributes in many different ways [to meaning]. In some cases it may 
                                                 
19 Argyle et al. Social Skills and Mental Health (1978): 16 
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seem as if a gesture provides an expression parallel to the meaning that is 
provided in words. In other cases gesture appears to refine, qualify or make more 
restricted the meaning conveyed verbally, and sometimes we encounter the 
reverse of this. In yet other cases gesture provides aspects of reference that are not 
present at all in the verbal component. In other cases again, gesture may serve to 
create an image of the object that is the topic of the spoken component. 20
Clearly, the identification of the different ways in which gesture communicates meaning 
can be extremely useful for the actor. While Kendon’s focus is on hand and arm movements, the 
principle extends to other features of non-verbal communication. Current research on the 
different systems at play in nvc can be used to create a framework for training in nvc equivalent 
in detail and scope to vocal training. This would offer theatre practitioners a way of codifying the 
ways in which we express thoughts and feelings that are implicit in a situation, but not explicitly 
expressed in language. In current theatre practice, this is commonly called subtext, but since that 
term depends on the concept of reading lines of text, I would like to propose the term “non-
verbal meaning” as one that offers more scope, and is more sensitive to the current understanding 
of communication. 
 
The challenge for the actor is to make consciously chosen non-verbal communication 
appear credible. Given that much of this activity is involuntary and unconscious, this is a 
significant issue. Psychologist Geoffrey Beattie observes that 
[v]oluntary or deliberate facial movements, like false smiles, are controlled by 
the cerebral hemispheres and show an asymmetry in their expression on the face 
as a result of this. Involuntary facial movements that reflect real emotion, such as 
                                                 
20 2004, 161 
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genuine smiles, are controlled by lower, more primitive areas of the brain, and are 
 essentially symmetrical on both sides of the face.” 21
Clearly, the difference between apparently genuine and false displays of emotion will provoke a 
response in audiences. Observant members might find the difference discernible at a conscious 
level, and would probably identify false displays of emotion as “bad acting”, unless such a false 
display was appropriate in the fictional circumstances. Other, less observant members might feel 
vaguely unsatisfied or subliminally unconvinced by the acting, without being able to identify 
why. Like a pianist practicing scales, it makes sense for the actor to work at practicing the 
mechanics of physical expression, to understand and control how features like posture, gesture, 
and facial expression communicate, and how to make voluntary actions in these areas appear 
involuntary, and therefore spontaneous. Like any other skill, this takes practice, and needs to be 
assimilated to the point where its mechanics are engaged unconsciously. 
  
The “conscious competency” model of assimilation is useful in demonstrating the process 
by which this can happen.22
                                                 
21 Beattie, 2004, 15 
 This model is a useful reminder of the need to learn, and train 
others, in sequential stages.  According to this model, the learner always begins at Stage 1 –
“unconscious incompetence”, and if successful in their training, will end at stage 4 – 
“Unconscious competence”, having passed through stage 2 – “conscious incompetence”, and 
stage 3 –“conscious competence”. In stage 1, the student has no awareness and no ability in the 
skill being taught. In stage two, the student is aware of the skill, but has not yet developed any 
ability. In stage 3, the student is able to perform the skill, but needs to consciously think about it, 
while in Stage 4, the skill has become integrated to the point where it can be performed without 
22 It is difficult to pinpoint the originator of this model. It became current in various forms of business management 
training during the 1970’s, and is described in print in W.C. Howell and E.A. Fleishman (eds.), Human Performance 
and Productivity. Vol 2: Information Processing and Decision Making. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum; 1982. 
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conscious thought. These stages are easily recognized by anyone who has learned a skill such as 
riding a bike or driving a car.23
It is worth reminding ourselves of this process in order to counter the still active tendency 
in theatre programs to resist “technical” training in the misguided assumption that it will produce 
“technical” performances. This mistrust is based on a phenomenon that it is easily recognized 
from an experiential point of view. If an actor is thinking of technique while performing, they are 
not focusing on the fictional circumstances of the play, and from the point of view of people who 
mistrust technique, this inevitably compromises “truth”. This stance ignores the concept of “dual 
consciousness” expressed by Michael Chekhov, which describes the phenomenon of being 
simultaneously aware of self and character. I’ll explore this more fully later in the chapter on 
character, but for now, it’s a useful example of how an understanding of acting as a 
psychophysical activity rather than a mental one leads to propositions that sit well with current 
cognitive discoveries.  
 
Chekhov’s concept is rooted in the notion of thought and physical activity being 
inextricably entwined. The research of Kendon, mentioned above, and David McNeill (addressed 
in the next chapter) demonstrate the way in which the physical activity of gesture is part of the 
process of generating “utterances” – a term for communication that may be linguistic, gestural or 
both:  
When a speaker speaks, the speech is organized into a series of packages …  
[t]hese packages tend to correspond to units of meaning … which may be 
 referred to as ‘idea units’. Gesture is also organized into packages of action,  
                                                 
23  A non-driver is at the level of unconscious incompetence.  
A beginner would be at the level of conscious incompetence.  
Someone who’s just passed his or her driving test is at the level of conscious competence.  
The driver who gets to work without remembering the drive is unconsciously competent. 
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… which coincide with and tend to be semantically coherent with … the ‘idea  
units’… However, the gestural expression typically takes up just a part of the  
idea … For example, it may bring out an aspect of meaning associated with the  
verb … or it may add an imagistic dimension to something referred to by a noun. 
The precise way in which a coincidence is achieved  … appears to be variable. In  
our interpretation, this means that the speaker can adjust both speech and gesture 
one to another as if they are two separate expressive resources which can be  
deployed, each in relation to the other, in different ways according to how the  
utterance is being fashioned. 24
 
 
Kendon’s summary of his findings offers an endorsement of Chekhov’s approach and an 
intriguing corollary to the Stanislavski-inspired model of breaking dialogue up into units (beats). 
Again, this aspect is something that I will investigate more fully in the next chapter. Kendon’s 
work demonstrates that speech and gesture are linked, and is part of a growing body of work that 
disproves the notion that nvc is reserved for interpersonal relationships. 25
                                                 
24 Kendon, 2004, 126 
 For many theatre 
practitioners, this may seem self-evident from practical experience. After all, the whole concept 
of non-verbal meaning depends on this notion, but the paradoxical situation that obtains in most 
theatre training programs is that there is no systematic organization of the elements that 
communicate non-verbal meaning, or even a comprehensive vocabulary. Now that there is an 
empirical basis for codifying nvc, it makes sense to use this as a basis for an approach to training 
actors in physical communication.  
25 David McNeill is the foremost among authors in this area, and I discuss his work in Chapter two.  
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In Successful Nonverbal Communication
The Visual system is the major source of nvc, followed by the Auditory, and then the 
Invisible. In the Visual system, Kinesic communication is made up of facial expression, eye 
behavior, gesture and posture, and Proxemics consists of the use of space, distance between 
individuals, and the idea of territory. The Auditory system is made up of nine different attributes 
that can be consciously controlled by the communicator: loudness, pitch, rate, duration, quality, 
regularity, articulation, pronunciation, and silence. In the intriguingly named Invisible system, 
the tactile subsystem, while experienced by an individual as touch in daily life, becomes visible 
to an audience in performance, and is closely related to gesture. Chronemics deals with the use of 
time in interpersonal interaction. In western culture, this is closely associated with status –the 
scheduling of meetings, for instance, often reflects the relative hierarchical positions of those 
, Dale Leathers offers a useful overview of the 
different categories that psychologists now use in analyzing nvc. While these categories are 
based on the observation of behavior, they can be used as a framework for the creation of 
communication when combined with acting studio exercises.  The systems that Leathers 
identifies generally interact with verbal communication, but can operate in the absence of 
speech, or even assume a dominant role in certain situations. He defines three nonverbal systems; 
the Visual, which includes Kinesic, Proxemic and Artifactual subsystems; the Auditory; and the 
Invisible, which includes Tactile, Olfactory, and Chronemic subsystems. For the purposes of this 
discussion, I will be selective, and focus on those elements that are in the actor’s control in a 
performance, and communicable to an audience in the majority of situations.  Smell, for 
example, is not often used as a communicative device in theatre, and Artifactual communication 
(the information that is conveyed by the overall appearance of face and body and includes 
appearance modifying options) is more in the purview of costume and make-up design.  
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involved, and lack of punctuality is often considered an affront to the established pecking order. 
In performance, time is, of course, important, but the unit most relevant to the actor is the 
second, or even the microsecond. At this level, the manipulation of time becomes intuitive rather 
than mechanical, a matter of feel. 
In order to apply the analysis of nvc to acting, it makes sense to make some adjustments. 
Firstly, because the categories used by social psychologists are formulated from the point of 
view of the observer, the changes that I propose below mean that categories can be used for both 
the observation and the creation of behavior. Additionally, the adjustments mean that conceptual 
connections can be made across categories, acknowledge the degree of control that the actor can 
exert, and make links with familiar concepts and existing terminology. The following table lists 
nvc terms on the left, theatre terms on the right. 
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Table 1. Categories for defining nvc 
Facial expressions Facial expressions 
Eye behavior Eye behavior 
Posture Posture 
Gesture Gesture 
Space, Territory, Closeness Spatial dynamics and movement 
(blocking) 
Vocal loudness  Volume, projection 
Vocal rate Tempo of speech 
Duration, regularity, silence Rhythm of speech 
Pitch Pitch, inflexion 
Quality Timbre 
Articulation Vocal production, enunciation 
Pronunciation Accent and dialect 
 
To demonstrate how these terms can be used in the analysis of performance, I’m going to 
apply them to an extract from Act II of The Importance of Being Earnest
Cecily. May I offer you some tea, Miss Fairfax? 
. This extract 
demonstrates the way in which Wilde sought to define what the actors embodying his characters 
do as well as say, revealing his awareness of the degree to which behavior communicates 
meaning:  
Gwendolen. [With elaborate politeness.] Thank you. [Aside.] Detestable girl! But I 
require tea! 
Cecily. [Sweetly.] Sugar? 
Gwendolen. [Superciliously.] No, thank you. Sugar is not fashionable any more. [Cecily 
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looks angrily at her, takes up the tongs and puts four lumps of sugar into the cup.] 
Cecily. [Severely.] Cake or bread and butter? 
Gwendolen. [In a bored manner.] Bread and butter, please. Cake is rarely seen at  the 
best houses nowadays. 
Cecily. [Cuts a very large slice of cake, and puts it on the tray.] Hand that to Miss 
Fairfax. 
[Merriman does so, and goes out with footman. Gwendolen drinks the tea and makes a 
grimace. Puts down cup at once, reaches out her hand to the bread and butter, looks at it, 
and finds it is cake. Rises in indignation.] 
Gwendolen. You have filled my tea with lumps of sugar, and though I asked most 
distinctly for bread and butter, you have given me cake. I am known for the gentleness of 
my disposition, and the extraordinary sweetness of my nature, but I warn you, Miss 
Cardew, you may go too far. 
 
Cecily. [Rising.] To save my poor, innocent, trusting boy from the machinations of any 
other girl there are no lengths to which I would not go. 
Gwendolen. From the moment I saw you I distrusted you. I felt that you were false and 
deceitful. I am never deceived in such matters. My first impressions of people are 
invariably right. 26
 
 
The stage directions are explicit, specific, and detailed in describing the desired physical 
and vocal behavior of the characters, and make clear the way in which the comedy of the scene 
arises from the tension between genuine feelings and “the shallow mask of manners.” In the last 
speech of the section quoted, no directions are given beyond “Rises in indignation”  - this, 
together with the cumulative effect of the preceding stage directions make clear the desired 
manner of vocal delivery. However, to include such a level of detail for all the dialogue in a play 
becomes unwieldy and restrictive, and, of course, there is also considerable variance among 
playwrights in the extent that they use stage directions that describe behavior, a feature that is 
                                                 
26 Jacobus, 2001, 783 
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affected by many factors, including period, style, and genre. In the case of this extract, the 
following analysis will show that the amount of nvc that communicates meaning far exceeds 
even the stage directions that Wilde has included. 
I’ll refer to two filmed versions of the play. The first, directed by Anthony Asquith, was 
released in 1952,27 and features Joan Greenwood as Gwendolen, and Dorothy Tutin as Cecily. 
The second, directed by Oliver Parker, was released in 2002,28
 
 and features Frances O’Connor 
and Reese Witherspoon respectively in the same roles. Some allowance has to be made for the 
fact that the second version has cut significant portions of the script, and often intercuts a scene 
with visual montage shots of action that is only reported in the stage play. Both 
cinematographers use close-ups to direct attention to the action of placing sugar in the tea, 
rendering a portion of the actor’s behavior invisible, and also cut to reaction shots of 
Merriweather’s face on some lines. In the following table, lines and stage directions are in the 
left hand column, descriptions of behavior in each version in the second and third column 
respectively.  
Table 2. Analysis of nvc in "Earnest" 
Script  
[original stage direction] 
{} = cut in Asquith 
() = cut in Parker 
Asquith 1952 Parker 2002 
Cecily May I offer 
you some tea, {Miss 
Facial expression 
not visible, exaggerated 
Neutral facial 
expression, low vocal 
                                                 
27 The Importance of Being Earnest. Dir. Anthony Asquith. Perf. Michael Redgrave, 
Michael Denison, Margaret Rutherford, Edith Evans, Dorothy Tutin, Joan Greenwood. 
Paramount Pictures, 1988. 
 
28 The Importance of Being Earnest. Dir. Oliver Parker. Perf. Judi Dench, Rupert Everett, 
Colin Firth, Frances O’Connor, Reese Witherspoon. Miramax Films. 2002  
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Fairfax}? 
 
rising inflexion at end of 
sentence 
timbre, constant pitch, eyes 
closed at start of line, then 
narrowed with visual focus 
avoiding G. and directed 
downwards 
Gwendolen. [With 
elaborate politeness.] Thank 
you. {([Aside.] Detestable 
girl! But I require tea!}) 
‘Miss Cardew’ 
added in Parker 
Upright posture. 
Forced smile, followed by 
angry facial expression 
(narrowed eyes, muscular 
tension around mouth), 
visual focus on C. from 
corners of eyes, switching 
to front at end of word in 
avoidance of eye contact, 
narrowing of eyes. 
Body and face not 
visible. Descending vocal 
inflexion 
Cecily. [Sweetly.] 
Sugar? 
 
Slight lean towards 
G. hand extended towards 
sugar bowl, eyes switch 
down towards hand, then up 
to G. Head tilted, chin 
pushed forward. 
Downturned mouth, 
angry expression, closed 
eyes, head tilted down 
Gwendolen. 
[Superciliously.] No, thank 
you. Sugar is not 
fashionable any more. 
Eyes widen, head 
turns towards, C, eyes 
narrow, then close on ‘No’ 
open on ‘thank you’. Visual 
focus sustains on C. then 
switches downwards. Slight 
chuckle after ‘Sugar’, 
followed by a sneer and 
then a smile. Vocal 
inflexion descends on last 
three words, as head is 
turned to front, breaking 
eye contact with C. 
Moves into C.’s 
personal space to sit down, 
sneers, then smiles, seats 
herself with torso oriented 
away from C.,  posture 
reclining on back of chair, 
visual focus in opposite 
direction from C, tilts head 
away from C., rests it on 
hand, closes eyes briefly, 
then moves hand to chin 
[Cecily looks 
angrily at her, takes up the 
tongs and puts four lumps 
of sugar into the cup.] 
 
Visual focus on 
sugar bowl. Frown. Hand 
grasps sugar cubes, visual 
focus switches to G. Hand 
places sugar cubes in cup, 
as visual focus switches to 
cup. Small smile. As cubes 
are released, focus switches 
back to G. Hand 
emphasizes action of 
releasing cubes. 
Close-up of C.’s 
hand placing three cubes of 
sugar in cup, then mid-shot 
showing chin thrust 
forward, angry expression, 
changing to smile as C. 
looks sideways at G., 
dropping fourth cube in 
cup. Passes cup to 
Merriweather. 
Cecily. [Severely.] Not visible. Rising Rising vocal 
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Cake or bread and butter? 
 
vocal  inflexion on ‘cake’, 
then again on ‘butter’ 
inflexion on ‘cake’, slight 
pause, consistent pitch for 
rest of line. Head turned to 
side, away from G. Chin 
thrust forward, corners of 
mouth turned down. Visual 
focus to side away from G, 
brief closing of eyes on 
‘bread’, simultaneous with 
slight shrug of shoulders. 
Gwendolen. [In a 
bored manner.] Bread and 
butter, please. Cake is rarely 
seen at the best houses 
nowadays. 
 
Receives cup from 
C. Head and visual focus 
switch to cup. Slow vocal 
tempo on first sentence, 
with  low pitch. Vocal 
inflexion descends on 
‘please’.  Head moves front 
after receiving cup. Eyes 
close on ‘cake’ open on ‘is’ 
and close again on ‘rarely’ 
This word is drawn out 
(first vowel sound 
sustained).  Head tilts to 
side on ‘best houses’. Smile 
follows completion of 
sentence, with visual focus 
switching down. 
Smiles, sits up, 
accepts cup of tea from 
Merriweather. Flat vocal 
pitch on first sentence, 
slight pitch variation 
suggesting  laughter in 
second sentence, torso 
turned away from C., visual 
focus directed away from 
C., then down to cup. 
Cecily. [Cuts a very 
large slice of cake, and puts 
it on the tray.] (Hand that to 
Miss Fairfax.) 
 
Visual focus on 
cake, mouth open with tip 
of tongue placed on  top 
teeth, as hand takes slice of 
cake and places it on plate. 
Visual focus switches to 
plate, then to G. Mouth 
closes; muscular tension 
around mouth. Visula focus 
switches to Merriweather as 
plate is handed to him. 
Sustained eye contact with 
Merriweather as plate is 
transferred. 
Action not shown – 
cut to facial reaction of 
Merriweather. 
[Merriman does so, 
and goes out with footman. 
Gwendolen drinks the tea 
and makes a grimace. Puts 
down cup at once, reaches 
Merriweather purses 
lips, looks down and 
sideways at G. before 
placing plate on table in 
front of her. 
Upright seated 
posture. Widening of eyes, 
slight ‘gulp’ vocalization as 
tea is drunk. (other action 
not shown, close-up of 
 44 
out her hand to the bread 
and butter, looks at it, and 
finds it is cake. Rises in 
indignation.] 
G. head lowered, 
visual focus down, sips tea, 
and then looks up and 
forward suddenly with open 
mouth and a slight frown 
after tasting it. Mouth 
closes. Muscular tension 
around mouth as she looks 
down to cup again, then 
expression of disgust. 
Visual focus switches to C. 
and sustains for speech.  
Merriweather’s hand 
placing cake on table) 
Gwendolen. (You 
have filled my tea with 
lumps of sugar, and though 
I asked most distinctly for 
bread and butter, you have 
given me cake. I am known 
for the gentleness of my 
disposition, and the 
extraordinary sweetness of 
my nature, but I warn you, 
Miss Cardew, you may go 
too far.) 
Eyes narrow. 
Expression of puzzlement 
on ‘sugar’. Vocal rhythm 
steady, pich low, 
pronuciation smooth, pitch 
descends on ‘cake’. G. 
stands on ‘cake’. Visual 
focus sustains on  C. 
Volume increases on 
‘gentleness’, ‘extraordinary’ 
is  emphasized by 
elongation of central vowel 
sound, eyes close 
simultaneously with this. 
Vocal tempos increases, 
volume increases, timbre 
gets fuller until ‘Miss 
Cardew’, then  a quick 
visual switch to 
Merriweather precedes  a 
sudden softening of timbre 
and decrease of volume for 
‘you may go too far’ 
(Not included) 
Cecily. [Rising.] (To 
save my poor, innocent, 
trusting boy from the 
machinations of any other 
girl there are no lengths to 
which I would not go.) 
Looking down and 
away from G until 
‘machinations’ Sideways 
head movements. Chin 
thrust forward. Vocal 
rhythm has slight pauses, 
vocal tempo increases to 
‘machinations’, when face 
assumes aggressive 
expression; lips pressed 
together, chin pushed 
(Not included) 
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forward, eyes wide. Visual 
focus sustains on G. from 
this point to end of speech. 
Stands on ‘there are’. Vocal 
volume increases on ‘no 
lengths’, slight pause after 
these words, and tempo 
increases for final phrase. 
After standing, posture is 
upright with arms held 
away from torso, chin 
raised. 
Gwendolen. From 
the moment I saw you I 
distrusted you. I felt that 
you were false and 
deceitful. (I am never 
deceived in such matters. 
My first impressions of 
people are invariably right.) 
 
Elongation of 
words, raised volume, 
raised pitch in first 
sentence. Upright posture, 
raised chin, sustained visual 
focus on C. Increase in 
vocal tempo in second 
sentence, sideways 
movement of the head on 
‘never’, visual focus 
switches down and to the 
side, then back to C. Chin 
raised further on ‘My first’, 
‘invariably’ elongated by 
sustaining of second vowel 
sound. Final consonant of 
‘right’ emphasized. 
Considerable pitch variation 
throughout. Arms drawn 
back from shoulders in final 
sentence, breathing rate 
increases in tempo. 
Leans towards C., 
sustains visual focus on her. 
Low vocal timbre, low 
volume, exaggerated vocal 
articulation, consistent 
pitch. Head inclined 
towards C., chin thrust 
forward, muscular tension 
around mouth. 
 
The close examination of these two different versions raises many interesting points. 
Firstly - it becomes extremely evident how the application of technology raises awareness of 
nvc. Even watching the scenes attentively at normal speed I did not notice facial expressions that 
appeared when the material was run in slow motion. Psychologist Paul Ekman calls these “micro 
expressions” –rapidly appearing and disappearing expressions that do not register consciously in 
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the viewer’s awareness. (I’ll address Ekman’s work more fully in chapters four and five.) 
Repeatedly experiencing the scenes also alerted me to vocal mannerisms that weren’t evident in 
the first viewing. Perhaps the most surprising feature is the sheer amount of nonverbal 
information that is present, and by extension, the sheer amount of information that we process 
unconsciously when interacting with others or watching drama. For reasons of clarity and space, 
I have only included the nvc of each actor as they are speaking –there is, of course, double that 
information when one considers the nvc that is displayed as characters listen to each other and 
respond nonverbally.  
As one would expect from actors at the top of the profession, there is a high degree of 
facility and accomplishment with nvc. It is unlikely that the actors in these scenes were 
consciously thinking about posture, gesture and vocalics as they were speaking; just as in daily 
life, the process is largely intuitive in delivery, but depends, of course, on the preparation of 
rehearsal. It’s intriguing how actors separated by fifty years use very similar aspects of nvc to 
communicate –the chin pushed forward, the narrowed eyes that both Tutin and Witherspoon use 
to communicate Cicely’s dislike of Gwendolen. From an analytic point of view, the 
identification of components of nvc makes it possible to use objective criteria to identify the 
differences in style that are evident. The 1952 version appears more formal; comparing the 
elements of nvc show that this impression is generated by a number of factors. Firstly, Tutin and 
Greenwood maintain upright postures throughout. Neither of them recline as O’Connor does, nor 
use the inclination of the torso that she does towards the end of the scene. Both actors in the 1952 
version have a high degree of vocal articulation; vowel and consonant sounds are clearly 
distinguished and not run in to one another. Vocal tempo is slower overall in the 1952 film, and 
the rhythm of speech from both actors includes more pauses than in the 2002 version. This sets 
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up the confrontation at the end of the scene to be more forceful, however, than in the 2002 
version. Both actors maintain an upright standing posture, sustain their visual focus on one 
another, and increase the volume and tempo of their speech. The contrast with the behavior in the 
earlier part of the scene is more marked than in the confrontation between O’Connor and 
Witherspoon. This means that there is greater variation in the dramatic tone of the piece, 
something that might suggest that Asquith’s version is closer to a stage tradition of presenting 
the play in England, while Parker’s version seeks to fit the play into the romantic comedy genre 
of contemporary film making. A full analysis of the differences between the two films is beyond 
the scope of this dissertation, but hopefully this approach demonstrates the validity and 
usefulness of using a vocabulary derived from social psychology to analyze performance. 
The identification of activities and categories in nvc can also be used to create a 
framework for the training of actors. The examination of behavioral communication in daily life 
shows us both the source material and the expressive territory of acted behavior. In training, 
however, it is possible for an actor to increase the range of their expressive behavior beyond that 
which they use in daily life. Different training methods have different attitudes towards this 
potential. In the Method approach, the insistence on ‘truthfulness’ and the use of biographical 
material as the source of that truth encourages the actor to stay within the range of 
expressiveness that they are comfortable with in daily life. At the other end of the spectrum, 
Jacques Lecoq’s work with actors draws on the experience of daily life, but seeks to radically 
increase the range of expressivity through physical training, and the embodiment of animals, 
qualities, and materials. This offers the actor a repertoire of physical expression to use in 
performance that is far beyond what is used in daily life. While the full range of this repertoire 
may not be explicitly called on in the style of psychological realism, it gives the actor increased 
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fluency and precision in nonverbal communication. Moreover, the plurality of styles that 
currently coexist in Western theatre means that actors need to be adaptable.  A focus on the 
structure of the body and its mechanisms identifies principles that underlie a variety of training 
methods and performance styles. When this is allied to the perspective of cognitive science on 
the way that the body shapes meaning, it is possible to identify foundational principles of activity 
that link Story, Space, and Time in performance.  
Lakoff and Johnson (L & J) point out that “Our abilities to move the way we do and to 
track the motion of other things give motion a major role in our conceptual system. The fact that 
we have muscles and use them to apply force in certain ways leads to the structure of our system 
of causal concepts. What is important is that the peculiar nature of our bodies shapes our very 
possibilities for conceptualization and categorization.” 29 This is because “(our) brains are 
structured so as to project activation patterns from sensorimotor areas to higher cortical areas.” 30 
A simple example of this can be seen “when we conceptualize understanding an idea (subjective 
experience) in terms of grasping an object (sensorimotor experience) and failing to understand an 
idea as having it go right by us or over our heads…A gesture tracing the path of something going 
past us or over our heads can indicate vividly a failure to understand.” 31
A corollary of this analysis is that metaphor is central to both perception and thought, 
rather than a post-perceptual activity that occurs only in poetry, which has tended to be the way it 
has been identified in the twentieth century. This has important implications for actors seeking to 
create vivid embodiments of thought, because it shows that many concepts are metaphorically 
based on a sensorimotor source domain, and therefore have latent movement inscribed in them. 
 
                                                 
29 Lakoff and Johnson, 19 
30 ibid. 77  
31 ibid. 78 
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This understanding of the way in which physical experience in the material world shapes 
conceptual thought gives an interesting valence to a statement made by Michael Chekhov long 
before cognitive science was established:  
[T]here are no purely physical exercises in our method…our primary aim is to 
 penetrate all the parts of the body with fine psychological vibrations. This 
 process makes the physical body more and more sensitive in its ability to receive 
 our inner impulses and to convey them expressively from the stage to the  
audience.32
Chekhov proposed that the actor should practice a range of gestures in order to increase 
sensitivity and expressivity:  
 
Train yourself to make certain gestures with the utmost expressiveness, as fully 
and completely as you can.  These gestures might express, for instance: drawing,  
pulling, pressing, lifting, throwing, crumpling, coaxing, separating, tearing,  
penetrating, touching, brushing away, opening, closing, breaking, taking, giving,  
supporting, holding back, scratching.  33
That this is more than a mere technical exercise is supported by L &J’s description of the way in 
which we create conceptual metaphors through a process of conflation:  
   
We acquire a large system of primary metaphors automatically and unconsciously 
simply by functioning in the most ordinary of ways in the everyday world from 
our earliest years. We have no choice in this. Because of the way neural 
connections are formed during the period of conflation, we all naturally think 
using hundreds of primary metaphors.” 34
                                                 
32 Chekhov 1991 43 
  
33 ibid 41 
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The authors go on to give examples of the way in which sensorimotor experience is 
mapped on to conceptual thought. Taking one of these examples that uses one of the words from 
Chekhov’s list enables us to see how the link between physical action and thought occurs. In this 
example, the primary metaphor is “Help is support,” and is derived from the Sensorimotor 
domain of physical support and the primary experience of “Observing that some entities and 
people require support in order to continue functioning.” 35 Through a process known as 
conflation, “permanent neural connections between the domains develop.” 36
While much of Chekhov’s work acknowledges the psychophysical features of expression, 
it lacks organizational principles that correlate with current knowledge. Rudolf Laban’s work, 
however, provides a useful framework for an initial approach to the demonstration and practice 
of physical actions as metaphorical expressions. Laban was a choreographer who developed a 
system of notation of human movement in the 1920’s. Combined with his book 
 This means that 
Chekhov’s exercise, through the use of physical activity, is stimulating a mental concept. 
Effort,
  
 this 
notation is now known as Labanotation and is widely used in choreography. Laban’s analysis of 
movement in space can be used to create a list of actions that have both experiential physical 
origins, and metaphorical applications. The following chart is derived from my practical 
experience as an actor in England in the 1980’s and 1990’s. 
                                                                                                                                                             
34 L & J 47 
35 ibid 52 
36 ibid 48 
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Table 3. Laban Efforts as behavioral actions 
WEIGHT SPACE TIME 
Heavy Direct Sudden 
Light Indirect 
 
Sustained 
Selecting one quality from each column gives you eight choices: 
 
Heavy-Direct-Sudden
 
 describes a PUNCH  
Heavy-Direct-Sustained
 
 describes a PUSH or PULL  
Heavy-Indirect-Sudden
 
 describes a SLASH  
Heavy-Indirect-Sustained
 
 describes WRINGING (wringing out a cloth)  
Light-Indirect 
 
–Sustained describes STROKING (like stroking an animal)  
Light-Indirect-Sudden
 
 describes FLITTING about.  
Light-Direct-Sudden
 
 describes a DAB or TAP  
Light-Direct-Sustained
 
 describes a GLIDE 
The heavy, direct, and sudden action that is described by “Punch” can become a verb of 
action that is metaphorically applied in the vocal delivery of a line. I have found this approach to 
be very useful in helping trainee actors to achieve behavioral differentiation of their actions, 
since psychophysical actions offer detail and variety. For example, if an actor has chosen “to 
seduce” as a conceptual action, this could incorporate the psychophysical actions of “stroking,” 
“dabbing,” and “flitting.” This approach also offers directors a clear and specific vocabulary to 
use in communicating with their actors. Another significant benefit is the added ease with which 
instructors, directors, and actors can identify levels of intensity. Because the metaphor of 
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“punch” has a physical origin, one can talk about the range of movement or the relative force of 
the metaphorical punch in the vocal delivery.  
Activities such as these enable the actor to link Space, Time and Story in precise ways, 
and offer the actor a model of the way in which impulse becomes action that is congruent with 
the current understanding of the embodied mind. This understanding enables direct actions to be 
applied to make instantaneous links between “internal” experiences of psychological and 
emotional states, and “external” expressions of those states through behavioral activity. The next 
chapter investigates this process in more detail. 
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3.0  WHAT IS THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THOUGHT, PHYSICAL ACTION, 
AND LANGUAGE? 
The previous chapter demonstrated how visible behavior communicates meaning. In this chapter 
I will investigate the psychophysical processes through which this behavior arises by looking at 
recent research on the relationship between written and spoken language. The difference between 
the two is at the heart of the challenge that actors face. Most performances (but certainly not all) 
start with a written text.  As described above, most of the dialogue in plays note what characters 
say, and leave it to the actor to create the “how” of its being said. This involves, of course, a 
psychophysical process that combines thought, imagination, and expression as the actor seeks to 
embody the fictional content of the script. While theatre practitioners are familiar with this meld, 
the traditional view within psychology (as noted above) has been that language and non-verbal 
communication (nvc) are two separate systems, devoted to different subject matters. David 
McNeill, a cognitive linguist, has been one of the pioneers of the move towards recognizing nvc 
as an equal partner of language as a conveyor of meaning. In Language and Gesture (2000) 
McNeill states that “Utterances possess two sides, only one of which is speech; the other is 
imagery, actional and visuo-spatial. To exclude the gesture side, as has been traditional, is 
tantamount to ignoring half of the message out of the brain.”37
                                                 
37 McNeill (2000), 
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This statement stems from earlier work, described in his 1992 book, Hand and Mind, that 
probes the difference between the ways our brains process written and spoken language. 
“[G]estures are an integral part of language as much as are words, phrases and sentences- gesture 
and language are one system.” 38 Moreover, an understanding of the distinction between the 
ways that language and gesture operate underscores the importance of physicality and image in 
the actor’s process: “If one knows how to read them, the gesture can convey meaning no less 
than language, but the method used by the gesture for doing this is fundamentally different from 
language.” 39 Although Mc Neill recognizes language and gesture as parts of the same system, he 
proposes a view of their functions that makes them complementary to one another, and identifies 
crucial differences between them: “Language has the effect of segmenting and linearizing 
meaning. What might be an instantaneous thought is divided up and strung out through 
time…the total effect is to present what had been a single instantaneous picture in the form of a 
string of segments.” 40 In written language, this effect is unmediated by any physical action, but 
when language is spoken, meaning can be complemented or modified by gesture:  “Gestures are 
different in every way. This is because they are themselves multidimensional and present 
meaning complexes without undergoing segmentation or linearization. Gestures are global and 
synthetic and never hierarchical.” 41
In McNeill’s analysis, the term “hierarchical” arises because speech relies on “bottom-
up” processing; the meanings of the words are combined to create the meaning of the sentence. 
In understanding a sentence we start with the lower level words (hence “bottom-up”), whereas in 
gestures, we start with the overall concept portrayed by the gesture. It is this concept which gives 
  
                                                 
38 McNeill (1992), 2 
39 ibid 19 
40 ibid. 19 
41 ibid. 19 
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rise to the meaning of the individual parts (hence “top-down”). Consequently, a gesture is a 
symbol –it is global in that the whole is not composed out of separately meaningful parts. Rather, 
the parts gain meaning because of the meaning of the whole. To illustrate this, McNeill provides 
the example of a person representing a running cartoon character by moving his hand through 
space whilst wiggling his fingers: “The gesture is a symbol in that it represents something other 
than itself—the hand is not a hand but a character, the movement is not a hand in motion but the 
character in motion, the space is not the physical space of the narrator but a narrative space, the 
wiggling fingers are not fingers but running feet. The gesture is thus a symbol, but the symbol is 
of a fundamentally different type from the symbols of speech.” 42
A further, and significant, difference between language and gesture is that gestures have 
no standards of form. These are the linguistic rules that utterances must follow, or be rejected as 
ungrammatical. Gestures have no such rules and therefore reflect the idiosyncrasies of the 
speaker: “Precisely because gestures are not obliged to meet standards of form, they are free to 
present just those aspects of meaning that are relevant and salient to the speaker and leave out 
those aspects that language may require but are not relevant to the situation.” 
  
43
These findings have important implications for actors and trainers of actors. They 
identify one of the crucial components involved in transferring written scripts into embodied 
behavior. Bad acting, I suspect, often arises because the actor hasn’t made the mental leap from 
the linear nature of written language into the gestural imagery of spoken language. Given that 
about 90% of spoken utterances in daily life are accompanied by gesture, acting that does not 
incorporate gesture will appear stiff and unexpressive. (I should point out here, that I consider 
vocalics to be gestural). In theatre, we often refer to this as a lack of “investment”, meaning that 
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the actor doesn’t seem to be fully engaged in the character’s thought processes. Common 
responses from instructors and directors include exhortations to “feel it more”, or to transpose 
biographical experience to the fictional circumstances, or to discover analogous situations that 
might prompt imaginative identification. Following these suggestions might result in the 
imaginative connection necessary to make the dialogue more expressive, but none of them 
acknowledge the psychophysical process that underlies the phenomenon. The exercises of 
Jacques Lecoq that I describe later in this chapter prepare the actor to respond gesturally to 
written language by developing a heightened awareness of the relationship between thought, 
gesture and language. Before looking at his work in detail, there are several more relevant 
cognitive principles to consider.  
McNeill develops his analysis of the relationship between gesture and speech in Gesture 
and Thought (2005), arguing for a new conception of language, viewing it as an imagery-
language dialectic, in which gestures provide imagery. Expanding on an approach introduced by 
Lev Vygotsky in the 1930s, McNeill posits that gestures are key ingredients in an “imagery-
language dialectic” that fuels both speech and thought.  Gesture is an integral component of 
language in this conception, not merely an accompaniment to, or ornament of, speech but 
synchronous and co-expressive with it. While McNeill’s earlier work demonstrated what 
gestures reveal about thought, here, gestures are shown to be active participants in both speaking 
and thinking. Gesturing is actually a dialectical component of language, and both participate in 
formulating meaning, with their opposition creating instability that gets resolved in expression. 
The instability of the confrontation of opposites (imagery and language) in the process of 
thinking for speaking seeks resolution in utterance that can be expressed either as gesture or 
speech, or both.  This analysis is developed from close observation of the synchrony of speech 
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forms and gestures that suggests that they are co-expressive of the same underlying thought unit. 
The smallest element of this dialectic is the Growth Point (GP), a snapshot of an utterance at its 
beginning psychological stage.  
This analysis has exciting implications for actors, since it includes immensely valuable 
information about the relationship of thought to expression – the core of meaning in a 
performance. While the analysis uses observed speech and gesture to identify units of thought 
and their expression, its findings can be reverse-engineered to apply to the reading of a script in 
preparation for performance. While actors who are familiar with a Stanislavskian form of script 
analysis think of objectives and tactics, McNeill’s empirically derived theory offers a reliable 
way of analyzing dialogue that depends on the identification of units of thought, the 
differentiation between contextual information and new ideas, and the points in a phrase or 
sentence where a gesture is originated. This happens when new information is added to 
established context, which gives the actor a useful tool in textual analysis, and facilitates the 
subsequent transformation of written language into embodied speech.  
A key feature of McNeill’s theory is the differentiation of “background” and “focus” – 
visual metaphors that distinguish contextual information from information that is “newsworthy”. 
McNeill describes a process whereby we construct meaning as we speak:  
The speaker shapes the background in a certain way, in order to make possible the 
intended significant contrast within it. Background and contrast are both 
necessary and are constructed together. A new “meanin”' is a fresh differentiation 
from a constructed background - meaning has this dual character of being both a 
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focal point and an implied background, and both are necessary… 44
The Growth Point (GP) can be thought of “as an image that is being categorized linguistically -
an image with a foot in the door of language, as it were. The combination is called a growth 
point since it is meant to be the initial form of a thinking-for-speaking unit out of which a 
dynamic process of organization emerges.” 
  
45 A further feature of the GP is that it “addresses the 
concept that there is a specific starting point for a thought. Although an idea unit continues out of 
the preceding context and has ramifications in later speech, it does not exist at all times, and 
comes into being at some specific moment; the formation of a growth point is this moment, 
theoretically, and it is made visible in the onset of the gesture…”. 46
 The suggestion is that in everyday speech, when speakers are mentally focused on the 
content of their communication, a new idea is marked by the preparation phase of a gesture. 
Consequently, when an actor identifies a new idea in a passage of dialogue, he or she knows that 
this an appropriate moment for a gesture, and in choosing to use one, helps to clarify meaning for 
an audience.  In this model, meaning progresses in a stream of contrasts between context and 
GPs –information communicated by a GP forms context for the next new idea. 
 
Another significant feature of McNeill’s model is the concept of the catchment. This is “a 
kind of thread of consistent dynamic visuospatial imagery running through the discourse segment 
that provides a gesture-based window into discourse cohesion.” 47
                                                 
44 
 It is recognized when two or 
more gestures in a sequence of discourse display recurring features, such as shape, movement, 
http://mcneilllab.uchicago.edu/topics/growth_points.html accessed 5/29/09 
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space, orientation, dynamics and so on. These indicate how an individual groups meanings, or 
separates them. Again, an understanding of this naturally occurring phenomenon gives the actor 
a useful tool in consciously choosing gestures that help audience members understand the 
implicit meaning of a piece of dialogue by showing them the linkages between different ideas. 
The concept of the catchment also helps us to identify lack of differentiation in a performance; if 
we see repetitive gestures when the content varies in ideas, it suggests that the actor has not 
successfully established this variety at an ideational level. 
McNeill’s theory fits in to a widely used categorization in social psychology of types of 
gestures. British psychologist Geoffrey Beattie explains these in Visible Thought –The New 
Psychology of Body Language
Spontaneously occurring gestures that accompany speech can be divided into two main 
categories; Iconic and Metaphoric. The Iconic gesture is one “whose particular form displays a 
close relationship to the meaning of the accompanying speech.” 
. Beattie takes care to distinguish between gestures and 
“emblems”, which are physical signs that are consciously sent and consciously received. Easily 
reproducible, these are signs such as the “thumbs up” that have become codified in the cultures 
in which they are used. In contrast, the vast majority of gestures are unconsciously generated, 
produced alongside words (rather than substituting for them), and almost impossible to inhibit. 
This last feature probably explains the fact that most people, when confronted with a discrepancy 
in meaning between verbal and nonverbal communication, will trust the nonverbal.  
48 These are generally pictorial 
representations that show the speaker’s mental image and point of view. Beattie cites an example 
from McNeill’s Hand and Mind
                                                 
48 Beattie, 65 
 where a speaker describes a cartoon figure bending back a tree, 
saying “he bent it way back” and accompanying this by the physical action of grasping and 
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pulling back. Sometimes Iconic gestures add information to what is said. In the example quoted 
above, the gesture shows that the tree was attached to the ground –information not explicitly 
mentioned in the verbal portion of the utterance. An important feature of the gesture analysis 
described by Beattie is that of timing. Gestures generally have three phases; the preparation, 
where the arms move from their resting position, the “stroke” where the main action occurs, and 
the retraction, where the arms return to their resting position.  In spontaneous gestures, the 
preparatory phase normally precedes the noun or verb most closely associated with the gesture, 
so that this can be synchronous with the stroke. Contrived gesturing often looks “wrong” because 
the timing is off. 
The second category of spontaneously occurring gesture is called “Metaphoric”. These 
are essentially pictorial, but the content is an abstract idea rather than a concrete object or event. 
“The gesture presents an image of the invisible – an image of an abstraction.” 49 Metaphoric 
gestures frequently represent abstract concepts that have been metaphorically formed from 
sensorimotor experience. Lakoff and Johnson (L & J) present an accessible and cogent overview 
of this process in Philosophy in the Flesh
Metaphor allows conventional mental imagery from sensorimotor domains to be 
: 
used for domains of subjective experience. For example, we may form an image 
of something going by us or over our heads (sensorimotor experience) when we 
fail to understand (subjective experience). A gesture tracing the path of something 
going past us or over our heads can indicate vividly a failure to understand.” 50
L & J contest the traditional theory of metaphor that includes the precepts that it is purely 
linguistic, and that “metaphorical language is not part of ordinary conventional language.” 
  
51
                                                 
49 McNeill 1992, 14 
 
50 L & J 2000, 45 
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Indeed, they state that “[c]onceptual metaphor is pervasive in both thought and language. It is 
hard to think of a common subjective experience that is not conventionally conceptualized in 
terms of metaphor.” 52 This is because “[o]ur abilities to move in the ways we do and to track the 
motion of other things give motion a major role in our conceptual system. The fact that we have 
muscles and use them to apply force in certain ways leads to the structure of our system of causal 
concepts.” 53An example of this process can be found in our understanding of time. “There is an 
area in the visual system of our brains dedicated to the detection of motion. There is no such area 
for the detection of global time.” 54 Motion is directly perceived and is thus available as a source 
for our metaphor systems to give shape to the abstract concept of time. The neural activity that 
makes this connection becomes more established with repetition until a permanent connection is 
forged in the brain in a way that makes metaphor part of our perceptual apparatus rather than a 
post-perceptual activity of disembodied reason. Thus, in English, the most basic metaphor for 
time involves “an observer at the present who is facing toward the future, with the past behind 
the observer.” 55 We conceive of the future as being ahead of us, the past behind. As F & T point 
out: “Metaphoric thinking, regarded in the commonsense view as a special instrument of art and 
rhetoric, operates at every level of cognition and shows uniform structural and dynamic 
principles, regardless of whether it is spectacular and noticeable or conventional and 
unremarkable.” 56
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While Jacques Lecoq’s work largely predates the findings described above, and was 
developed independently of this scientific research, much of it displays remarkable synchrony 
with the mechanisms that L& J and McNeill identify, suggesting that Lecoq’s analysis of human 
behavior was both insightful and thorough. Lecoq’s founding principle was  “Tout Bouge” – 
everything moves. His fascination with, and analysis of, movement led him to develop a highly 
sophisticated repertoire of physical exercises. Given the foundational nature of sensorimotor 
experience in shaping abstract thought outlined by L & J, it is evident that such a repertoire is 
more than a simply physical experience for the actor, and provides a rich resource for the 
embodiment of thought in language. Indeed, in some of his statements, Lecoq almost duplicates 
the statements of principle that L & J lay out:  
 … the laws of movement govern all theatrical situations. A piece of writing is a 
structure in motion. Though themes may vary (they belong to the realm of ideas), 
the structures of acting remain linked to movement and its immutable laws …  
Outer movements resemble inner movements, they speak the same language. My 
main fascination is with the poetics of these permanencies, which give birth to 
writing.” 57
This focus on movement and its laws as the structure of acting bears an astonishing conceptual 
resemblance to L & J’s identification of sensorimotor experience as the source domain for 
conceptual metaphor.  
 
Lecoq’s statement also links strongly to L & J’s work on neural modeling and the 
embodiment of mind. L & J make a strong argument that “the same neural mechanisms used in 
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perception and movement are also used in abstract reasoning.” 58
1. Spatial relations concepts, for example those named by English words like in, 
on, over, through, and under.  
 They focus on models for three 
kinds of concepts: 
2. Concepts of bodily movement, represented by verbs like grasp, pull, lift, tap, 
and punch. 
3. Concepts indicating the structure of actions or events…like starting, stopping, 
resuming, continuing, finishing, including those indicated grammatically as in 
process  (in English, is/are plus the verb stem plus –ing: is running) or completed 
(has/have plus the verb stem plus-ed: has lifted). 59
L & J make clear the relationship that they see between bodily experience and conceptual 
thought: “In such models, there is no absolute perceptual/conceptual distinction, that is, the 
conceptual system makes use of important parts of sensorimotor system that impose crucial 
conceptual structure.” 
 
60 This statement lends credence to Lecoq’s observation that “Outer 
movements resemble inner movements, they speak the same language.” Indeed, a significant 
thread of Lecoq’s philosophy of training for the theatre, expressed in The Moving Body
                                                 
58 L & J 38 
, 
repeatedly links a progression of training to the development of the human in learning about the 
world. As babies our experiences of the physical world are images, touch, movement, before 
they are language. In writing about his method of improvisation, Lecoq says ” The aim of these 
initial exercises, taken as a whole, is to delay the use of the spoken word.  The imposition of 
silent performance leads the students to discover this basic law of theatre: words are born from 
59 L & J 38 
60 ibid 39 
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silence. At the same time they discover that movement, too, can only come out of immobility.” 61
The dynamics underlying my teaching are those of the relationship between 
 
Thus the progress of an actor through Lecoq’s training method replicates the processes described 
by L & J whereby our physical experience of the world shapes the structure of thought:  
  rhythm, space and force. The laws of movement have to be understood on the 
basis of the human body in motion: balance, disequilibrium, opposition, 
alternation, compensation, action, reaction. These laws may all be discovered in 
the body of a spectator as well as in that of the actor.” 62
Lecoq’s biography reveals a lifelong fascination with movement and the body, and places 
him in a tradition of movement oriented work that leads from Copeau through Dasté to his 
school, and has been expressed in the work of artists such as Dario Fo, Ariane Mnouchkine, 
Simon McBurney and Julie Taymor, and companies such as Footsbarn, Mummenschanz, 
Complicité, Commotion, Peepolykus, Theatre O, and Theatre de la Jeune Lune among many 
others. Born in Paris in 1921, Lecoq taught physical education and sport from 1941 to 1945. This 
brought him into contact with Jean-Marie Conty, a master of physical education and friend of 
Antonin Artaud and Jean-Louis Barrault. This led to an increasing interest in theatre, and the 
formation of a theatre group in 1945 that staged large-scale festive events celebrating, for 
example, the homecoming of prisoners of war. Jean Dasté happened to see one of these events 
and invited Lecoq to join his theatre company, known as the "Comédiens de Grenoble", where he 
was put in charge of physical training. Here he was introduced to Japanese Noh theatre, and 
discovered masks, in particular Dasté’s ‘noble’ mask, which was the forerunner of the neutral 
mask. The ideas of Copeau, who had been Dasté’s teacher, became a reference point for Lecoq’s 
 
                                                 
61 Lecoq 35 
62 Lecoq 21 
 65 
exploration, in particular the “ambition to take theatre that spoke simply and directly to 
unsophisticated audiences.” 63 In 1948 Lecoq moved to Italy, originally for three months, but 
stayed for eight years. During this period, he directed at the university theatre in Padua, and 
researched Commedia dell'Arte with the sculptor Amleto Sartori, rediscovering the technique of 
making leather masks, and developing the neutral mask. He then set up the drama school at the 
Piccolo Teatro in Milan with Giorgio Strehler and Paolo Grassi, and worked as a director and 
choreographer with actors such as Dario Fo and Anna Magnani. In 1956 he came back to Paris 
armed with discoveries about Commedia dell’arte, Ancient Greek tragedy and the movement of 
the chorus, and a set of commedia masks given to him by Sartori. In 1956 he opened his School 
of Mime and Theatre and later set up his own theatre company, worked at the National Popular 
Theatre with Jean Vilar, and then on television, writing and directing a series of twenty-six silent 
comic films entitled La Belle Equipe (The Great Team). Before long the school had expanded 
and Lecoq decided to devote all his efforts to teaching: “I have always loved teaching, seeing it 
as a path to my own greater knowledge and understanding of movement. Through teaching I 
have discovered that the body knows things about which the mind is ignorant. This research into 
body and movement has been my passion and I still long to share it with others.” 64
Lecoq taught at his school until a few days before his death in 1999. Ten years on, the 
school continues to flourish under the direction of Lecoq’s wife, Fay, with classes led by former 
students. The nature of the teaching evolved during Lecoq’s lifetime, as he added significant 
features such as the study of clown in 1962, and the Laboratoire d'étude du mouvement  
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(Movement research laboratory) in 1977.65
1 Melodrama (grand emotions) 
 At the time of his death, the structure of the course 
involved a first year with open admission, followed by a second year by invitation only, for 
approximately a third of the first year students. Lecoq describes the training as taking place along 
two parallel paths, the study of improvisation and its rules, and the investigation of movement 
technique and its analysis. Concurrently with their classes, students engage in “autocours” – self-
directed group work that generates small productions that are shown to the teachers and other 
students. The first year involves work with the neutral mask, expressive and character masks, 
movement training and analysis, and creative exploration that links theatre with painting, poetry 
and music. Students that graduate to the second year work on five dramatic styles, which Lecoq 
calls “territories”, following the metaphor of  “The Journey” that he uses to describe a student’s 
progress through the school. Lecoq describes the styles as follows: 
2 Commedia dell’arte (human comedy) 
3 Bouffons (from grotesque to mystery) 
4 Tragedy (chorus and hero) 
5 Clowns (burlesque and absurd) 66
I will examine some of his exercises in detail, linking them to the cognitive processes 
outlined above, and showing how their physical nature parallels cognitive processes. In 
particular, I will focus on three areas of his work. Firstly, I will look at exercises in heightening 
awareness of fundamental sensorimotor experiences such as push/pull. These links to what L & J 
call primary metaphors – projections of activation patterns from sensorimotor areas of the brain 
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to higher cortical areas. Secondly I will look at Lecoq’s work with the neutral mask, where actors 
develop their range of sensorimotor experience by embodying rhythms such as those of fire and 
water, different animals, and man-made substances. This work leads to the third area, that of 
exercises in embodying poetic metaphors, which reverses the direction of the process, starting 
with a received linguistic stimulus, and translating it into sensorimotor experience. This again 
links very closely to the cognitive processes relating written language to speech outlined by L & 
J and McNeill. 
Early work in a student’s progression through Lecoq’s school involves silent 
improvisation, and investigation and analysis of movement. To describe the bare bones of the 
activities cannot hope to replicate the somatic experience, but will at least give the reader a 
flavor of Lecoq’s approach. The following is a description of an exercise that uses the actions of 
“push” and “pull” as a foundation to approach different dramatic territories. The information is 
drawn from my own experiences of learning and teaching, and the description noted down by 
Simon Murray, a former pupil of Lecoq’s, in his book in the Routledge Performance 
Practitioners series titled simply Lecoq
The first step in the work demonstrates an attention to semantic detail. The dynamics of 
pushing and pulling are broken down into three pairings, or six distinct units; I push…I pull; I 
am pushed…I am pulled; I push myself…I pull myself. It should be borne in mind that the verbs 
. The text can be considered a reliable source for an 
understanding of Lecoq’s approach: Murray prepared the written description with Thomas 
Prattki, who became the pedagogical director of the school after Lecoq’s death. The sequence as 
described would not take place in one session, but indicates how primary physical experience is 
first investigated to identify components of meaning, then consciously controlled to lead to 
dramatic expression. 
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push and pull fall into L & J’s second category of neural modeling,  “concepts of bodily 
movement”, and that the same neural mechanisms used in perception and movement are also 
used in abstract reasoning, meaning that the exercises help students to make links between 
movement and thought and feeling.   
An instructor invites the students to walk across the space individually, naturally, with no 
acting. The others in the class observe the movement of the walkers, and are asked to reflect on 
questions such as these: 
Do they push the space, are they pushed by it? 
Do they have to push themselves through the space, or are they pulled by something? 
Do they push the space with the upper body, while some force appears to pull the pelvis 
back? 
What images are generated by the different ways of walking? (Someone who pushes the 
space may appear powerful, someone who is pushed, reluctant, someone who is pulled, 
naïve) 
Do diverse ways of walking suggest different emotional states? 
Is it possible to correlate different permutations of pushing and pulling with different 
emotions? 67
 
 
This exercise alerts students to a number of factors –firstly that posture and movement by 
themselves can suggest meaning, secondly, that their own personal walks have habitual patterns, 
and thirdly that push and pull actions can help to find physical characterizations in different 
styles. All of this rests on the fundamental recognition that movement communicates meaning, 
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and begins the process of increasing students’ sensitivity to this fact. By placing conscious 
attention on movement that has become unconscious through habituation, the exercise stimulates 
the neural connections between this movement and its conceptual expression. Having heightened 
students’ awareness through observation, the components of the exercise can then be used to 
make conscious choices of physicality. Students can be invited to experiment with, for example, 
pushing the space with their chest, or pulling the space with one shoulder. One development that 
I have used is to invite two students to work in the space simultaneously, moving in relationship 
to one another while focusing on “push” and “pull” with different parts of the body. In over 
twenty years of teaching this exercise, I have found that students repeatedly report a changed 
sense of self when working in this way. Comments on pushing with the chest report a sense of 
aggression, or confidence, or cockiness, for example. Evidently, different students will have 
different experiences depending on their personalities and their habitual postures. What is 
significant is that there is a changed sense of self through consciously chosen muscular activity (I 
will look at the physiological processes involved in a later chapter), and for players and 
observers alike, a recognition that the dynamics of silent spatial interaction suggest narrative. 
In Lecoq’s approach, the work on push and pull and other primary physical activities 
serves as a foundation for exploration in other dramatic “territories”, and as an approach to text. 
As Murray points out: 
When students work with text it is important to register the relationship between words 
and actions, or physical behaviour. Is the body expressing the same emotion as the words, 
or do they counterpoint each other? In Commedia there is sometimes a complete 
congruence between a character’s body and verbal language. However, in many of the 
other dramatic territories there is often a strong contradiction between body and 
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language. A character might push with words, but the body is pulled back. A character 
may state he is not scared, while his body expresses the opposite. 68
In the vocabulary of psychological realism, this understanding would refer to the communication 
of “subtext”, something that is better defined as non-verbal meaning, as detailed in the previous 
chapter. Lecoq’s approach offers the student a way of defining, naming, and working on the 
components of physical expression that make up nvc. For analysts of written drama and 
observers of performance, the concept of congruity and contradiction in nvc and speech also 
offers an empirical basis for considerations of character and style. Where there is consistent 
congruence between verbal and nonverbal features of communication, we would understand the 
character to be “simple” (all thoughts and feelings declared, as in farce, for example), whereas 
frequent contradictions in this area would suggest complexity (conflicts between declared 
information and thought and feeling, as in psychological realism). This can also be one of the 
components that identify different genres of drama and their attendant styles of performance. The 
example of Commedia that Murray mentions could be logically extended to farce and sitcom, for 
instance. In a comedy of manners, however, such as 
 
The Importance of Being Earnest
Murray describes how the preparatory work on “push” and “pull” extends through several 
phases of development at Lecoq’s school. He describes an exercise that is used in the 
development of Melodrama, where the psychophysical implications of “push” and “pull” are 
heightened by the increase of force necessary to accomplish the actions. In the first phase of the 
exercise, students work in pairs, one behind the other, with the person behind holding the pelvis 
, much of 
the humor arises from the contradiction of verbal and nonverbal content, as indicated in the 
analysis in the preceding chapter. 
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of the one in front, who leans forward against the pull. This leads to an experience of “dynamic 
balance”  - a physical expression of stasis that is nevertheless charged with energy. Once again, 
Lecoq’s awareness of the metaphorical connection between physical activity and thought is 
apparent in linking the physical experience of balance with a dramatic status quo. The next 
development of the exercise is for both the students to exert more force –the one in front to push 
the pelvis forward in order to walk, the one behind to pull the other back to prevent the walk. 
This generally results in an off-balance situation as one or the other succeeds. The heightened 
physical experience of the breaking of the balance gives both participants a strong sensation of 
the dramatic impact of a disruption of balance. This experience embodies the process described 
by McNeill in his definition of the mental development of a GP, where the state of balance 
would be the background, and the breaking away the focus, or “newsworthy” event. Once again 
Lecoq’s focus on the semantic detail of physical activity parallels cognitive dynamics. 
Lecoq then draws upon this heightened psychophysical experience in a silent 
improvisation entitled “The Departure”, in which a member of a family leaves home.  The 
metaphorical values of push and pull are employed in the spatially and physically expressed 
dynamics   among the family members, some of whom may want to “push” the departing 
member out, others of whom may want to “pull” her back. The balance of a status quo and the 
imbalance that results from a departure are now expressed in dramatic narrative.  
While the exercises described above are conducted without masks, they encourage an 
awareness of physical expression that is deepened by the work with the neutral mask. This is a 
full-face mask with symmetrical features, devoid of expression, that serves several functions. 
Lecoq talks about the way that it produces a state of calm in the wearer, and consequently, 
receptiveness to the environment. While this may sound somewhat mystical, the physiological 
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process by which this can happen is suggested by Paul Ekman’s work on facial expression and 
emotion, which will be described more extensively in chapters four and five. 
The effect of the neutral mask is startling. From my own experience of training in it and 
teaching others, I see the mask demonstrate in a profound way the immense potential of the body 
for expression. It immediately uncovers the degree of engagement that the wearer has with his or 
her environment, both literal and imagined. It also has the effect of essentializing the dramatic 
quality of themes that arise in improvisation, creating a sense of archetypal drama.  In part this 
arises because the thoughts that we are accustomed to expressing through speech and facial 
expression have to be communicated in physical action. From the perspective of observers, the 
actor wearing the neutral mask is somehow exposed –the corporeality of expression being 
difficult to fake.  
An example of how the essentializing quality arises can be seen in an exercise in which 
students are invited to imagine a situation where they are arriving at a dock to wave goodbye to a 
loved one who is departing on a boat. The improvisation is conducted in small groups of students 
each wearing a neutral mask, and beyond the information that I’ve just described, there is no 
specification of given circumstances. The students are thus free to create their own individual 
imaginative connection with the situation. The primary focus of each individual is on the 
imagined loved one, rather than on creating interaction with other members of the group. As the 
exercise is performed, observers notice the ways in which various aspects of the participants’ 
behavior communicate meaning; the individual who arrives after the other members of the group, 
and who doesn’t wave, turning abruptly to leave; the person who continues to wave after the rest 
of the group have departed, and so on. Activities such as these suggest emotional identification 
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with a theme of personal loss without describing an explicitly detailed set of fictional 
circumstances. It is this feature that Lecoq calls “essential”. 
In daily life we are accustomed to watching faces as the primary communicators of 
meaning and emotion. When the face of an actor is covered by the neutral mask, the 
communicative aspects of other parts of the body shine out; posture, gesture, tempo and rhythm 
of movement. In the primary phase of the work, this transparency allows the instructor to 
identify postural and gestural habits that might need correcting, habits that limit the range of 
expression. One actor might, for example, have a tendency to tilt the head to one side, which 
tends to communicate appraisal or consideration to observers. As an unconscious habit, this 
would lead to inappropriate choices in performance. Clearly, habits cannot be changed overnight, 
but the use of the Neutral mask assists actors in making the essential first step, which is to notice 
and identify the habit. Other actors in a workshop format, observing, realize the potential for 
communication that is inherent in corporeality, and hone their skills in “decoding” nvc signals. 
This in turn enhances their own abilities in “encoding” such signals.  
The work on neutrality is intended to enable the actor to discover a physical starting 
point, “a blank page on which drama can be inscribed.” 69
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 It provides “reference points” – until 
one discovers neutral tempo in oneself, then it is difficult to gauge fast or slow. If one cannot 
discover neutral posture, it is difficult to use the full expressive range of expansion and 
contraction, symmetry and asymmetry in postural attitudes. This focus on physical expression 
develops an ability in the actor to be specific and expressive in their nonverbal communication, 
no matter what style of performance they perform. 
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Beyond the diagnostic and corrective features of work with the Neutral mask lies the 
work of discovering the body’s response to different environments, and then embodying the 
rhythms of natural elements, objects and animals. Lecoq uses an improvisation entitled the 
Fundamental Journey, in which the masked actor moves through imagined natural environments. 
The focus is on the embodied experience, but introduces students to what Lecoq calls the “poetic 
aspects of the theme: … The crossing of the river can be compared to passing through 
adolescence to adult life, with all the movements finding their reflection in emotional feelings: 
the currents, the whirlpools, the waves rising and falling, washing back and forth from one bank 
to the other.” 70
This process engages the actor in what Lecoq calls “identifications” - identifying and 
moving in the rhythms of natural elements and different materials. In the work with elements, the 
students seek to embody the different rhythms of fire, air, water and earth. Working with water, 
for example, entails discovering the difference in rhythm between a bubbling spring, and the 
steady flow of a mature river, or the difference between waves gently lapping at a beach, and the 
sea in a violent storm. Materials might include oil, rubber, cellophane wrapping –each have a 
distinctive pattern of movement that can be embodied. Lecoq uses a developmental approach 
where the technical work of controlling the body so that it mimics different rhythms is 
subsequently transposed into expressive drama. These activities extend the range of the actor by 
  This again recalls the metaphorical links between movement and thought that L 
& J describe.  In this phase of the work, the actor thinks of her self being acted on by different 
rhythms of nature. The next phase is to embody those rhythms, starting by physically identifying 
with the rhythms of the elements, and discovering the different senses of the self that they 
provoke. 
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establishing neuronal patterning that is beyond the normal everyday range of behavior. This 
approach can be contrasted with Method acting where “Truth” resides in the biographical 
experience of the actor, which is brought to the fictional character as the vehicle for its 
expression. In this style of acting, the neuronal patterns are those belonging to the biographical 
experience. This approach devalues, if not negates, the function of imagination in creating a role, 
whereas Lecoq’s work stimulates the imagination through extending the actor’s collection of 
sensorimotor experiences that can become source domains for conceptual thought. For example, 
Lecoq describes elastic materials as “nostalgic to return to their original shape, even though they 
may not succeed”. 71 A detailed physical embodiment of such a process can give the actor the 
muscular memory source material for varied characterizations: “After having experienced, by 
means of these identifications, the greatest possible number of natural or animal dynamics, the 
actor (or author) is in a position to use these experiences, sometimes unconsciously, to feed the 
characters which he must act  (or write) and to bring out some of their fundamental 
characteristics.” 72
The use of the neutral mask heightens the actor’s awareness of, and ability to draw on, 
the sensorimotor source domains of abstract thought, something that Lecoq makes explicit: “ The 
main results of this identification work are the traces that remain inscribed in each actor, circuits 
laid down in the body, through which dramatic emotions also circulate, finding their pathway to 
expression.” 
  In the example of “elastic materials” mentioned above, the somatic 
experience links with themes of striving, nostalgia, and failure.  
73
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 Through consciously chosen muscular activity, repeated over time, actors 
develop ‘muscle memory’ of a variety of different rhythms of movement that are linked to 
72 ibid 45 
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concepts and emotions. Lecoq suggests that these are then available to the actor when she 
subsequently works on a text: “These experiences…remain forever engraved in the body of the 
actor. They are reactivated in him at the moment of interpretation. It may be many years later, 
when an actor finds himself with a text to interpret. The text will set up resonances in his body, 
meeting rich deposits awaiting expressive formulation.” 74
At this point, it is useful to recall L & J’s statement that approximately 95% of the brain’s 
activity is unavailable to conscious reflection, and McNeill’s observation that the processes 
involved in generating gestures are largely unconscious.  Lecoq’s method offers a way of 
accessing and training some of those unconscious processes, bringing them to the level of 
awareness, and creating a reservoir of somatic experiences for the actor.  
 
Having developed a foundational awareness through investigating the movement of the 
body, Lecoq’s training process progresses to encounters with text:  
Words are approached through verbs, bearers of action, and through nouns, which 
represent a designated object. We consider words living organisms and thus we 
search for the body of words. For this purpose we have to choose words which 
provide a real physical dynamic. Verbs lend themselves more readily to this: to 
take, to raise, to break, to saw, each contains an action which nourishes the verb 
itself. 75
Again, the approach demonstrates a remarkable congruity with the principles identified by L & J 
of metaphoric transference from sensorimotor experiences to conceptual thought. Also, by 
focusing first on singular units of linguistic meaning, Lecoq’s process is sympathetic to the way 
in which the brain makes meaning of written language. As McNeill points out, written language 
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is processed in a “bottom up” fashion, with meaning constructed from the constituent parts. 
These synchronies between Lecoq’s exercises and empirically identified processes of cognition 
mean that students are sensitized to the micro processes of communication in ways that make 
them more likely to become aware of the GP phenomenon. The consciousness of the relationship 
of movement to speech develops a greater facility and variety of nonverbal expression, as well as 
offering a foundation for performance that can move beyond realism. 
The next step in Lecoq’s progression is through poetry. He reads the students poems and 
invites them to work in groups of three or four. Lecoq chooses poems that address natural 
elements, and invites the students to improvise physically to discover a group movement in 
response to the poem. The poems are richer in imagery than everyday language, making the 
transition from image-based gesture to segmented language an easier one. Lecoq uses a 
sophisticated array of pedagogic methods, and takes account of shifts in direction –from the body 
in response to environmental stimuli to the body expressing internal stimuli. Music is also used 
as a stimulus for movement before the students approach dramatic texts. Lecoq uses a neologism 
– “mimodynamic” - to describe a way of working that includes both imitation (mimesis) and also 
“physical movements which translate into bodily action the sensations aroused….by colours, 
words, music.” 76
The approach to dramatic text encourages this translation of response into physicality: “In 
our way of working we enter a text through the body. We never sit around and discuss, but adopt 
the ‘mimodynamic’ method. In the same way as we did for music and poetry, we explore the 
different texts: working through movement, we ask the actors to get to grips physically with the 
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text, its images, its words, its dynamics.” 77
While Jacques Lecoq’s work predates the findings of cognitive science that Kendon, 
McNeill, and Lakoff and Johnson mention, it displays synchrony with the principle that 
physicality is often an equal component of meaning with language. Through an approach that 
always begins with physical activity, Lecoq’s exercises offer a training that perfects an actor’s 
ability to create both iconic and metaphorical gesture, and an awareness of the link between 
movement and conceptual thought. It also develops sufficient voluntary control of expression to 
effectively mimic involuntary expression. 
 While it may appear that this approach lacks 
psychological subtlety, the physical groundwork that has been laid down by the time the students 
approach text leads to a refined and nuanced expressiveness. This means that they are highly 
responsive to, and expressive of, the impulses that lead to “utterances” in McNeill’s analysis of 
thinking for speaking.  
For some in mainstream theatre, there is an assumption that Lecoq’s work, because it is 
physically based, leads graduates of his school to do  “physical theatre”, and dictates a style of 
performance. Simon McBurney of Complicite has countered this view by stating that “all theatre 
is physical”, 78
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 meaning that no matter what style of performance an actor is engaged in, 
meaning is communicated through the body. Lecoq himself was fond of saying that he trains the 
actor for a theatre that hasn’t been invented yet, and was insistent that his graduates discover 
their own style.  It is true that he has influenced companies who are radically experimental in 
their style, such as Complicite and Theatre de Soleil, but he has also trained actors such as 
Geoffrey Rush, who is well known for naturalistic film performances. It seems that Lecoq 
prepares the actor for a variety of styles by focusing on fundamental cognitive and expressive 
78 Conversation with the author, February 18, 1991, London. 
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activities. Ariane Mnouchkine, speaking in a video documentary about Lecoq, said “His down to 
earth style … showed me a certain truth which is not to imagine that everything takes place in 
the head … the theatre is flesh. It’s from the verb made flesh and Lecoq transmits that.” 79
There is however, a marked difference in philosophy between Lecoq and proponents of a 
style of psychological realism that depends on autobiographical experience as source material: 
  
In my method of teaching, I have always given priority to the external world over inner 
experience … It is more important to observe how beings and objects move, and how 
they find a reflection in us … People discover themselves in relation to their grasp of the 
external world, and if the student has special qualities, these will show up in the 
reflection. I do not search for deep sources of creativity in psychological memories… I 
prefer to see more distance between the actor’s own ego and the character performed … 
Neither belief nor identification is enough –one must be able genuinely to play.” 80
Lecoq’s statement again displays coherence with the basic principle expressed by L & J   that our 
experience of movement in the physical world shapes our conceptual thought. It also raises 
questions about the degree of identification between actor and character. This is also a topic that 
can be investigated using the findings of cognitive science, and is the subject of the next chapter. 
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4.0  HOW DOES THE ACTOR CREATE A CHARACTER?  
The process of creating a character, obviously, is at the heart of acting and theatre, and is at once 
both obvious and mysterious. Obvious, because the character is who we see and hear on stage, 
mysterious, because we generally cannot see or hear the relationship between actor and 
character. Indeed, in most styles of theatre, an audience considers the apparent melding of actor 
and character as evidence of “good” acting. The process by which the actor melds self and 
character is one that is frequently described by contemporary actors as occurring through two 
possible pathways –“internal” or “external”; “inside out” or “outside in”. Although there are 
many variants of what precisely is meant by this, in broad terms these reflect ideas of 
“psychological” or “physical” starting points, and sometimes “sameness” (of self and character), 
or “difference” (between self and character). These two notions reflect the split between body 
and mind in Western thought that we now know is mistaken, and rest upon a concept of the 
individual that is in itself metaphorical –that of the body as a container, with thought being 
something that occurs “inside”, and mimesis or imitation something that happens “outside”.  
These perception spring from phenomenological experience and are part of the “recessive 
body” phenomenon described by Mark Johnson. Ultimately, what is happening when an actor 
prepares and performs a character is that patterns of neurons firing in the brain provoke physical 
action that can be perceived by an audience. The process by which this occurs is largely 
unavailable to conscious reflection; we define those aspects of it that we can become aware of in 
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metaphorically shaped concepts. Many of the proclaimed differences between approaches to 
acting are actually differences in the types of metaphors used to describe self and process.  
In this chapter, I’ll describe several aspects of current cognitive studies that facilitate a 
better understanding of what is actually happening when an actor embodies a character.  I’ll 
begin by reviewing some examples of the prevalent “inside/outside” dichotomy in acting 
discourse, and then describe aspects of cognitive theories that suggest that this dichotomy is 
mistaken. At the linguistic level, L & J provide an accessible analysis of the metaphorical 
construction of the concepts of self and different selves, and how these are based on physical 
experience in the material world. Psychologist Paul Ekman demonstrates how consciously 
chosen muscular activity can affect the autonomic nervous system and thence the experience of 
emotion. I go on to describe the connectionist view of the brain, which models mental activity as 
a series of neural networks, and give examples of how such modeling can create hypotheses of 
the way in which abstract concepts, such as morality, are linked to motor activity. In this I draw 
on George Lakoff’s description of work by Sri Narayanan, and also on Paul Churchland’s 
analysis of the cognitive basis of morality. I also summarize Merlin Donald’s description of the 
way in which mimesis is central to cognition and precedes language in human evolution. Finally, 
I turn to Fauconnier and Turner’s theory of conceptual blending to offer a description of how the 
model of “mental spaces” can be used to understand the way in which we can combine different 
concepts while simultaneously maintaining an awareness of their differences. These features of 
cognitive studies will then be applied to a consideration of character exercises designed by 
Michael Chekhov. 
This consideration of actor and character seeks to discover foundational cognitive 
principles that underlie multiple theatrical styles. My intention is to examine the starting point –
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the actor’s embodiment of a character - rather than the varied theories that lead to different 
styles, while recognizing, of course, that discourse about acting tends to get framed by references 
to different methodologies or theories. Certain metaphors recur; twentieth-century concepts of 
approaches to acting translate Diderot’s nineteenth century paradox of “sensibility” and 
technique into the “inside/outside” conceptualization mentioned above, and, following the 
publication of An Actor Prepares
For example, the English actor Michael Redgrave, writing about Stanislavski in 1946, 
observes that: 
 in 1936, often defined the dichotomy with reference to 
Stanislavski, and later Strasberg. 
There are in England today, roughly speaking, two styles of acting: the acting in which the 
effect springs from the cause, and that which begins with effect and which rarely, and only 
in part, seeks the cause. The latter style is still very much preponderant. It is very seldom 
we see a production in which more than a few actors are faithful to the author, the director, 
and their artistic conscience. “Always he sought,” said Nemirovich-Danchenko, “the 
essence of the play in the times and events described; and this he expected the actor to 
understand. This is what Stanislavsky called the core, and it is this core which must stir the 
actor, which must become part of him for the time being.” 81
In talking about cause and effect, it seems that Redgrave is talking about thought and expression. 
The juxtaposition of the quote from Nemirovich-Danchenko links “cause”, “artistic conscience”, 
“essence”, and “core” together. The latter term implies that these are all interior qualities, and 
that consequently, for theatre to be art, the actor must move from cause to effect, from “inside” 
to “outside”. 
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 A similar sentiment is expressed by John Gielgud:  
Komis’ [Komisarjevsky’s] interest and help had encouraged me tremendously, and I began 
to feel that I could study a part from the inside, as he taught me, not seizing at once on the 
obvious showy effects and histrionics, but trying to absorb the atmosphere of the play and 
the background of the character, and then to build it 
 outwards so that it came to life naturally, developing in proper relationship to the  
 other actors, under the control of the producer.” 82
Again, the notion is that “showy effects and histrionics” are external and therefore superficial, 
and that “inside out” is the preferable direction in creating a character, with internal thought 
leading to external expression. 
 
Olivier also uses the “inside/outside” dichotomy, although he identifies himself as 
working in the opposite direction to Gielgud and Redgrave. In response to a question about how 
he had created his characterization of Richard III, he talks about how he started with two 
“extraneous externals”; a voice that was an imitation of old actors imitating Henry Irving, and a 
big nose:  
I’m afraid I do work mostly from the outside in. I usually collect a lot of details, a lot of 
characteristics, and find a creature swimming about somewhere in the middle of them. 
Perhaps I should mention now what everybody’s been talking about for years, and that’s 
the Actors Studio and the Method. What I’ve just said is absolutely against their beliefs, 
absolute heresy. And it may be, as long as you achieve the result of, don’t let’s call it 
naturalism, don’t even let’s call it realism, let’s call it truthfulness, that it doesn’t matter 
which method you use. … Some people start from the inside, some people start from the 
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periphery. I would say, at a guess, that Alec Guiness is what we’d call a peripheral actor. I 
think I’m the same. The actor who starts from the inside is more likely to find himself in 
the parts he plays, than to find the parts in himself; perhaps not necessarily in himself, but 
to find the parts, go out to them and get them, and be somebody else. 83
Several intriguing concepts emerge from Olivier’s statement. He feels the need to apologize for 
his “external” approach, and then justify it by saying that it can lead to “truthfulness”, and then 
makes a separation between character and self that suggests that the internal approach leads to 
autobiographical acting, and that there is a distinction between characters as autonomous beings, 
and characters as facets of one’s own “self”. The full significance of these distinctions will be 
clarified later by the work of L & J, but for now it is intriguing to note the amount of thought and 
feeling provoked by what is ultimately a metaphorical distinction between “internal” and 
“external”. 
 
Peter Brook also refers to the concept of “internal” and “external” in The Empty Space
There have been times in theatre history when the actor’s work has been based on certain 
accepted gestures and expressions: there have been frozen systems of attitudes that we 
reject today. It is perhaps less obvious that the opposite pole, the Method actor’s freedom 
in choosing anything whatsoever from the gestures of everyday life, is equally restricted, 
for in basing his gestures on his observation or on his own spontaneity, the actor is not 
drawing on any deep creativity. He is reaching inside himself for an alphabet that is also 
fossilized, for the language not of invention but of his conditioning.  
, 
and like Olivier, references Method acting as an example of an “internal” approach:  
84
The observation suggests that the desired feature – “invention”, or creative choice –is no more 
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likely to proceed from an “inside-out” process than from “external” codified gestures. 
While these comments range in date from 1939 to 1968, it is evident that the 
inside/outside conceptualization persists in current discourse about acting. During a discussion 
about acting and mirror neurons that took place at the Philoctetes Center in New York in 2007, 85
Current texts on acting, intended for use as practical instruction, also use the concepts of 
“inside/outside” to talk about an actor’s relationship to character. Robert Benedetti’s 
 
talk turned to the question of “mirroring” in the sense of imitation of gesture. Moderator Adam 
Ludwig, an experienced professional actor, responded to a comment about Delsarte by observing 
that “you can do this ‘outside in’ thing where you imitate just the form…but over years that form 
becomes hollow because the intention isn’t learned also.” Tony Award winning actress Blair 
Brown, invited to talk about her own experience of “external approaches” commented that “I had 
worked with a lot of English directors who took much more that approach, which was - just in 
broad terms - Americans work ‘inside out’ and British –the Brits –work ‘outside in’, and I work 
both ways.”  Ludwig describes an exercise of Michael Chekhov’s; “You create an other [that] 
you can relate to and imitate in your head. You close your eyes and imagine the character, then 
you begin to imitate it through gesture.” In the context of the discussion, it is clear that Ludwig 
considers this an “external” approach. The potential difficulties that arise from using the 
“inside/outside” schema to describe acting become clear as one investigates the statement:  
presumably the activity is “external” because it involves physical imitation, but the initial act of 
imagination would seem to be one that is “internal” in that it is done through thought alone.  
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at Work 
During the first half of the twentieth century, the British acting tradition stressed the 
importance of externals in the acting process, working “from the outside in”. Our 
American tradition, on the other hand, stressed the importance of internals, working “from 
the inside out.” For the past sixty years, however, a real effort has been made in both 
countries to combine these two approaches. … If your performance consists only of 
external movement and speech unconnected to an inner energy, it will seem hollow and 
lifeless; if it consists only of inner intensity, without skillful outer expression, it will seem 
vague and self-indulgent. 
was first published in 1970 and is now in its ninth edition:  
86
 Benedetti’s statement differs from others in saying that both “external” and “internal” 
activities are necessary, rather than positing an either/or process. Nevertheless, notions of what 
happens “outside” and “inside” the actor’s body are used to define the quality of performance, 
and are set up as a dichotomy. Although the proposition sounds reasonable, the dualism that is 
established is complicated the moment one asks how an actor communicates “inner energy”, or 
indeed, how an audience member will identify it. The answer has to be that it is through audible 
or observable communication, which would be considered “external” in the conceptual system 
used by Benedetti and the others quoted. 
 
That this way of understanding actors’ approaches to character is widespread in Western 
theatre is further confirmed by Robert Gordon, whose The Purpose of Playing
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 is an admirable 
analysis of trends in contemporary acting. He introduces his work by summarizing eleven 
common topics of debate among contemporary practitioners and critics in a series of questions. 
In one of these he asks: “Should the actor work from the “outside in” (commonly associated with 
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the traditional British acting practice of characterization through techniques of voice and 
movement) or from the inside out (somewhat misleadingly assumed to be a Stanislavskian 
approach)?” 87
We now have information that offers more empirically based insight into the actor’s 
process. One of the features of cognitive science’s understanding of the mind is the fact that a 
large proportion of the brain’s activity occurs unconsciously, and is consequently unavailable to 
introspection. The abstract concepts that we are conscious of are shaped metaphorically by our 
physical experience in the material world, as described in the introduction and Chapter 1. In the 
analysis provided by cognitive linguistics, metaphor is not just a feature of language, but is 
fundamental to cognition through the transference of meaning from one domain to another. Mark 
Johnson explains how the metaphor of the body as a container arises:  
 When one considers this question in the light of the findings of cognitive science 
about cognition and expression, it becomes apparent that the premise on which this question is 
based is a false dichotomy that misleads practitioners and theorists alike. The origin of the 
dichotomy is understandable – the body is visible, thought is not - but even before one delves 
into its metaphorical formation, the complications mentioned above demonstrate its lack of 
coherence under examination. 
We are immediately aware of our bodies as three-dimensional containers into which we put 
certain things (food, water, air) and out of which other things emerge (wastes, air, blood, 
etc.). From the beginning, we experience constant physical containment in our 
surroundings (those things that envelope us). We move in and out of rooms, clothes, 
vehicles, and numerous kinds of bounded spaces. 88
The kinesthetic experience of the body as a container is transferred to feelings and concepts of 
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the mind, and therefore creates a notion of the mind as something with a boundary that separates 
interior from exterior, and that has contents. 
One of the corollaries of this is that our experiencing consciousness, the foundation of 
our sense of self, is also shaped metaphorically in a variety of ways. Investigating the way this 
happens is essential for an empirically responsible description of the relationship between the 
self of the actor and that of the character. It is worth remembering at this point that the concept of 
the embodied mind that L & J describe in Philosophy in the Flesh,
…our conceptual systems and our capacity for thought are shaped by the nature of 
our brains, our bodies and our bodily interactions. There is no mind separate from the 
body, nor are there thoughts that have an existence separate from and independent of the 
body, nor are there thoughts that that have an existence independent of bodies and brains. 
But our metaphors for mind conflict with what cognitive science has discovered. We 
conceptualize the mind metaphorically in terms of a container image schema defining a 
space that is inside the body and separate from it. 
 is fundamentally different to 
the notion of the mind that we are familiar with in Western thought that separates reason from 
the body: 
89
This metaphorical conceptualization of the mind is what gives rise to the “inside /outside” 
conceptualization of work on a character. When mental activity is thought of as “inside”, and 
communication as “outside”, it is inevitable that the two will be considered to be separate. When 
the mind is conceptualized as a container, it is inevitable that “[i]deas and concepts are internal, 
existing somewhere in the inner space of our minds, while what they refer to are things in the 
external, physical world. This metaphor is so deeply ingrained that it is hard to think about mind 
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in any other way.” 90
When one considers the above quotes from theatre practitioners in this light, one can see 
how notions of truth, imagination and self are identified as “internal” because they are mental 
concepts. Gestures without intention are “hollow”, and Olivier’s approach to characterizing 
Richard III by imagining a big nose and an imitated voice is identified as “external” because 
these are things of the body.  Yet L & J state that “[t]here is no true separation of mind and body. 
These are not two independent entities that somehow come together and couple…[r]ather, mind 
is part of the very structure and fabric of our interactions with the world.” 
 
91
Consequently, rather than trying to argue the relative merits of psychological or physical 
approaches to characterization, it makes sense to acknowledge that the central activity in creating 
a character is the stimulation of the imagination, and that this can occur from a variety of 
prompts. This reflects the variety of activities described by the practitioners above without 
getting tied into knots over what is “internal” or “external”. To make a division along these lines 
results, as we have seen, in identifications of process that do not reflect how the mind/body 
actually works and therefore are of limited use to the actor, if not actively counter-productive.  
 
Several aspects of cognitive science help us to better understand what is actually 
happening when an actor conceives of and embodies a character.  The first of these that I’ll 
describe is L & J’s analysis in Philosophy in the Flesh
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 of the way that we construct metaphors of 
self as a way of defining different aspects of our experience of personality. It is probably 
reasonable to say that in creating a character an actor creates an alternate “self” from his or her 
own identity. This notion can be seen in Olivier’s description above of how an actor can “find 
himself in the parts he plays, or find the parts in himself”. This implies an essential self of the 
91 ibid. 266 
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actor, and then aspects of the self that are embodied in character roles.  This conceptualization 
rests on a metaphoric system of mental life, which we all use, and which L& J call the “Subject - 
Self Metaphor system”. In this system;  
…there is always a Subject that is the locus of reason and that metaphorically has an 
existence independent of the body. As we have seen, this contradicts the fundamental 
findings of cognitive science. And yet, the conception of such a Subject arises around the 
world uniformly on the basis of apparently universal and unchangeable experiences. 92
Olivier’s idea of “himself” would be what L & J identify as the Subject –“ the locus of 
consciousness, subjective experience, reason, will and our ‘essence’ - everything that makes us 
who we uniquely are.” 
  
93
 The Self is that part of a person that is not picked out by the Subject. This 
 Because the Subject is that aspect of a person that is the experiencing 
consciousness, it exists only in the present: 
includes the body, social roles, past states, and actions in the world. There can be 
more than one Self. And each self is conceptualized metaphorically as either a 
person, a place or a location. 94
There are four types of everyday experience which form the source domains of the system: 
 
1) manipulating objects 2) being located in space 3) entering into social relations, and 4) 
empathic projection –conceptually projecting yourself onto someone else. There is a fifth 
special case; each person is seen as having an Essence that is part of the subject. The 
Subject may have many Selves, but only one of these selves is compatible with the 
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essence, and this is called the “real” or “true” self. 95
This conceptual understanding of Subject and different Selves underlies most attempts to 
describe the relationship between actor and character. For example, Uta Hagen, in the widely 
read 
 
Respect for Acting
The Representational actor deliberately chooses to imitate or illustrate the character’s 
behavior. The Presentational actor attempts to reveal human behavior through a use of 
himself, through an understanding of himself and consequently an understanding of the 
character he is portraying. The Representational actor finds a form based on an objective 
result for the character, which he then carefully watches as he executes it. The 
Presentational actor trusts that a form will result from identification with the character and 
the discovery of his character’s actions, and works on stage for a moment-to-moment 
subjective experience. … I believe that the illustration of a character’s behavior at the cost 
of removing one’s own psyche, no matter how brilliant the performance that results, 
creates an alienation between audience and actor…the vital empathy with human behavior, 
the emotional involvement between actor and audience will be lacking. 
 says: 
96
Hagen’s description suggests that the difference between the “Representational actor” and the 
“Presentational actor” is essentially one of “identification with the character”, which results in 
“subjective experience”. When viewed in the context of the Subject-Self system, the distinction 
between the approaches that Hagen describes is metaphorical rather than actual. Both activities 
that she describes involve a Subject (an experiencing consciousness) and one or more selves in 
the form of people or objects (“forms”). The notion of an essential self is implied in the phrases 
“the use of himself” and “one’s own psyche”, and would seem to equate with Olivier’s 
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description of an actor “bringing himself to a role”. So the concept that is expressed by this 
progression of thought is that an actor can only move an audience if he projects his “essential 
self” into the role. 
 This idea falls into another one of the categories of conceptualization that L & J describe, 
where the Subject can project him or herself onto another person in one of two ways; Advisory 
Projection and Empathic Projection. In Advisory Projection “I am projecting my values onto you 
so that I experience your life with my values.” 97 In Empathic Projection, “I am experiencing 
your life, but with your values projected onto my subjective experience.” 98
Imitating makes use of an ability to project, to conceptualize oneself as inhabiting the body 
of another. Empathy is the extension of this ability to the realm of  
 This metaphoric 
conception is key to the debate about self and character and underlies notions of whether the 
character is similar to, or different from the actor’s “essential” self. In the example quoted above, 
Hagen clearly favors Advisory Projection, and the two types of projection account for the 
distinction that Olivier makes between  “finding oneself in the part” and “finding the part in 
oneself”. L & J relate this metaphoric system to the capacity to imitate:  
 emotions – not just to move as someone else moves, but to feel as someone else  
 feels.” 99
Empathy as a cognitive mechanism is immensely important to a consideration of acting, and I’m 
going to talk about it in depth in Chapter 4. For now, L & J’s statement serves to highlight the 
fact that the dichotomies of “internal/external” and “same/different” are based on metaphorical 
conceptualizations that are inaccurate representations of how the mind/body works. Given that 
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physical imitation and the ability to feel as someone else feels are linked faculties, and that both 
incorporate the imagination at some level, it would seem that “outside in” and “inside out” 
approaches are actually doing the same thing; stimulating the actor’s imagination so that she can 
create an imagined self, who is then embodied in fictional circumstances. 
While most of us are comfortable with the concept that imagination is a mental activity, 
for many it may be difficult to conceive of a physical activity as something that can stimulate the 
imagination. One of the ways in which this can happen can be seen in the fact that consciously 
chosen muscular activity can affect the autonomic nervous system, and thence the experience of 
emotion. Psychologist Paul Ekman and others identified this phenomenon while researching the 
facial expressions associated with different emotions:  
I found that when I made certain expressions, I was flooded with strong emotional 
sensations. It wasn’t just any expression, only the ones I had already identified as universal 
to all human beings. When I asked Friesen if this was happening to him to him also, he 
reported that he, too, was feeling emotions when he made some of the expressions, and 
they often felt unpleasant. 100
Ekman’s experience was confirmed by further studies, and their findings are congruent with 
research by Antonio Damasio and others in the field of neurobiology. (I will investigate this 
phenomenon in detail in chapter 5.) It seems likely that consciously directed muscular activity in 
other areas can also have an effect on the autonomic nervous system. For example, Ekman noted 
that conscious alteration of the voice would probably have an effect: 
 
In this research we asked people to make certain facial movements, but I also believe we 
could also have obtained the same results if people had made the voice sound for each 
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emotion. It is much harder for people to produce the vocal sounds of emotion deliberately 
than to make the facial expression. But we did find one woman who could so, and indeed, 
she produced the same results with the voice or the face. 101
If consciously chosen muscular activity can stimulate something as apparently “internal” as 
emotional states, then the idea that “internal” and “external” approaches to the creation of 
character are in opposition, or even separate, is clearly mistaken. 
 
Despite phenomenological experiences such as that investigated by Ekman, the mistaken 
conceptual divide between physical and mental activities is a persistent one. A variety of sources 
in the field of cognitive studies can assist in gaining a better understanding of what is actually 
happening in the relationship between thought and physicality. Given that most of the mind’s 
activity is unconscious, our current understanding of it arises from research in a variety of fields 
such as cognitive psychology, neurobiology, and linguistics, with a reflexive relationship 
between theoretical hypotheses and clinical research. An understanding of the connectionist view 
of mind is foundational to this field, and is therefore worth spending a bit of time on. 
Connectionism is a view of the mind as a system of networks, a theory that became 
popular with cognitive scientists in the 1980’s, and is considered by some to be an alternative 
view to the computational model that prevailed prior to this. Connectionism creates models of 
mental activity based on the hypothesis that it is a result of the processes of interconnected 
networks of simple units. This modeling is used in a variety of different ways. For example, each 
unit in a network could represent a word, and the connections between the units would represent 
semantic similarity. The most common forms of connectionist models identify neurons as units, 
and synapses as connections. These models cannot come near to matching the scope of the 
                                                 
101 ibid. 36-37 
 95 
brain’s activity (it has an estimated 10 billion neurons, each with multiple synapses), but suggest 
the nature of the process that is involved. There is general agreement among connectionists that 
one type of neural network – the “recurrent” network, is a better model of what happens in the 
brain than a “feedforward” model. In the recurrent network, connections can form a “directed 
cycle”, meaning that (in the case of a neural network) some synaptic connections will have more 
“weight” than others, and that with repetition over time, patterns of connection emerge and 
become confirmed. In the “feedforward” model no such directed cycles occur. 
Connectionist modeling is used to describe cognitive tasks such as visual and aural 
perception or the processing of language, and is supported by empirical data gathered through 
the use of PET and MRI scans, which can identify which parts of the brain are active during 
particular mental operations. Beyond these cognitive activities, however, certain researchers 
have proposed that neural network theory can also be applied to mental activity that involves 
abstract concepts. For example, neurobiologist Paul Churchland has advanced the proposition 
that moral behavior emerges from cognitive processes.102
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  His central contention is that moral 
knowledge is a set of skills that can be described using the connectionist modeling described 
above. In the model, an abstract neuronal space of potential activation is configured by weighted 
synaptic connections to create prototypical moral categories such as “morally good action” or 
“morally bad action”. Actual sensory input is assimilated to these categories with varying 
degrees of closeness as we make assessments of moral behavior. This analysis is supported by 
two clinical studies conducted by Hanna and Antonio Damasio in the 1990’s. These studies 
showed that in two different subjects, moral behavior was different following trauma to a 
specific area of the brain.  
 96 
Another example of the way in which the connectionist view of mental activity can assist 
us in understanding the workings of the brain is given by George Lakoff, who, drawing on the 
work of Sri Narayanan, supplies an accessible description of how models of neuronal activity 
can be used to explain the way in which conceptual metaphors arise: 
In the neural theory, conceptual metaphor arises in childhood when experiences regularly 
occur together, activating different brain regions. Activation repeatedly spreads along 
neural pathways, progressively strengthening synapses in pathways between those brain 
regions until new circuitry is formed linking them. The new circuitry physically 
constitutes the metaphor, carrying out a neural mapping between frame circuitry in the 
regions and permitting new inferences. The conceptual metaphor MORE IS UP (as in 
"prices rose," "the temperature fell") is learned because brain regions for quantity and 
verticality are both activated whenever you pour liquid into a glass or build any pile. 
AFFECTION IS WARMTH (as in "She's a warm person," or "She's an ice queen") [is 
learned] because when you are held affectionately as a child by your parents, you feel 
physical warmth. Hundreds of such primary metaphors are learned early in life. Complex 
metaphors are formed by neural bindings of these primary metaphors. And metaphorical 
language expresses both primary and complex metaphors. 103
Experiences that repeatedly activate neural mapping between different brain areas create 
“directed” networks by establishing and reinforcing patterns of “weighted” synaptic connections. 
Through this process, we create cognitive connections between the different areas before we 
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create linguistic ones. It will be useful to bear both these features in mind later, when considering 
the concept of mental spaces in relationship to self and character.  
These principles are also helpful in understanding the role of mimesis in acting and the 
creation of character. A description of the development of mimesis in human evolution is offered 
by cognitive psychologist Merlin Donald, who has taken a particular interest in the evolution of 
the human brain. In his analysis, outlined in his essay “Art and Cognitive Evolution”, he states 
that mimesis preceded the development of language as humans evolved: “Mimesis is an 
analogue or holisitic style of thought that is more basic to our uniquely human way of thinking 
than language or logic. Indeed, on present evidence language and logic evolved much later, from 
a mimetic platform.” 104
The term mimesis describes a cluster of activities that were made possible by a single 
neuro-cognitive adaptation…The four central mimetic abilities are mime, imitation, 
gesture, and the rehearsal of skill … Mimesis seems to have evolved as a cognitive 
elaboration of embodiment in patterns of action. Its origins lie in a redistribution of frontal-
cortical influence during the early stages of the evolution of species Homo, when the 
prefrontal and parts of the premotor cortex expanded enormously in relative size and 
connectivity. The cognitive significance of this lies in the fact that, in virtually all social 
mammals, the frontal regions are concerned with the control of action and behavior… 
 This statement is congruent with McNeill’s differentiation between 
written language and gesture, and proposes that gestural and postural action is actually a “style of 
thought”, further undermining the conceptual divide between physical and mental activity. 
Donald’s description of mimesis also indicates its centrality to the acting process:  
105
Obviously, the control of action and behavior is a central feature in the process of acting, and the 
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fact that the evolution of mimesis is tied to the development of the prefrontal cortex also links 
mimesis to character, as this area of the brain is the one most strongly implicated in the creation 
and expression of personality. It would seem likely that the connection between physical action 
and conceptual thought occurs because there is neural circuitry from the premotor cortex to 
other, nonmotor domains, which allows the neural circuitry that controls movement to be used by 
conceptual domains such as emotion, sensing and thinking.106
This interconnectedness is further confirmed by a comment that Vittorio Gallese made in 
the Philoctetes Center discussion on mirror neurons and acting. Gallese was one of the 
neurosphysiologists who discovered mirror neurons, which are neurons in an observer’s brain 
that fire in a similar pattern when an action is seen to be performed as when that action is 
actually executed. 
  
107
When I see a goal – directed motor act, not only the visual part of my brain is stimulated, 
but also a part of the motor brain. We discovered not only that the human brain behaves 
in a similar way – the motor strip is activated not only when we act, but when see other 
individuals acting –but [also that] the same mirroring mechanism is applied to other 
domains of social cognition, emotions and sensations. 
 This is a topic that I’ll investigate in depth in chapter 4, as it links mimesis, 
empathy, and the imagination. Gallese describes the activity of mirror neurons as follows. (His 
use of ‘act’ as noun and verb is in the everyday sense, not the theatrical sense): 
108
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In other parts of the discussion, Gallese was careful to point out that mirror neurons fire only in 
response to a goal directed motor act, so the connection to emotions and sensations in an 
observer arise via the part of the observer’s brain that perceives and controls movement. The 
concept of a mirror neuron system in humans seems to confirm Narayanan’s neural modeling 
and demonstrate further the way in which movement, the observation of movement, and the 
imitation of movement are cognitive activities that engage multiple features of experience.  
Theatre practitioners and researchers are very fortunate to have a record of Gallese’s 
contributions to this discussion – it is rare that eminent neurophysiologists comment directly on 
matters of theatrical practice. Gallese made this observation during a phase of the discussion that 
focused on the creation of character: 
Your relationship with a character you’re supposed to play is intrinsically relational, so 
you try to enter into the –metaphorically or even literally – into the body of someone else. 
In the body, in the gesturing, in the mind. So more than a mirroring mechanism, it’s an 
imagery mechanism which partly impinges upon the same neurocircuits which are 
involved in action observation. 109
Gallese’s conception of the character coincides remarkably well with the work of Michael 
Chekhov. Actor Adam Ludwig evidently notices this, for shortly after Gallese’s comment, he 
describes the Chekhov exercise in the comment that I have quoted above. Given the features of 
the discourse about character that I’ve mentioned above, it is significant that Gallese identifies 
the character as “someone else” rather than “self in character.” It is also instructive that body and 
image feature strongly in his description, and how the container metaphor of self is applied to the 
identity of the imagined character, not the actor. I suspect that when he distinguishes between 
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metaphorical and literal ways of entering the body of someone else, that “literal” means the 
assumption of physical characteristics, since there is an implicit understanding that the character 
is fictional. 
Michael Chekhov’s conception of the relationship between actor and character bears a lot 
of congruence with the cognitive principles that I’ve outlined, and I’m going to trace the 
relationship of these more closely by looking at some of his exercises. Like Stanislavski he acted 
and directed at The Moscow Art Theatre, but while Stansilavski’s work and life have been 
extensively documented, Michael Chekhov’s is less well known. Nevertheless, his ideas have 
contributed significantly to actor training in the latter part of the twentieth century, with an 
emphatic resurgence of interest evident since the 1980’s. 
Born in 1891, Michael Chekhov was the nephew of Anton Chekhov. At the age of 
nineteen he began working as an actor with The Maly Theatre in St. Petersburg, and was then 
invited to join the First Studio of the Moscow Art Theatre by Stanislavsky in 1912. In the 
following fifteen years, Chekhov achieved fame for his innovative and unusual performances 
with both the first and the second MAT, but as the new communist regime tightened its grip on 
artistic activity, his aesthetic principles and his interest in the philosophy of Rudolf Steiner made 
him a target for the hard line Marxists within his company. In 1928, his autobiography became 
an unexpected best seller, and the increased fame led to denouncements of him by Moscow 
newspapers as a mystic and a “sick artist’” whose work was “alien and reactionary”, and the 
preparation of an arrest warrant. To escape imprisonment, he traveled first of all to Berlin, 
hoping to mount a German-language production of Hamlet
Chekhov endured a nomadic existence for the next six years, working in Austria, France, 
Latvia and Lithuania. In 1934, at the invitation of impresario Sol Hurok, he and other MAT 
.  
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emigrés formed a company called The Moscow Art Players, which toured the United States in 
1934-5. They performed a repertoire of seven plays and an evening of adaptations of Chekhov 
stories and played on Broadway to full houses and highly favorable reviews. At this point 
Chekhov was invited by Stella Adler to join the Group Theatre, and also by actress Beatrice 
Straight to lead a theatre company and training studio at Dartington Hall in Devon, England. No 
doubt attracted by the school’s links with the philosophy of Rudolf Steiner, and the financial 
security afforded by its backing by the wealthy Elmhirst family, Chekhov chose to go to 
England.  From 1936 to 1939 he taught at The Michael Chekhov Theatre Studio in Dartington, 
but moved back to the USA at the outbreak of the Second World War.  
Based in Ridgefield, Connecticut, Chekhov started another studio, and staged some 
performances with an ensemble that included a young Yul Brynner that were poorly received. He 
created a production of Twelfth Night in 1941 on Broadway, however, that was favorably 
reviewed. His Ridgefield studio was forced to close in 1942 when the draft removed most of its 
male actors, and he moved to Los Angeles in 1943. He then began a film career as an actor that 
included an Oscar nomination for his role in Hitchcock’s Spellbound in 1945, and resulted in a 
total of ten films. He continued to teach during this period, and actors who trained with him 
included Gary Cooper, Marilyn Monroe, Gregory Peck, Patricia Neal, Clint Eastwood, Leslie 
Caron, Anthony Quinn, Ingrid Bergman, Jack Palance, Mala Powers, Lloyd Bridges, and Yul 
Brynner. His book To The Actor was published in 1953, two years before his death from a heart 
attack.110
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During his time at MAT, Chekhov rejected certain elements of Stanislavski’s system, 
notably his approach to characterization: 
Stanislavski’s viewpoint was that when an actor gets a part he has to imagine [that] the 
character he will play is, figuratively speaking, seated within himself-absolutely and 
completely occupying the actor’s inner self-... In sum, the character dwelt within the 
actor, and the actor’s voice and body expressed in a true–to-life manner what the 
character was supposed to think and feel and do…yet in such a way that it was also true 
to the psychology or inner life of the actor himself. 111
This would be an example of Advisory Projection, where the actor’s values are projected on to 
the character, since the values of the character have to be “true” to those of the actor. That 
Chekhov took a different approach, and favored Empathic Projection is clear from the following 
quote where he invites the student of acting to ask three questions about the character that is 
being approached: 
 
1) What is the difference between my way of thinking and the character’s way of 
thinking?  
2) What are the differences between the feelings and emotions of the character and 
myself?  
3) What is the nature of my will and inclinations against those of the character?112
The focus is constantly on becoming aware of differences, rather than the similarities that 
Stanislavski’s approach favors, and which Chekhov believed led to “weary repetitions” of the 
actor’s autobiography. This approach evidently invites the Subject (the student of acting), to 
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experience the life of the character with the character’s values projected onto the Subject’s 
subjective experience. 
An endorsement of Chekhov’s approach can be found in Fauconnier and Turner’s (F & 
T) theory of conceptual blending, described in The Way We Think. Briefly, a conceptual blend is 
a mental construction, initially composed of at least three mental spaces, that occurs at the level 
of short-term, or “working” memory. Each of these contain aspects of meaning that, when 
integrated with the others, creates a fourth mental space and new conceptual material. The 
process starts when two concepts, or domains of experience, are framed together in linguistic or 
imagistic ways, making the mind scan automatically for underlying similarities. This is the 
process that occurs when an actor thinks of “self” and “character”. In Chekhov’s approach, these 
would be two domains of experience, framed together by the fact that they will share the same 
body. F & T posit that if the two domains have traits in common (in the example of actor and 
character, these could be personality traits), then the result of the scanning will be the recall from 
long-term memory of a third or “generic” space containing the outlines of these traits. This 
would justify Chekhov’s statement that “the similarities take care of themselves.” The presence 
of this generic space primes the mind to project or "map" connections, resulting in yet a fourth 
space, the blend itself. In Chekhov’s process this would be the mental space in which the actor 
embodies the realized character. Stanislavski’s concept of total identification between self and 
character is undercut by F & T’s analysis, while Chekhov’s description of his process in The 
Path of The Actor
If an actor prepares his role correctly, the whole process of preparation can be 
characterized as his gradual approach to the picture of his character as he sees it in his 
 has remarkable similarities with it: 
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imagination, in his fantasy. The actor first builds up his character exclusively in his 
fantasy life, and then tries to imitate the character’s inner and outer qualities. 113
While F & T are describing a mental process that operates in many areas of activity, they do 
make mention of what they call “drama connectors”. In the quote below they begin by describing 
the phenomenon of the blended actor and character from the audience’s perspective, but 
nevertheless, the principles described are pertinent when addressing the process of the actor: 
 
Dramatic performances are deliberate blends of a living person with an identity. They 
give us a living person in one input and a different living person, an actor, in another. The 
person on stage is a blend of these two. The character portrayed may of course be entirely 
fictional, but there is still a space, a fictional one, in which that person is alive. In the 
blend, the person sounds and moves like the actor and is where the actor is, but the actor 
in her performance tries to accept projections from the character portrayed, and so 
modifies her language, appearance, dress, attitudes, and gestures. 114
It is clear from the last sentence that F & T also conceive of the character as someone different 
from the actor, but also living.  One of the very significant factors for the consideration of theatre 
as a whole is that audiences are simultaneously aware of actor and character without losing their 
engagement with the fictional circumstances:
 
115
While we perceive a single scene, we are simultaneously aware of the actor moving and 
talking on a stage in front of an audience, and of the corresponding character moving and 
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talking within the represented story world. Common to the two frames are some language 
and action patterns.” 116
While this simultaneous perception of “fictional” and “real” is something that F & T describe 
from an audience’s point of view, it seems reasonable to identify the same mental processes in an 
actor creating and performing a character. A core feature of Michael Chekhov’s approach to 
characterization is congruent with this principle, which Chekhov identified as “dual 
consciousness”. His assertion of this feature arose from an experience that he had while playing 
the character of Skid in a play called 
 
Artists 117
Skid was speaking, and it suddenly seemed to me that I really understood for the first 
time the meaning of his words, his unrequited love for Bonny and his drama. My 
exhaustion and calmness had turned me into a spectator of my own action … I looked at 
Skid sitting down there on the floor and I was struck by it, as if I could “see” his feelings, 
his pain and agitation …Now I was able to conduct Skid’s acting. My consciousness had 
split into two – at one and the same time, I was in the auditorium and standing beside 
myself … 
 in Berlin, directed by Max Reinhardt: 
118
While Chekhov describes this as a unique, even transcendental, experience, he links it to an 
ongoing phenomenon of his experience of acting: “Earlier it had been familiar to me in a 
somewhat less pronounced form”, 
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 and identifies it as an experience of inspiration. Having 
studied the ideas of Rudolf Steiner, he identifies inspiration as being a function of “the higher 
ego”, a part of consciousness that is creative, and distinguished from “the lower ego” which is 
117 Originally called Burlesque, written by George Watters and Arthur Hopkins. 
118 Chekhov 2005, 145 
119 Chekhov 2005, 145 
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identified with ambition, passion and egotism: “A kind of division of consciousness occurs, with 
the higher ego acting as the source of inspiration and the lower ego as the bearer, the agent.” 120
In the context of the Subject-self system identified by L& J, Chekhov “observing” 
himself would be the Subject (experiencing consciousness), the “higher ego” would correlate 
with the “essential self”, the “lower ego” with another self, Skid as yet another. The 
simultaneous awareness of these selves correlates with F & T’s description of blended “mental 
spaces”. Chekhov saw dual consciousness as essential to an actor’s control; the higher ego 
 
… observes and directs the lower ego from outside, guiding it and empathizing with the 
imagined sufferings and joys of the character …although the actor on stage suffers, 
weeps, rejoices and laughs, at the same time he remains unaffected by these feelings on a 
personal level. Poor actors pride themselves on the fact that they sometimes succeed in 
having such “feelings” on stage to the extent that they forget themselves completely! 
Such actors break the furniture, dislocate their fellow actors’ arms and suffocate their 
lovers while on stage121
This was the root of Chekhov’s antipathy to “affective memory” – another significant difference 
between his practice and that of Stanislavski’s at that stage of his development. Chekhov played 
Skid in 1928, and while his communication with his former teacher is not known, Stanislavski 
acknowledged the existence of “dual consciousness” by the time 
  
An Actor Prepares was 
published in 1936, while maintaining his belief in the usefulness of “affective memory”. Before 
examining Chekhov’s approach to emotion, it is instructive to look at a key exercise in the 
creation of character, described in his  To the Actor.
                                                 
120 ibid. 147 
  This is the “imaginary body” exercise, 
partially described by Adam Ludwig in the Philoctetes discussion.  
121 ibid. 147 
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Chekhov invites the actor first of all to pose the questions of difference mentioned above, 
and by answering them, identify those characteristics of the character that are different from the 
actor. In the hypothetical example that he gives, the character is “lazy, awkward and slow”:  
As soon as you have outlined these features and qualities of your role – that is, compared 
with your own – try to imagine what kind of body such a lazy awkward and slow person 
would have. Perhaps you will find that he might possess a full, plump, short body with 
drooping shoulders, thick neck, long arms hanging listlessly, and a big heavy head … 
You are going to imagine that in the same space you occupy with your own, real body 
there exists another body – the imaginary body of your character, which you have just 
created in your mind. 
You clothe yourself, as it were, with this body; you put it on like a garment. 122
The differentiation, and then melding, of self and character through imagery offers a useful 
conscious and physical corollary of F & T’s mental spaces, which, by their analysis, would be 
present unconsciously in the creation of character. The “wearing” of the imagined body offers a 
corollary of the “blended” space of actor and character. Although Chekhov arrived at this 
exercise through the use of phenomenonological experience, its process is congruent with both F 
& T’s analysis, and Gallese’s comment about character.  
 
Chekhov also demonstrates an awareness of mimesis as a type of thought, as defined by 
Merlin Donald. According to Chekhov: 
When really taken on and exercised, the imaginary body stirs the actor’s will and 
feelings; it harmonizes them with the characteristic speech and movements, it transforms 
the actor into another person! Merely discussing the character, analyzing it mentally, 
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cannot produce this desired effect, because your reasoning mind, however skilful it may 
be, is apt to leave you cold and passive, whereas the imaginary body has the power to 
appeal directly to your will and feelings. 123
Chekhov displays an inclination that is opposite to the Cartesian separation of reason from body. 
I read his use of the phrase “reasoning mind” to suggest that reason is only a part of mental 
activity, not synonymous with it, while the rest of the statement makes clear that the body can 
stimulate experiences in response to the imagination. 
 
A further example of this can be seen in a statement that Chekhov made while teaching 
actors in the MAT First Studio, making clear the link between his idea of character and the 
creation of emotion on stage: 
Do not try to feel your own personal feelings. It is the character who has to feel, not the 
actor, and the actor must only sacrifice himself to the character … In imitating and 
depicting what my fantasy gives me, I don’t have to try to appear inside the character, 
because then the actor ceases to be an artist and becomes a madman. 124
Once again, the notion is that character is different from actor, and the statement adds the 
element of emotion to what we have been investigating so far, implying that emotions are part of 
the character, and not of the actor. Paul Ekman’s findings about facial expression and emotion 
(mentioned above) suggest a process by which this could happen. I’ll investigate this 
phenomenon in detail in Chapter 5, but for now the basic principle is that consciously directed 
muscular activity can affect the autonomic nervous system, and thence our experience of 
emotion. Chekhov displays an awareness of this phenomenon in another exercise: 
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Lift your arm. Lower it. What have you done? You have fulfilled a simple physical 
action. You have made a gesture. And you have made it without any difficulty. Why? 
Because like every action, it is completely within your will. Now make the same gesture, 
but this time color it with a certain quality. Let this quality be caution. …Your movement 
made cautiously, is no longer a mere physical action, it has acquired a certain 
psychological nuance. What is this nuance? It is a Sensation of caution which now fills 
and permeates your arm. It is a psychophysical sensation. Similarly, if you moved your 
entire body with the quality of caution, then your entire body would naturally be filled 
with this sensation. … Now ask yourself if you forced your feelings. Did you order 
yourself to “feel caution”? No. You only made a movement with a certain quality, thus 
creating a sensation of caution through which you aroused your feelings. 125
Again, physical activity is experienced with conceptual thought in a form of “moving as 
thinking”. The activity stimulates the imagination through the neuronal links between motor 
activity and conceptual thought. Trying the exercise as I sit and type, I feel a distinct difference 
between my state of being simply thinking the word “caution” without movement, and my state 
of being as I move my arm cautiously. I also notice retrospectively that as I moved my arm, my 
eyelids narrowed and my eyes darted from side to side, without any conscious command. I can 
only guess that this activity is a result of neuronal links. 
 
Perhaps the most widely known, and simultaneously least understood, of Chekhov’s 
exercises is the Psychological Gesture (PG). A common feature of the misunderstanding is that 
the PG is shown to the audience and that this leads to stylized or contrived behavior in the actor. 
Chekhov intended this exercise to be both a preparation for performance and also an image that 
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was held in the imagination, but not shown to the audience; “…the PG itself must never be 
shown to the audience, no more than an architect would be expected to show the public the 
scaffolding of his building instead of the completed masterwork.” 126 The root of the PG is in the 
actor defining what the character’s strongest wish is. This bears a lot of resemblance to the idea 
of Stanislavski’s “super-objective”. While Chekhov asserted many differences between his 
approach and that of Stanislavski, he offers a ringing endorsement of  “units” and “objectives” as 
tools of script analysis. The distinctiveness of the PG is that it expresses the character’s strongest 
wish in a physical and imagistic way. Chekhov’s description of the process in To the Actor
In this chapter I’ve outlined some of the research in the field of cognitive studies that 
informs an understanding of what is happening as an actor conceives of, and embodies a 
character. This research shows that the prevalent conceptual dichotomy of “internal” 
(psychological) versus “external” (physical) approaches to characterization is mistaken, because 
it is based on an idea of mind separate from body. The research that I’ve described shows that 
mental and physical activities are both ways of thinking, or “minding”, that they are frequently 
 is too 
long to quote here, but involves making a gesture with hand and arm that expresses the wish, and 
gradually developing the gesture to include the whole body, so that the final expression is both 
postural and gestural. This is done repeatedly through a rehearsal period, with adjustments and 
refinements as the actor’s understanding of the character develops. In this way, a muscular 
memory of the image of the wish is developed, so that a recall of the image of the gesture during 
performance informs the character’s physicality. Subsidiary PGs can be created to reflect the 
strongest wish of the character in each scene –akin to Stanislavski’s scene, or “beat” objectives. 
As with his other exercises, the imagination is stimulated through physical activity. 
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linked, and that our conceptual thought is based on physical experience. Because of the way that 
we represent different aspects of our personalities to ourselves (the Subject-self system), we have 
a metaphorical system of multiple selves that forms the framework for discourse about the 
relationship between actor and character. Much of this discourse associates successful acting 
with the investment of the “essential” self in the character. Chekhov’s approach, however, 
identifies a character as one of many “selves” whose actions are controlled by his experiencing 
consciousness, an approach that is congruent with the model of conceptually blended mental 
spaces proposed by F & T. That his approach was successful is indicated by the high praise that 
he received as an actor, and also as a teacher. 
A central feature of the “internal/external” dichotomy is a metaphorical conception of the 
self as a container. While Chekhov was not immune to this, he seemed to have an imaginative 
conception of the container as permeable and malleable, as demonstrated by many of his 
exercises. 127
As Franc Chamberlain acknowledges, Chekhov was prescient in the way that he 
structured 
 He also incorporated work on physical actions that led to primary metaphors, such 
as expand/contract, grasp, push/pull, throw etc., in much the same way that Lecoq did. These 
features of his approach constantly link physical with mental activity in ways that fit with the 
role of mimesis in art described by Merlin Donald, and usefully bridge the difference between 
written and spoken language described by David McNeill.  
To The Actor
                                                 
127 These include the ideas of radiating light from the body, and “molding” the body to make shapes in the 
surrounding air. I have not described these for reasons of space, but they are included in To the Actor. 
; of the key figures in early twentieth century theatre (Stanislavsky, 
Brecht, Copeau, Craig, Artaud, Vakhtangov, Meyerhold, Craig) he was the first to include 
practical exercises for the actor to follow, rather than describing them in narrative form or as 
general principles. His opening sentence was also prescient: “It is a known fact that the human 
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body and psychology influence each other and are in constant interplay.” 128
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 The statement has 
the bravado of the autodidact; when he was writing, the concept was neither well known nor 
widely believed. Empirically derived proof of the statement is only now finding its way into 
discussions of acting, but as the practitioner most associated with the term “psychophysical” in 
connection with acting, Chekhov deserves credit for creating exercises that are in sympathy with 
the current understanding of the body/mind. 
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5.0  HOW DOES THE ACTOR IDENTIFY WITH THE CHARACTER? 
In the previous chapter, I proposed that the internal/external dichotomy is much less significant 
in actual cognitive terms than current discourse on acting suggests, and also that the idea of 
bringing one’s “true” or “essential” self to a role is a metaphorical construct that reflects the 
transposition of values rather than a difference at a cognitive level. Whether one conceives of 
“self in the role” or “role in the self” it would seem that the same process of minding is engaged - 
the blending of mental spaces that connote concepts of self and character.  In this chapter I’m 
going to talk about how the process of melding might operate in the preparation of a role for 
performance. In theatre parlance, this tends to get called “identification with the role”, and 
sometimes “investing”, although this term is also used to mean “to make emotionally 
significant”. 
 In considering this phenomenon, another duality arises – that of “persona” acting versus 
“transformational” acting. (Also known as “personality” acting and “character” acting”). Once 
again, this is a slippery subject to discuss-much of the discourse about it is expressed from a 
subjective point of view, in terms that mean one thing to one person and another thing to 
someone else. My understanding of the distinction is that the “persona” actor maintains a more 
or less constant personality from one role to the next, while the “transformational” actor 
embodies varying personalities according to role. I avoid the use of the term “character actor” to 
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describe the latter, because that term is also used in “typing” to distinguish actors who play 
secondary roles from those who play leads. 
A number of issues are tied in with the “persona/transformational” dichotomy. While the 
difference is often understood in terms of finding one’s “essential self” in a role, a more 
empirically reliable way to define the difference is to look at the range of actions that an actor 
uses to portray the character. The persona actor uses behavioral communicators that stay within a 
range that identifies his or her personality, which remains more or less constant from one role to 
the next. The transformational actor displays a variety of behavioral communicators according to 
the demands of character. Their actions link them to the fictional circumstances and demonstrate 
the personality of the character. In the case of the persona actor we see the more or less constant 
personality responding to the fictional circumstances with reasonably predictable results –we 
don’t expect characters played by Tom Cruise or Harrison Ford to meekly surrender to adversity, 
for instance. We see a greater variety of behavior in actors like Philip Seymour Hoffman and 
Daniel Day Lewis in different roles, but in neither category can we state from observation that 
the actors are, or are not, identifying their concepts of their “essential selves” with the roles that 
they play. Consequently, the distinction that is based on behavioral action is more empirically 
useful. 
If one accepts that the range of actions that they perform defines the distinction between 
persona actor and transformational actor, it is also useful to distinguish between narrative action, 
and behavioral actions that communicate meaning. It has become a commonplace to say that 
character is expressed by action, but what is often unconsidered is that action (in the sense of 
narrative development) is in itself communicated by gestural actions, and that these have 
meaning that communicate personality: The hero is presented with an opportunity to kill the 
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villain. He chooses not to. The choice is at the level of narrative action. At another level, the 
actor can choose whether this is done out of cowardice, indecision, altruism or a malevolent 
desire to exact a more cruel punishment in the future, and this choice is communicated by the 
gestural actions of the actor/character in delivering the language of the text. At this level, the 
actions communicate the values of the character, and hence, his or her personality. It is at this 
level that we talk of the “interpretation” of a role.129
It is useful to recall Lecoq’s work on extending the range of an actor’s behavior. The 
larger an actor’s repertoire of behavioral actions is, the greater the range of personality he or she 
can play. It is also instructive to recall the neuronal links between motor activities and conceptual 
thought, and the reflexive relationship between muscular activity and the experience of emotion. 
A variety of actions will also generate the experience of a variety of conceptual thoughts and 
feelings in the actor. This is a proposition that is supported by emerging research about 
proprioception and a sense of self, which I will describe later in this chapter. (Proprioception is 
the physiological process by which information about where the body is and what it is doing is 
relayed back to the brain). So it could be said that not only is character expressed by action, but 
also that actions create character.  
 
While I would propose that this is true to varying extents in all types of performance, and 
will investigate traditional scripted drama later, an explicit example of this phenomenon can be 
found in Anna Deveare Smith’s accounts of her work in creating Fires in the Mirror: Crown 
Heights, Brookyln, and Other Identities
                                                 
129 My focus is on the process of an actor in creating character, but this approach could have significant benefits for 
the comparison of existing performances. For example, a patient analyst could identify the range of types of actions 
used by Olivier/Hamlet, and compare them to those used by Gibson/Hamlet, and consequently specify how each 
actor’s conception of the character’s personality is communicated to the audience.   
. This was a solo show created by Smith from interviews 
that she conducted with residents of a neighborhood in Brooklyn, New York that had 
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experienced rioting and conflict between Hasidic Jews and Afro-Caribbean Americans. Smith 
created her material by precisely imitating portions of the recorded interviews, providing an 
example of total imitation that is rare in contemporary theatre. First performed in 1992, the show 
was extremely successful, winning a Drama Desk Award, and nominations for a Tony Award 
and a Pullitzer Prize. Much of the critical response to the play focused on socio-political issues 
and the implicit commentary on identity afforded by Smith’s impersonation of people of a 
variety of races and ethnic backgrounds. My focus, however, is on her process of embodying 
characters; the relevance of the piece for this discussion lies in Smith’s coherent and explicit 
commentary on how the gestural actions of speech affected her. 
 In her introduction to the play text, Smith talks about the difference between persona 
acting and transformational acting:  
A character from a play does not have a visible identity until the actor creates a body for 
that character. The self-oriented technique involves rendering characters who looked and 
acted like the actors. What are the subtleties in real-life behavior that could be used in the 
creation of characters? There are linguistic as well as physical details that make a person 
unique. 130
The issue of process was very clearly in her mind, as she describes attempting to teach students 
to imitate interviewees, and encountering resistance:  
 
They believed that they couldn’t be someone else until they knew themselves. My 
argument was, and still is, that it doesn’t have to be either/or, and that neither comes first. 
The discovery of human behavior can happen in motion. It can be a process of moving 
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from the self to the other and the other to the self … I knew that by using another 
person’s language, it was possible to portray what was invisible about that individual. 131
Smith’s description has a lot in common with the principles that I’ve outlined of a reflexive 
relationship between self and character. Her comment on language, when seen in context, is 
about the gestural activity in speech patterns as well as the verbal content. 
 
 Smith’s interest in the potential of speech to evoke somatosensory sensations stems from 
her first experience of speaking Shakespeare; “In the first class we had to take any 14 lines of 
Shakespeare and say them over and over again to see what happened… I knew nothing; it was 
my first acting class ever and I had some kind of a transcendental experience.” 132 Smith expands 
on the description of this experience in her book 
Everything happened. Not only did I feel as though I had become Queen Margaret, but I 
had what in the seventies we would have called a “transcendental experience,” fully 
unaided by chemical substances of any kind. I, in fact “saw” Queen Margaret – she was a 
small vision, standing in my apartment. She came from the same place that the tooth fairy 
came from when I was a child. She came from my imagination. She was concocted 
somehow from the words. Words, it seemed me, from then on were truly magical, not 
only by their meaning but by the way we say them, how we manipulate them. 
Talk to Me: 
133
Similarly to Chekhov’s experience when performing Skid, Smith finds her everyday perception 
altered through performance, and also has an experience of dual consciousness - sensing herself 
as Queen Margaret while also seeing a vision of the character. While the experience may sound 
mystical, my guess is that the breathing pattern necessitated by the multiple repetitions of the 
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line, coupled with the rhythm of speech dictated by the verse linked with the linguistic content to 
stimulate the imagination. Neither in the book nor the interview does Smith attempt to explain 
how she thought this happened, although the experience forms a cornerstone of her practice 
thereafter. She takes a pragmatic, functional view of the phenomenon, as is revealed later in the 
interview when she describes working on Leonard Jeffries as a character for Fires in The Mirror
… the point is simply to repeat it until I feel it and what I begin to feel is his song and 
that helps me to remember more about his body… My body begins to do the things that 
he probably must do inside while he’s speaking. I begin to feel that I’m becoming more 
like him. 
:  
134
Smith is saying, that for her, direct physiological re-experiencing of the character occurs because 
of the repeated imitation of his speech patterns and vocal gestures; his “yawning, … [his] way of 
lifting his soft palate”. 
 
135 By doing this, she feels she is able to “become the ‘them’ they present 
to the world.” 136
Smith also talks about how her approach differs from the common understanding of 
Stanislavskian-based “psychological realism”.  
 Her experience supports the idea that behavioral communicators play a part in 
defining personality, and also calls to mind Paul Ekman’s observation that the consciously 
chosen use of the vocal characteristics of an emotion can generate the experience of that 
emotion.  
Psychological realism - this is a real over-simplification of Stanislavsky - saying: Here’s 
Leonard Jeffries. You have to play Leonard Jeffries now. Let’s look at Leonard. Let’s 
look at his circumstances. Let’s look at your circumstances. How are you two alike? How 
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can you draw from your own experience? Contrary to that, I say, this is what Leonard 
Jeffries said. Don’t even write it down. Put on your headphones, repeat what he said. 
That’s all. That’s it. 137
Smith’s perspective is tied to her own creative process of recording interviews, and doesn’t 
concern itself with the more common challenge that faces the actor when approaching an 
existing script. Nevertheless, her experience and her stance tie in to the issues that become 
apparent when one considers McNeill’s analysis of the difference between written and spoken 
language. It is significant that she says “Don’t even write it down.” In her personal process, she 
is experiencing the sensual impact of spoken language without going through the distancing of 
written analysis that she characterizes as Stanislavkian. At a phenomenal level, Smith is very 
aware of the difference between spoken and written language: “This project is at its heart about 
the act of speech, the physical action of dialogue, and was not intended for the printed word.” 
 
138 
This awareness of a distinction between the two is surely involved in her choice to repeat several 
times during an interview that: “My grandfather said if you say a word often enough, it becomes 
you.” 139
Further comments by Smith echo Chekhov’s belief in identifying a difference between 
self and character:  
 
What has to exist in order to try to allow the other to be is separation between the  
actor’s self and the other … I can learn to know who somebody is, not from what 
they tell me, but from how they tell me. This will make an impression on my  
body and eventually on my psyche. Not that I would understand it but I would  
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feel it.” 140
Once again, Smith is drawing a distinction between language and speech, and stressing how the 
physical activity of speech crosses the space between the character’s personality and that of the 
actor.  
 
While Smith adamantly espouses imitation as the process by which she embodies a 
character, this has not prevented her from gaining work in popular naturalistic television dramas 
such as The West Wing, and The Practice, where, presumably, she has to work from a script. In 
search of more recent information on her views about character that might reveal her approach to 
this situation, I came across a 2007 interview, entitled “How do you get into character?” 141
The way in which Smiths’s process of imitation can generate a sense of character can be 
better understood by an examination of the role of proprioception. Actors are generally more 
familiar with this faculty as “kinaesthetic sense.” I prefer to use the former term, because the 
 The 
interview reveals no development or change in the methods already described, except for a 
general comment about the importance of imagination for the actor. Perhaps Smith uses the 
repetition technique that she describes in her work on Shakespeare, although the short speeches 
typical of television drama would seem to limit the effectiveness of this approach. Another 
possibility would be that she simply employs her own everyday mannerisms, although these 
would have to be modified. In this interview they include abrupt turns and tilts of the head, and 
sharply leaning sideways and forwards from the waist –all movements that would take her out of 
a camera’s focal setting in everything except a long shot. Whatever process she uses, it is 
inevitable, given what we know from cognitive science, that some degree of imagination has to 
be involved to engage with the fictional circumstances.  
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phenomenon has greater implications than simple awareness of movement. Initially, 
proprioception gives us information about muscle tone, effort and balance.  Nerve endings in our 
muscles, fascia, tendons, ligaments, joints, and skin send signals to the brain about the 
deformation of tissue. This includes information about a number of features: the degree of 
pressure, which indicates stretching and placement; the speed of movement, and the rate at which 
the speed is changing; the direction of movement, and, in cases of extreme tissue deformation, 
pain.  Large amounts of information from sensory nerves embedded in muscles and joints are 
carried through the spinal cord to the subcortical and cortical parts of the brain.  This information 
is integrated through many neural pathways that synapse at various levels of the nervous system 
to give us a sense of where we are, and how we are moving, both at a conscious and unconscious 
level. 
It is proprioception that enables us to move in the dark, that is involved as we learn and 
execute a dance step or tennis stroke, and also allows us to walk or run without exerting 
conscious control over the activity. It is also a crucial feature in our sense of self, and this quality 
makes it of particular interest in considering the relationship between physical activity and the 
actor’s creation of character. Philosopher Shaun Gallagher and psychologist Andrew Meltzoff 
investigate this aspect of proprioception in a paper that argues that it is more innate than 
previously thought. They state that all accounts of proprioception agree that “the organized and 
meaningful perception of self and others depends on a proprioceptive system of a developed 
body schema organized to allow for an intermodal translation between external and internal 
senses.” 142
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 This description again challenges the “inside/outside” dichotomy of acting discourse, 
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because the body schema depends on both internal (proprioceptive input) and external (visual 
and tactile) senses in combination. 
The body schema is one part of proprioception, and Gallagher and Meltzoff take care to 
point out the difference between it and body image. The body image is the mental representation 
of the varying levels of conscious awareness of the body, and includes perceptual and conceptual 
understanding, along with emotional attitude. The body schema is  
a system of motor functions that operates below the level of self-referential intentionality, 
although it can enter into and support intentional activity. It involves a set of tacit 
performances, preconscious subpersonal processes that play a dynamic role in governing 
posture and movement. In most instances, movement and the maintenance of posture are 
accomplished by the close to automatic performances of a body schema, and for this 
reason the normal adult subject neither needs nor has a constant body percept. To the 
extent that one does become aware of one’s own body in terms of monitoring or directing 
perceptual attention to limb position, movement, or posture, then such an awareness helps 
to constitute the perceptual aspect of a body image. 143
The definition of the body schema helps us further understand the distinction between persona 
acting and transformational acting. As I mentioned earlier, I define persona acting as a style in 
which the actor maintains a more or less consistent personality from role to role. In 
transformational acting, the actor embodies varying personalities according to role. It seems 
likely that the persona actor is working more closely with the unconscious body schema than the 
body image, which is more conscious, because he or she is not attempting to alter physical 
activity to express a character. In transformational acting, the actor is working consciously to 
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control aspects of physicality, and is therefore working more in the realm of body image. Of 
course, both aspects of proprioception are involved in all activities, so it is a question of 
emphasis rather than exclusivity. Nevertheless, the body image is more involved in intentional 
action, which is at the core of the acting process: “ The body image, consisting of a complex set 
of mental representations of the body, involves a form of explicit and self-referential 
intentionality.” 144
Studies of body image often distinguish three elements of intentionality: 
 
(a) the subject’s perceptual experience of his/her own body; 
(b) the subject’s conceptual understanding (including mythic and/or scientific knowledge) of 
the body in general; and 
(c) the subject’s emotional attitude toward his/her own body 145
When the actor consciously directs attention to postural or gestural actions, all three elements are 
involved, but at varying levels of conscious awareness. For example, when Smith sought to 
imitate Jeffries, (a) is involved as she adjusts the movement of her soft palate. Smith’s 
conceptual understanding of her body, (b), includes the notion (among many others) that her 
body is different from the character’s body and that, although female, she can successfully 
embody a male character. While her writing gives no explicit indication about her emotional 
attitude, (c), it seems likely that she has a degree of comfort with her body, given her success in 
making it follow her conscious promptings, and her willingness to experience public scrutiny in 
performance.  
 
There are distinctions between the process of the actor and the experience of daily life; 
(b) and (c) are not always at the level of conscious awareness in daily life, but are more likely to 
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be considered by the actor at some stage of training. One of the goals of this dissertation is to 
make theatre people more aware of what their conceptual understanding of the body is, and to 
include more scientific knowledge in that understanding. The conceptual understanding of the 
body will influence what one believes it to be capable of. Clearly, activities such as Lecoq’s 
Neutral mask work, by extending the range of behavioral expression, alter one’s concept of what 
one’s body can do. Even something as basic as the neutral posture can have an effect. 
I received a vivid illustration of this during a movement course that I taught recently. In 
the early part of the course, I encouraged the students to heighten their awareness of nonverbal 
communication (nvc) by observing behavior as they moved around campus. One impassioned 
report came from a female student focused on the behavior of football players whose demeanor 
on campus walkways forced other students to change course to avoid collisions. A few weeks 
later, after intensive work on the neutral posture and the neutral walk, the same student, enthused 
by the sense of confidence that she had gained from her altered physicality, proposed to her 
classmates that they walk across the quad in a group, maintaining neutral posture. They set off, 
still wearing their movement clothing and barefoot, and returned ten minutes later, whooping 
with laughter. Apparently two football players had stood aside to allow the group to pass. 
Of course, increased self-confidence is not the only quality to be gained from work with 
the Neutral mask. Embodying a variety of organic rhythms, for example, will provide the actor 
with proprioceptive input that is significantly greater, and more differentiated, than the range of 
that is encountered in daily life. Given that proprioception is linked to conceptual thought and 
emotional attitudes, it follows that the execution of postural and gestural movements that are 
different from those that we employ in everyday life are likely to give us an altered sense of self.  
 125 
The emphasis that both Chekhov and Smith place on physical action in the creation of a 
character is validated by another study that shows that the proprioceptive system is more active 
in response to movement, and that this feature is linked to one’s awareness of self through the 
agency of one’s actions. 146
Much of the current discourse about acting uses William James’ idea of multiple selves to 
link everyday behavior to the task of creating a character. Uta Hagen’s widely used 
 While Smith’s actions come from observation of the interviewed 
subject, Chekhov’s arise from the imagination, stimulated by a play text. I’ve used Chekhov and 
Smith as examples because the work that they describe offers well-defined activity that is 
congruent with the cognitive principles that I’ve described. This is not to say that other 
practitioners are not congruent in this way – but simply that Chekhov and Smith provide explicit 
examples of processes that underlie performance. To further understand these processes needs 
more examination of concepts of self, the activity of the imagination, and how actors can 
respond empathetically to fictional material.  
Respect for 
Acting
You spontaneously play a variety of different roles in life. Imagine yourself attending a 
cocktail party given for producers, agents, directors, all in a position to employ you. How 
you feel, how you dress, how you behave will be a you that is different from the you who 
goes to a party of friends and colleagues in a loft where you sit guzzling wine and beer, 
and munching on pretzels. Or the you who attends a children’s birthday party, or a party 
given by your parents for your friends. In each situation your very idiom changes, your 
self-image changes. 
 offers this comment: 
147
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Hagen focuses on feeling, dress and behavior as the features that vary from situation to situation. 
Dress doesn’t need a lot of investigation in this context, and as I’ll show in the next chapter, the 
current understanding of emotional activity indicates a reflexive relationship between feelings 
and behavior. Hagen goes on to explain how she relates these different selves to the “essential 
self” by stating that each situation provides the actor with different “behaviorisms” and that 
recognizing these helps the actor in the “continuing job of learning to find out who you really 
are…” 148 The sense is that there is a self that one “really” is, and that the multiple selves, 
defined by behavior and feeling, demonstrate different aspects of this self. This self is then used 
as “the source for the character” 149
Robert Benedetti puts a similar view forward in 
 
The Actor at Work
You play a role every time you enter a social situation … It is this interaction with your 
world  - this give and take of acting and reacting, this adjustment of your behavior to fit 
your circumstances and those with whom you interact - that shapes and expresses your 
personality, your character, in everyday life … William James’s idea [is] that human 
personality contains various ‘me’s’ that one adopts in various situations but that are all 
versions of one’s central identity, the “I.” 
, another popular 
acting text: 
150
Benedetti’s view of how this understanding applies to performance has a different emphasis than 
Hagen’s. While Hagen defines the situational selves as aspects of the “essential self”, Benedetti 
talks about a character as “ …a new version of yourself, perhaps quite different from your 
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everyday self…” 151
A further feature of the examples above is that they deal only with conscious awareness 
of the self, whereas approaches like Chekhov’s and Lecoq’s, that place particular emphasis on 
stimulating the imagination through physical activity, might well be more successful at sparking 
unconscious metaphorical connections. Some light can be thrown on this aspect by Joseph 
LeDoux’s survey of neuroscientific research in 
 He also summarizes this section by saying that character grows out of 
action, which is very close to the principle that I proposed at the beginning of this chapter, and 
congruent with the cognitive principles that I’ve been describing. Interestingly, Benedetti 
proposes an exercise in which the actor repeatedly performs an expressive physical action in 
order to discover an altered sense of self, which echoes Chekhov’s and Smith’s approaches. The 
difference between Hagen’s and Benedetti’s conceptions of character and self perhaps reflects 
the change in understanding of Stanislavski’s theory that has occurred in the period between the 
writing of the two books  (Hagen published in 1973, the latest edition of Benedetti’s book dates 
from 2005), and this is something that I’ll investigate later in this chapter. Both, however, refer 
to everyday experiences as the source of the actor’s repertoire of experience and behavior, 
which, in comparison to Lecoq’s work, limits the actor’s expressive range. There is also a lack of 
distinction between narrative action and behavioral action in both of their books. 
Synaptic Self: How our Brains Become Who We 
Are
                                                 
151 ibid. 79 
. Current thinking on self in the field of cognitive studies distinguishes between those aspects 
of the self that we are, or can become, aware of, and those aspects that exist outside of conscious 
awareness. LeDoux’s position (in common with most working in this field) is that consciousness 
depends on unconscious cognitive processes, and also that it is possible to synthesize the various 
theories of personality. He defines those things that we are conscious of as explicit aspects of the 
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self. This category would include the multiple situational selves posited by Hagen and Benedetti. 
The implicit category includes those aspects of self “that are not immediately available to 
consciousness, either because they are by their nature inaccessible, or because they are accessible 
but not being accessed at the moment.” 152
The categories of explicit and implicit also apply to types of memory, and this is 
especially significant for the discussion of self and character in acting. As LeDoux points out: 
“To the extent that our life’s experiences contribute to who we are, implicit and explicit memory 
storage constitute key mechanisms through which the self is formed and maintained.” 
 
153
 Explicit memories are, naturally, those that we are conscious of, and would include the 
everyday experiences in different situations that Hagen and Benedetti regard as the actor’s 
repertoire of behavior. In the approach that their writings characterize, it is this aspect of self that 
is considered to include the “essential self” whose application to a role is necessary for 
authenticity. This approach does not take account of those aspects of self that are not available to 
consciousness, but these implicit memories are operating all the time: “The way that we 
characteristically walk and talk and even the way we think and feel reflect the workings of 
systems that function on the basis of past experience, but their operation takes place outside of 
awareness.” 
 In 
referring to “life’s experiences” he is talking about those aspects of self that are learned rather 
than the result of genetic heritage. It is those learned aspects that the actor is concerned with, 
because they are, to varying extents, malleable, while genetic heritage is not. 
154
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The majority of factors that go to make up the self are not conscious. 
Consequently, the idea that we can achieve authenticity in a role by identifying our essential “I” 
153 ibid. 28 
154 ibid. 28 
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with it is misguided. It does not reflect current convergent opinion about the nature of the self. 
To whatever extent that we can know what our essential “I” is, it seems unlikely that we can 
consciously make it be part of one of our situational selves. It seems to make sense to 
acknowledge that what we are doing in creating a character is expressing a range of behavior that 
reflects our understanding of an author’s intent, that seems credible in the fictional 
circumstances, and that forms a temporary situational self through the imagination, with feelings 
that arise through a combination of physical actions and empathetic stimuli in the fiction. 
Both Chekhov and Smith acknowledge the difference between “self” and “other”, and in 
some senses are both imitating the “other’s” gestures –Smith is using the perceptual stimuli 
gained from sight and hearing, while Chekhov responds to what is “seen” in the imagination. 
Both Smith and Chekhov explicitly differentiate their approaches from that of Stanislavski: 
Chekhov challenged Stanislavski’s conception of the relationship between self and character, and 
while Smith also opposes an approach that focuses on similarities between character and self, it 
seems that she is resistant to analysis in general. Her experiences provide a vivid example of the 
physiological effect of imitation, but her approach of imitating interviewees has limited 
application. How can actors use actions to stimulate the imagination in other forms of 
performance? In the case of written drama, the narrative action is already determined, so the 
actor’s choice is operating at the level of behavioral actions. What is the imaginative process that 
operates when these choices arise in response to written fiction? 
Much discourse about the role of the imagination in contemporary acting derives from 
Stanislavski’s concept of the “magic if”. This involves the actor behaving “as if” they are 
themselves in the fictional situation of the character. Information about this idea was originally 
included in An Actor Prepares. As Sharon Carnicke has pointed out, Elizabeth Hapgood’s 
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translation often distorted the meaning of the work, so I quote from the recent translation by Jean 
Benedetti: “The word ‘if’ is a spur, a stimulus to inner and outer creative dynamism. All you 
have to do is say ‘What would I do, how would I handle it if the story of the madman turned out 
to be actually true?’ and immediately you are dynamic and alive.” 155
Recent research has given us a more sophisticated understanding of imagination than was 
available to Stanislavski. L & J show that the imagination is not a discrete or specialized 
function, as is often thought, but that it is a feature of cognition that is woven through much of 
our mental processes as metaphoric activity. Beyond this, researchers in the field of cognitive 
studies point to the role that the imagination plays in interpersonal communication. This is 
described by what is known as Theory of Mind –our capacity to understand and sometimes 
predict the behavior of other people. We do this by attributing to them mental states that include 
beliefs, desires, and intentions, which requires a degree of imaginative activity. This is another 
feature of mental activity that is central to acting. Clearly, it is in operation when actors interact 
 In light of the features of 
self that I’ve described, this process seems to encourage the actor to respond from his or her own 
personality, to use what L & J call “Advisory Projection.” While this links the actor 
imaginatively to the fictional situation, the actor’s personality defines the character’s response. 
This has always seemed illogical to me. My personality is not the same as that of Lear or 
Leontes, and I would not respond to their fictional circumstances in the way that they do. This is 
true both at the level of narrative and behavioral action. While it is understandable that 
Stanislavski sought to promote credible behavior in actors, the legacy of this particular idea 
seems to limit the activity of the imagination in preparing a role. 
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with one another as characters, and it is also active in the individual actor as he or she reads and 
responds to a script, which is more the focus of this discussion than the former activity.  
Examining recent research into the nature of empathy assists an understanding of this 
imaginative response to written material. As McConachie and Hart point out in Performance and 
Cognition
[P]sychological and philosophical investigations have altered and broadened the 
conventional definition of empathy. Although empathy still involves seeing the world 
‘through another person’s eyes,’ many in cognitive studies have decoupled empathic 
projection from emotional identification. 
: 
156
This position arises from both theoretical hypotheses and experimental approaches. Philosopher 
Robert Gordon was the first to propose that we simulate the mental states of others in order to 
understand their behavior, or to predict their decision-making. This proposition, known as 
simulation theory (ST), holds that if our brains are able to use their own processes to represent 
those of others, then it is not necessary to hold a mental store of knowledge about other people’s 
behavior, a position known as “theory” theory (TT). Gordon’s proposition would mean that one 
imaginatively places oneself in another’s situation in order to understand them. McConachie 
points out that that this is similar to Stanislavski’s “as if” question. However, in contrast to 
Stanislavski, Gordon’s position allows for a continuum of adjustments that adapt to the other’s 
situations. The default position would be one in which no adjustments are necessary, occurring at 
an unconscious level. Adjustments to take account of difference can be unconscious or 
conscious, and could include character traits, thus moving beyond the Advisory Projection of 
Stanislavski’s approach.  
 
                                                 
156 McConachie 5 
 132 
As a theoretical model, ST has been strengthened by the discovery of Mirror neurons 
(MNs). These are neurons that fire in the pre motor cortex when one executes a goal-directed 
action, and also when one observes a similar action executed by someone else. MNs were 
originally discovered in macaque monkeys by a team of scientists including Vittorio Gallese 
who, with Alvin Goldman, built on this discovery to identify a mental mechanism in primates by 
which an observer mimics, resonates with, or re-creates the mental life of others based on direct 
observation of their movements. In a paper published in 2004, Gallese and others lay out the 
evidence that mirror neurons are also active in humans, both for action and emotions. They 
choose to call this process of internal replication “simulation”, linking it with Gordon’s theory 
but modifying the concept: 
… the fundamental mechanism that allows us a direct experiential grasp of the mind of 
others is not conceptual reasoning but direct simulation of the observed events through the 
mirror mechanism. The novelty of our approach consists in providing for the first time a 
neurophysiological account of the experiential dimension of both action and emotion 
understanding. 157
Obviously, we are able to reason about the actions and emotions of others at a conscious level 
when we choose to, but Gallese argues that mirror neuron system responses occur without any 
reflective mediation, without passing through the phase of conscious cognition. Thus, to a certain 
degree, we are actually experiencing the actions and emotions of others as we watch them. 
 
Some everyday examples will help to illustrate the phenomenon in the case of actions: I 
notice that when I play tug-of-war with my dog, I clench my jaws and teeth tight, even though 
I’m holding whatever we’re tugging with my hand. I notice that when watching a game of rugby 
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on tv, I brace myself for impact as a player is about to be tackled. I also notice that I move my 
body to the side (a swerve) as a player attempts to evade a tackle. (This was brought sharply to 
my attention when running on a treadmill as I watched a game.) These responses are probably 
more marked in me as a former rugby player than if I had not played rugby; I have executed 
these patterns of movement repeatedly of my own volition in the past.  An fMRI study of dancers 
from the styles of ballet and capoeira showed that they displayed more neuronal activity when 
watching dance in their own style than the other, and that both groups of dancers exhibited more 
neuronal activity than a control group of non-dancers.158
 Clearly this discovery has significant implications for acting theory, but a significant 
step needs to be made between these effects in daily life, where individuals respond to other 
individuals, and the way actors might be employing these mechanisms in response to reading 
about, imagining, or improvising a fictional character.  Might the same mechanism be involved 
in imaginative responses to a piece of writing? Gallese reports that it does: 
  This suggests that the establishing of 
neuronal patterns through training and repetition plays a significant part in the activity of mirror 
systems, in that they are more likely to fire in response to observed action that is already 
patterned in the observer.   
There is a part of your brain which is active when you do something, when you see 
someone else doing something, or when you are imagining either yourself doing 
something, or someone else doing something. The overlap is not perfect, so in other 
words, not all the same regions in your brain which are activated when you imagine 
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doing something are activated when you imagine the same thing being done by someone 
else.159
Imaginative responses to fiction, then, are to some extent the actual experience of what fictional 
characters do. The degree of intensity varies, presumably, from individual to individual, and 
probably from experience to experience within the same individual. It has been shown, though, 
that the amount of neuronal activity involved in mirror systems is increased when one physically 
duplicates the activity that is observed.
 
160
Another significant feature of the imagination’s response to fiction is that it uses a very 
similar pathway in the brain to perceptual responses to external stimuli: 
 When viewed from this perspective, Chekhov’s work 
of imagining the character, and duplicating the physical activity that one sees, would seem to 
intensify the actor’s imaginative experience.  
There is no distinct anatomical region of the brain used for representing the merely 
imaginary; nor is there a distinct set of nerve fibers carrying information exclusively 
about the merely imaginary; nor does there seem to be a special affective, or, for that 
matter, motor region designated for receiving input about the merely imaginary. 161
This information further destabilizes the “internal/external” dichotomy that is prevalent in 
conceptions about approaches to character, but also provokes an intriguing question: If 
imaginary stimuli use the same pathways as perceptual stimuli, why do we not carry out actions 
as a result of fiction? And what is it that inhibits physical action as a result of mirroring 
mechanisms? As my bruising encounter with the treadmill shows, the inhibition of motor activity 
in response to observed action is not complete. Schroeder and Matheson offer a possible answer 
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to the first question: “… actions are influenced more by belief than by mere representation in 
general, while feelings tend to be much more powerfully influenced by representation without 
regard to belief, regardless of whether the imagination is involved or not.” 162
The combined import of these interlocking pieces of theory and experimental evidence 
suggests that an actor is more likely to create a vivid embodiment of a character by using the 
imagination to stimulate an image of the character as an other, using physical actions to duplicate 
the imagined actions of the character, and by allowing feelings to arise from these activities 
without questioning whether they are “authentic” expressions of the “essential self”. For actors, 
then, it makes sense to train physically in the mechanics of behavioral expression to establish 
neuronal patterning that will facilitate these responses. If one is a mild-mannered person, for 
example, the neural patterns associated with the facial expression of anger, might not be very 
well established. Daily practices of the configurations of the facial expressions associated with 
primary emotions would provide a wider range of neuronal patterns that will respond more 
effectively to imaginary stimuli. In my experience, this sort of work is rarely done in actor 
training programs because it doesn’t fit with the prevailing concepts of authenticity and 
naturalness as “internal” qualities that would be contaminated by “technical” exercises. 
 If this is true, our 
belief that what we are reading or improvising is a fiction will inhibit our actions, but not our 
feelings. On the other side of the footlights, this goes a significant way towards explaining why 
an audience can be moved by something an actor does, while knowing that it is a fiction. 
A further piece of information leads the discussion back to Stanislavski. Psychologists 
Jonathan Schooler and Tonya Engstler-Schooler have conducted experiments at the University of 
Pittsburgh that show that verbal descriptions of visual stimuli impair one’s ability to 
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subsequently recognize what had been seen. 163
This hypothesis of what happens in verbal analysis of a script seems to be congruent with 
both McNeill’s analysis of the difference between speech and gesture, and Merlin Donald’s 
proposition that mimesis is an earlier evolutionary development than language: Mimesis is 
gestural, gestures are processed as visual image in the brain. Images that arise through 
imaginative activity are more like perceptual stimuli than language. An approach that encourages 
the imaginative development of visual stimuli in response to a script will more readily provoke 
gestures and feelings in an actor than an approach that supplants imagery with verbal description. 
That is not to say that fine performances cannot arise from a process that includes table analysis; 
it is a question of emphasis and sequencing. If the emphasis in a rehearsal is solely on conceptual 
ideas, the actor will have a significant jump to make when he or she gets to the gestural phase  -
 They have called this phenomenon “verbal 
overshadowing”, since it seems that the verbalization of a visual memory overshadows, but does 
not eradicate, the original visual memory. Some experiments worked with memories of faces, but 
the principle seems to apply to other perceptual stimuli such as taste and hearing. The connection 
with Stanislavski arises because of his use of “table analysis” – a process where actors sit with 
the director at a table and verbally analyze the script, identifying motivations, objectives and 
actions. Schooler’s findings suggest that this process would inhibit unconscious imaginative 
responses to the fictional world of the script, since it replaces the potential perceptual stimuli that 
might arise in the imagination with word-based, largely conscious thinking. The process of table 
analysis would also influence subsequent rehearsal, since actors would be likely to mentally refer 
back to the verbal analysis of the script, rather than images or sensations it provokes. In the 
terminology that Schooler uses, this would be “recoding interference”.  
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embodying the character in action. If, however, the investigation of the script’s meaning includes 
gestural activity alongside conceptual analysis, the meld is more akin to what the actor does in 
performance, where meaning is communicated both by words and gestures.  
Stanislavski seems to have come to an intuitive realization of these principles over the 
course of his life. As he developed his ideas, he turned from table analysis to “active analysis”, a 
process that became the cornerstone of his later work, which he called the Method of Physical 
Actions. This phase of Stanislavski’s work is much less well known than his earlier approach; 
given the influence that his ideas have on actor training in the U.S., it is important that the 
Method of Physical Actions, and the principles that explain its effectiveness, become better 
known. 
An understanding of Stanislavski’s work is complicated by three factors; the 
development and change of his ideas over his lifetime; the history of translation and publication 
of his work; and the partial application of his principles by Lee Strasberg that became known and 
popularized as the Method. During the period that Chekhov was working with Stanislavski 
(1912-1928), key features of his work included Emotion Memory, “Inner” psychological drives, 
and, as Chekhov noted, the idea that character and actor should be the same. The approach that is 
recorded in Vasily Toporkov’s  Stanislavski in Rehearsal
Stanislavski made several attempts to record his system, but only settled on the diary 
format in the late 1920’s, beginning work in 1928 after a heart attack that prevented him from 
continuing to perform. What was intended to be one book, 
 shows significant differences, which I 
will address later.  
The Actor’s Work on Himself, was 
eventually published in Russian in two parts in 1938 and 1953. The English publication of the 
first part as An Actor Prepares was in 1936, and of the second part as Building a Character in 
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1950. The first part of his book dealt with “internal” aspects, while the second focuses on 
physical and technical features of performance, although it remains unfinished because of 
Stanislavski’s death in 1938. In the opinion of Jean Benedetti, who has translated the entire work 
and related fragments, the intended result is “a unified, coherent psycho-physical technique.” 164 
Benedetti acknowledges the way in which the splitting of the work has resulted in 
misunderstanding, and reports that Stanislavski feared that by printing just the first part, his 
system would be considered purely psychological, and a form of “ultranaturalism”. Additionally, 
as we know from Sharon Carnicke’s analysis in Stanislavsky in Focus
Carnicke also addresses the way in which Stanislavski’s system became distorted by Lee 
Strasberg as “the Method”, describing how the founders of the Actors’ Studio (Elia Kazan, 
Robert Lewis and Stella Adler) favored the later version of the system, as described by Stella 
Adler following her sojourn in Paris with Stanislavski in 1934:  
, numerous distortions 
arose from confusions in the oral transmission of the system, and from Elizabeth Hapgood’s 
translation. 
When Adler spoke to the Group Theatre that summer about then unfamiliar  
aspects of the System, she split the group into camps and challenged Strasberg’s 
sole authority. She specifically opposed his take on affective memory with new 
information on how the play’s given circumstances shape character, the power of 
the actor’s imagination and what would come to be known as the Method of  
Physical Actions. 165
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Strasberg reacted angrily to her description, and asserted the value of “his” method, and 
by 1951 had gained complete control of the Studio. Benedetti describes the difference between 
Stanislavski’s system and the Method as follows; 
In the “system” the primary emphasis is on action, interaction and the dramatic situation 
which result in feeling with Emotion Memory as a secondary, ancillary technique. In the 
Method, Emotion Memory is placed at the very centre; the actor consciously evokes personal 
feelings that correspond to the character, a technique which Stanislavski expressly rejected ... 
Strasberg’s main concern was to enable the actor to unblock his emotions. 166
This analysis is generally concordant with other accounts of Strasberg’s emphasis, but 
Benedetti glosses over the question of how Stanislavski’s ideas changed over time, and 
consequently overstresses the intended coherence of his system. As is clear from Chekhov’s 
comments that in the 1920’s, Stanislavski believed in the character and the actor being the same. 
This advisory projection is confirmed by the passage about the “magic if” that I’ve quoted from 
the Benedetti-translated 
 
The Actor’s Work. Another quote from a piece of Stanislavski’s writing 
that preceded this work 167 makes clear his belief that authenticity lies inside the actor: “Scenic 
action is the movement from the soul to the body, from the center to the periphery, from the 
internal to the external, from the thing an actor feels to its physical form.” 168
    Evidently, Strasberg resisted the changes in thinking that were reported by Adler. 
Despite the internal politics within the Studio, Strasberg’s Method became associated with 
 So it is not only the 
splitting up of the original volume that led to the belief in the West that Stanislavski’s work 
focused only on the self of the actor, but also the change and development of his ideas over time. 
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Kazan’s success as a director, and the success of Studio-trained actors like Brando -who, 
ironically, had been Adler’s student. The fact that An Actor Prepares
In addition to the historical accidents that led to this conflation, the growth in popularity 
of this concept of acting also reflected wider socio-cultural factors. In 
 was the only available 
written information about Stanislavski’s system until 1950 further assisted in the conflation of 
Stanislavski’s system and the Method as an acting process that prized subjectivity and self-
expression.  
American Theater in the 
Culture of the Cold War: Producing and Contesting Containment, 1947-1962, Bruce 
McConachie investigates the way in which the concept of containment manifests itself as a social 
metaphor in a variety of ways during this period. Of particular interest to this discussion is the 
way in which the container metaphor of self operates in the appeal of Method acting to the Cold 
War generation: “… the model of self embedded in Method performance conformed to the 
contained, psychologized self of cold war culture.” This self is seen as “an authentic inner 
essence trapped inside a repressive outer shell.” 169
 The way in which Stanislavski developed his work over his lifetime makes his ideas 
about character and process significantly different from the Method approach. The Method of 
Physical Actions, described by Adler and rejected by Strasberg, relates character to situation, 
emphasizes the actor’s imagination, and discovers meaning in physical activity. In this 
conceptualization, the body becomes a conduit of meaning –from the fictional environment to 
 In this conceptualization, the boundary of the 
body creates a rigid distinction between the internal and the external; the interior authenticity can 
only partly be seen through the activities of the body, and any notion of a two-way relationship 
between thought and feeling and gestural activity is absent.   
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the actor, and from the character to the audience. In the last production Stanislavski worked on, 
Moliere’s Tartuffe, he replaced “analysis of feelings” with “active analysis”, after complaining 
that “after long discussions ‘at the table’ and individual visualizations, ‘the actor comes on stage 
with a stuffed head and an empty heart, and can act nothing.’” 170 This experience could be seen 
as an example of verbal overshadowing, where verbal reasoning replaces the imaginative stimuli 
that follow perceptual pathways. To engage the actors in the fictional environment of the play, 
and to stimulate a shared imaginative response to the play, Stanislavski put the actors on their 
feet from the beginning of rehearsal, improvising the situations of different scenes, paraphrasing 
the dialogue, and discovering the spatial elements of Orgon’s house, creating what Carnicke calls 
“collective fantasy”. 171
Vasili Toporkov’s book 
 
Stanislavski in Rehearsal provides individual examples of how 
rehearsals were conducted at this stage of Stanislavski’s life. Toporkov describes his own 
journey from joining the Moscow Art Theatre in 1927 to the production of Tartuffe on which 
Stanislavski was working when he died in 1938. Toporkov is frank about the challenges that he 
encountered in understanding Stanislavski’s way of working, providing fascinating details about 
rehearsal process, and his account is sensitively translated by Jean Benedetti. Toporkov recounts 
his first rehearsal in a play called The Embezzlers
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, in which he plays a cashier. Stanislavski 
watches his first attempt at a scene, and then questions him about the cashier’s office. Toporkov 
has not given any thought to this, and Stanislavski proceeds to give a lengthy description of the 
imagined office that begins: “Here we have the cashier, Vanechka, a mild, modest young man. 
His office is his home. It is his holy of holies. It is the best thing in his life. Everything about it 
171 ibid 32 
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reveals the nature of his concerns…” 172 The description continues to include details such as the 
cleanliness of the office, the well-oiled hinges of the safe, the cashier’s pencil, how banknotes 
are arranged in the safe and so on. It is intriguing to note how Stanislavski’s elaborate word 
picture moves from physical details to the way in which they reflect aspects of the character’s 
personality: “Vanechka can always tell how much is in there at any given moment. He loves the 
process of paying in and paying out. Issuing and checking money in the department is a holy 
ritual, a work of art for him.” 173
The process becomes more explicit when, in rehearsing another scene from 
 The sense is that he uses perceptual information to stimulate 
Toporkov’s imagination, and then relates the physical environment to the values and traits of the 
character, by encouraging the actor to engage imaginatively with his fictional environment. 
The 
Embezzlers
Go on working, don’t force anything, cautiously make your starting point the most 
simple, living, organic actions. Don’t think about the character. The character will 
emerge as a result of your performing truthful actions in the given circumstances. You 
have just seen, in this example, how you can build a pathway by going from one small 
truth to another, testing yourself out, releasing your imagination and so achieve a vivid, 
expressive character. 
, Stanislavski instructs actors to focus on the physical circumstances of the fictional 
scene, repeatedly refusing actions that were illogical or contrived: 
174
The injunction not to think about the character shows Stanislavski’s intent to place the attention 
of the conscious mind on the fictional circumstances, and physical actions within those 
circumstances. The imagination is stimulated through perceptual information, and the character 
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results from an unconscious combining of these elements. In Toporkov’s report, Stanislavski 
frequently distinguishes between behavior, and “playacting”, with behavior favored. Toporkov 
writes of his own response: 
At that time I still had not grasped the full significance of this type of work. I didn’t know 
the meaning of Stanislavski’s secret, that by truthfully performing physical actions and 
following the logic and sequence you can achieve the most complex feelings and 
experiences, those qualities which we had tried unsuccessfully to achieve in the first 
period of our work. 175
This process creates an environmental fictional situation, provoking the development of 
character as a situational self through physical responses to the imagined circumstances.  
 
While Stanislavski did not relinquish the concept of “internal” and “external” to describe 
the actor’s relationship to character, the metaphors he uses at this stage of his work suggest an 
interlinked whole. He saw the three basic drives behind creativity –“mind”, “will’, and “feeling” 
– as being “inextricably linked to each other in a tightly bound ‘knot’ or ‘bundle’.” 176 This 
bundle is not experiencing a struggle between its internal essence and its external container, but 
rather is “‘blended and interdependent!’ like a ‘harmonious’ musical chord.” 177
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 In 
Stanislavsky’s later practice one can see a holism that is absent in a great deal of current acting 
training, and which achieves the development of character in a way that is sympathetic to what 
we now understand about the processes of imagination and empathic responses to fiction. There 
is no insistence on authenticity through the transposition of the “essential I” to the character, but 
a development of a “self” who behaves in a way that is credible within a set of fictional 
176 Carnicke 2000, 33 
177 ibid 33 
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circumstances –a situational self. This process fits with the current convergence of opinion about 
self in daily life, summarized in this comment by psychologist Jerome Bruner: 
There is no such thing as an intuitively obvious and essential self to know, one that just 
sits there ready to be portrayed in words. Rather, we constantly construct and reconstruct 
our selves to meet the needs of the situations we encounter, and we do so with the 
guidance of our memories of the past and our hopes and fears for the future. 178
In the rehearsal process that Toporkov describes, the character emerges from a similar process, 
and feelings arise without conscious bidding through a combination of physical actions and 
empathetic responses to a fiction that is embodied from early on in a rehearsal, and thus more 
likely to stimulate the imagination. 
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6.0  HOW DOES THE ACTOR EMBODY EMOTION IN FICTIONAL 
CIRCUMSTANCES? 
As with the other areas that I have covered, there have been significant advances in the 
understanding of emotion in the last thirty years. This has arisen through a shift of emphasis in 
scientific research from a psychological to a biological approach that has been facilitated by the 
ability to study the human brain in operation with technologies such as functional Magnetic 
Resonance Imaging (fMRI), Magnetoencephalography (MEG), and Positron Emission 
Tomography (PET). Neuroscientists conceptualize brain functions as patterns of nerve cell 
activity; in fMRI, MEG, and PET studies, these patterns can be identified and traced. This 
process originated from work on the visual system, where objects in the environment have an 
effect on retinal receptive cells, with patterns of activation in the brain corresponding to external 
stimuli. The evidence from such studies, coupled with experimental research on animals, has 
allowed neuroscientists to offer empirically based descriptions of emotional processes.  
 However, concepts of emotion in actor training are still largely derived from variations 
of Stanislavski’s approach, which was inspired by his reading of the work of nineteenth-century 
psychologist Théodule Ribot. Sharon Carnicke points out in Stanislavski in Focus that 
Stanislavski’s approach bore little relationship to Ribot’s findings. The feature of Ribot’s work 
that Stanislavski focused on was his research into the memory of emotions. Ribot distinguished 
between “concrete” and “abstract” memories. “Concrete” memories would be felt in the body in 
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the same way as the original emotion, while an “abstract” recollection would be “intellectual”. 
Although Ribot concluded that “[t]he emotional memory is nil in the majority of people” 179 
Stanislavski decided that actors could develop their ability to recall “affective memory” by 
becoming more attuned to the feelings of the senses: “Once you can grow pale or blush at the 
memory of something you have experienced, once you are frightened to think about something 
unhappy that you lived through long ago, you have a memory for chuvstva (feelings, senses) or a 
memory for emotion.” 180
Stanislavski seeks to explain the application of “affective memory” in 
 
An Actor’s 
Work.181 Ironically, his choice of example demonstrates the effectiveness of imagination more 
than that of memory. In an exercise designed to stimulate the “as if “ phenomenon, Stanislavski’s 
fictional alter-ego, Tortsov, asks his students to behave as if a violent madman were at the door. 
The actors improvise a scene where they blockade the door with furniture, hunt for potential 
weapons, and hide themselves. Tortsov is satisfied with the reality of their behavior. Some time 
later, he asks them to repeat the improvised scene, only to be disappointed with the lack of 
“internal” truth. As the narrator recounts: “Tortsov and Rakhmanov told us that while our earlier 
efforts had been direct, sincere, fresh and true, what we had done today was wrong, insincere and 
contrived …” 182
If, the first time, your actions were prompted by your feelings, your intuition, your 
everyday experience, today you followed a well-beaten track blindly, almost 
 The distinction between the two outcomes is described by Tortsov as follows:  
                                                 
179 Carnicke 1998, 133 
180 ibid. 133 
181 As in previous chapters, I quote from Jean Benedetti’s translation, believing it to be more accurate than 
Hapgood’s 
182 Stanislavski 2008,195 
 147 
mechanically. You repeated the first, successful version, and didn’t create a genuine, new 
life belonging solely to today. 183
In response to questioning, Tortsov explains that this arose because the group “displayed an 
excellent memory for externals. But as for memory of feelings, that was not evident today.” He 
goes on to explain that he has replaced Ribot’s term “affective memory” with “Emotion 
memory”, and that recalling emotions is crucial to giving the scene life. Evidently, at this stage 
of Stanislavski’s work, there is a pronounced emphasis on the concept of difference between 
“inside” and “outside”, and a belief that emotion in fictional circumstances needs to be accessed 
through memory, as a further included in Carnicke’s book emphasizes: 
 
“Actors can experience only their own emotions” Stanislavski explains. “They can 
understand, empathize, put themselves in their characters’ shoes, and begin to act as the 
characters do. This creative action calls forth experiences analogous with the role … You 
never lose yourself on stage. You always act in your own person as artist. There’s no 
walking away from yourself.” 184
In the literal sense, there is some truth to the statement that actors can only experience their own 
emotions; however the cognitive research on empathy described in the previous chapter shows 
that one’s own emotion can arise through the mirror neuron mechanism when observing 
another’s emotion. Similarly, Stanislavski’s statement that “creative action” can only call forth 
“analogous experiences” from the actor’s own life does not sit well with contemporary cognitive 
theory. As Patrick Colm Hogan points out:  
 
It is well-established that when we concretely imagine an object, our brains  
behave in much the same way they do when we actually perceive the object…  
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Thus it would seem that the imagination of emotion triggers operates in the same  
general way as the direct perception of those triggers. The intensity may be less.  
But that no doubt depends on the vivacity of the imagination. 185
Hogan draws on information that makes it clear that emotion, like empathy, can be triggered 
from fictional sources, something that will be considered in more detail later in this chapter. 
Stanislavski’s insistence on Affective Memory as the resource for emotion in the early and 
middle parts of his career gave way in the latter part of his life to his work with physical actions 
as he came to recognize that emotions cannot be controlled in the same way that the body can, 
but that control of the body can bring forth emotion.  
 
Nevertheless, the use of Affective Memory exercises in actor training in the U.S. has 
become widespread through the influence of Lee Strasberg, who took up this concept from 
Richard Boleslavsky, and, as described in the last chapter, placed emotion memory at the center 
of his “method”. This decision correlates with the emphasis on the biographical experience of the 
actor as the primary resource in creating a role. In Strasberg’s conception of acting, the actor can 
only create “truth” in performance through the recall of lived experience: 
Affective memory is the basic material for reliving on the stage, and therefore for the 
creation of a real experience on the stage. What the actor repeats in performance after 
performance is not just the words and movements he practiced in rehearsal, but the 
memory of emotion. He reaches his emotion through the memory of thought and 
sensation. 186
This formulation of what an actor does to successfully embody a character is notable for 
its lack of acknowledgement of imagination or craft, or of an awareness of the way physical 
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activity can stimulate emotion. Strasberg’s commentary on the subject of emotion is frequently 
contradictory. For example, in an interview with Richard Schechner published in 1964, Strasberg 
first of all states that affective memory “is the basic element of the actor’s reality”, 187 but then 
that the “basic idea of affective memory is not emotional recall but that the actor’s emotion on 
the stage should never be really real. It always should be only remembered emotion.” 188
The actor [does not] try to recall the feeling directly, but rather to re-experience the 
sensory impressions surrounding it … Then the actor went over the exact sequence of 
events, concentrating on re-creating as precisely as possible the physical reality of the 
moment. When done properly with a strong situation, the exercise almost invariably 
brought the emotion flooding back to the present. The actor could then play the scene 
with the appropriate feeling. 
 Clearly, 
Strasberg has some idea of differences between “reality” and the “really real”, and “emotional 
recall” and “remembered emotion”, but what they are remains unclear. Even those who advocate 
for the effectiveness of the process fail to provide any meaningful criteria about the distinction 
between “real” emotion and “remembered” emotion. Wendy Smith attempts to explain one 
related exercise as follows: 
189
If, as Smith states, the exercise can bring the emotion “flooding back to the present”, how can 
one distinguish this from a “real” emotion?  
 
Further inconsistencies arise in David Krasner’s attempt to defend the practice against the 
critiques of writers such as Robert Brustein, Richard Hornby, and Colin Counsell. Krasner states 
that  
                                                 
187 Strasberg 1964 131 
188 Strasberg 1964 132 
189 Smith, W. 38 
 150 
the feelings evoked during an episode of affective memory may surprise the actor 
(you may laugh when you thought you would cry), and that is significant –the 
performer has created a true, original and spontaneous sense or feeling in 
response to scenic events.” 190
Again, the avoidance of acknowledging the role of imagination in the process leads to a 
contradiction –the “spontaneous response” is to the memory, not to the fictional circumstances of 
the “scenic events”. Since the exercise is intended to generate emotions appropriate to the 
fictional circumstances, unexpected responses would appear to be counterproductive to the 
intended result, although Method practitioners would prize them for their apparent spontaneity. 
 
 Strasberg’s insistence on biographical experience as the source of “truth” in the actor 
requires a belief that it is memory that provokes the experience of emotion in that actor. The 
convoluted and contradictory attempts to explain the usefulness of affective memory are based 
on concepts of self, consciousness and emotion that L & J call “Folk Theories”  - ideas of how 
we function that originate from the limited conscious awareness that we have of processes that 
are largely unconscious. The current understanding of the brain derived from neuroscience and 
experimental psychology points in a very different direction from the notions propounded by 
Strasberg. Patrick Colm Hogan, drawing on the work of experimental psychologist Daniel 
Schacter points out that memories  
are not like little videotapes stored in our heads. […] our minds reconstruct remembered 
events in relation to current concerns, experiences, and so on. Thus my recollection of a 
past event may change significantly, depending on the situation in which I am asked 
about it … The reconstruction of memories is affected by current emotional states as well 
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… Thus I remember a past event differently if I am now sad than If I am angry, fearful, 
or whatever. 191
This suggests that Strasberg’s activity of encouraging sense memory in order to stimulate 
emotional memory is as much an imaginative exercise as it is one of recall. As such, it is affected 
by the current circumstances in which the activity is undertaken. Hogan also explains that:  
  
…it seems that our memory storage is in fact very fragmentary and discontinuous. We 
have partial and isolated memories of past events … [i]n fact ‘retrieving’ a memory is a 
highly elaborate and constructive process. We access fragments from the relevant time 
period and link them together, often using broad schemas. In other words, we do not 
really remember the past, we reconstruct it – often in a way that reflects our present 
concerns as much as our past experience, sometimes in a way that does not reflect our 
past experience at all. 192
Joseph LeDoux describes the way in which this phenomenon arises in 
 
Synaptic Self: How our 
Brains Become Who We Are. The book is an examination of the brain mechanisms that create 
personality and self. LeDoux refers to a wide range of clinical research on the synaptic processes 
of features such as perception, memory and emotion. In a section titled “Reliving the Emotional 
Past”, LeDoux describes the way in which a part of the brain called the amygdala is involved in 
both the storage and retrieval of memories that have a strong emotional component. The 
information gives us a clearer understanding of what is happening when an actor tries to use 
“affective memory” to generate emotion. LeDoux points out that “Explicit memories established 
during emotional situations are often especially vivid and enduring…” 193
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explains the initial attraction of “affective memory” for Stanislavski, Strasberg and others. 
Experiments by psychologist Paul Ekman also describe the potential that the memory of an event 
has to generate emotion in the present. In his experiments, subjects responded emphatically in a 
physiological manner to the invitation to remember an emotion-inducing event: 
For example, to call forth sadness we asked people to remember a time in their 
life when someone to whom they were attached had died. We asked them to 
visualize a moment when they had felt the most intense sadness and then to try to  
experience again the emotion they had felt when the death first happened. 194
Instruments measuring heart rate, respiration, blood pressure, sweating and skin temperature 
showed that “the changes that occur when emotions are remembered actually resemble the 
changes that occur when emotions begin by other means…” 
  
195
These physiological indicators suggest that memory can stimulate emotion.  
 
LeDoux also describes how this phenomenon arises at the neurological level when the 
emotion of fear is engaged: 
During emotional arousal, outputs of the central amygdala trigger the release of  
hormones from the adrenal gland that return to the brain. … By way of its  
connections with the hippocampus and other regions of the explicit memory 
system, the amygdala then modulates (strengthens) the consolidation of explicit 
memories being formed during emotional arousal. 196
So far, this description would seem to support the idea that memories of emotional events would 
be useful resources for the actor. However, LeDoux concurs with Shacter in saying that 
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“memories are more easily retrieved when the emotional state at the time of memory formation 
matches the state at the time of retrieval.” 197 This poses a problem for the actor engaged in an 
affective memory exercise, since the conditions of a workshop or rehearsal are unlikely in 
themselves to provoke an emotional state that matches that of the memory – and if they did, the 
affective memory exercise would be redundant.  LeDoux points out that “[t]he unreliability of 
remembered emotion…may be related to the fact that the emotional state at the time of retrieval 
will by necessity be somewhat different from the state at the time of the original experience.” 198 
In common with LeDoux’s analysis, Ekman points out that “[w]e may replay the emotions we 
felt in the original scene, or we may now feel a different emotion.” 199
A further complication in the use of emotional memory arises from the degree of 
emotional arousal that occurred in the formation of the memory: “[A]s long as the degree of 
emotional arousal is moderate during memory formation, memory is strengthened. But if the 
arousal is strong, especially if it is highly stressful, memory is often impaired.” 
 
200
As Stanislavski moved towards developing the Method of Physical Actions, he grew 
increasingly impatient with actors who indulged in private emotions:  
 So on two 
counts, current, empirically based knowledge about the brain’s activities qualifies Strasberg’s 
notion of the effectiveness of affective memory. As I will show later, the use of memory is just 
one of several potential pathways for generating emotion, and Strasberg’s belief that it is the 
actor’s sole route to emotion needs to be recognized as outmoded by theatre practitioners. His 
insistence on its usefulness and on autobiographical material also disregarded the changes in 
Stanislavski’s thinking that were reported to him by Stella Adler and others.  
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What’s false here? You’re playing feelings, your own suffering, that’s what’s  
false. I need to see the event and how you react to the event, how you fight  
people – how you react, not suffer … To take that line …is to be passive and  
sentimental. See everything in terms of action! 201
Implicit in the exhortation is an endorsement of the idea of imaginative engagement with the 
fictional “event”, something that Strasberg’s emphasis on biographical “truth” disregards. Also 
implicit is the notion that the action that evolves from imaginative engagement can stimulate 
emotion, a concept that became the foundation of the Method of Physical Actions. As with other 
practitioners that I have mentioned, this phase of Stanislavski’s work displays a certain 
prescience of the current understanding of the nature of emotion, imagination, and action, which 
of course, has advanced considerably since Stanislavski’s time.  
 
Antonio Damasio has been one of the most prominent researchers and articulators of a 
neuroscientific understanding of emotion, disseminated through numerous research papers and 
articles, and the best-selling books Descartes’ Error, The Feeling of What Happens, and Looking 
for Spinoza. In The Feeling of What Happens
Damasio’s research shows that emotions are brain representations of body states. He 
suggests that while the senses of vision, hearing, touch, taste, and smell function by nerve 
, Damasio draws on his experience as a clinical 
neurologist to investigate the nature of consciousness, and, in the process of doing so, considers 
the nature of emotions. This is important information for theatre practitioners who seek to better 
understand emotional processes, which, in daily life, often seem to have no relationship to cause 
or conscious intent, and are not directly controlled by the will. Understanding how emotions 
occur is a useful foundation for developing an approach to stimulating emotion in performance.  
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activation patterns that correspond to the state of the external world, emotions are nerve 
activation patterns that correspond to the state of the internal world. These patterns have a 
biological basis and have evolved as bioregulatory devices that support survival: 
For neuroscience, emotions are more or less the complex reactions the body has to certain 
stimuli. When we are afraid of something, our hearts begin to race, our mouths become 
dry, our skin turns pale and our muscles contract. This emotional reaction occurs 
automatically and unconsciously. Feelings occur after we become aware in our brain of 
such physical changes; only then do we experience the feeling of fear. 202
The stimuli that activate these patterns can occur in the external environment, or within the body:  
“Representations of either the exterior or the interior can occur underneath conscious survey and 
still induce emotional responses. Emotions can be induced in a nonconscious manner and thus 
appear to the conscious self as seemingly unmotivated.” 
 
203 Thus, while we might be consciously 
aware of an event (external or internal) that stimulates an emotional response, it is also possible 
that we can have an emotion without being aware of the cause. Emotions use the “internal 
milieu” – the interstitial tissue and fluid in which cells exist, - and visceral, vestibular and 
musculoskeletal systems, which affect “a fairly restricted ensemble of subcortical regions, 
beginning at the level of the brain stem and moving up to the higher brain … [T]he collection of 
these changes constitutes the substrate for the neural patterns which eventually become feelings 
of emotion.” 204
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 As we know from our own experience, different emotions can entail varying 
levels of conscious awareness about their causes, and Damasio offers a further level of 
specificity by identifying three categories of emotion: 
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The primary or universal emotions: happiness, sadness, fear, anger, surprise, or 
disgust [;]…secondary or social emotions, such as embarrassment, jealousy, guilt, or 
pride; and what I call background emotions, such as well-being or malaise, calm or 
tension. 205
Each of these categories of emotions has a biological core, but they vary in the degree to which 
they are influenced by culture. For instance, “… several secondary emotions begin to appear 
later in human development, probably only after a concept of self begins to mature – shame and 
guilt are examples of this later development; newborns have no shame and no guilt but two year-
olds do.” 
 
206 Background emotions are what would commonly be called “moods” in daily life – 
emotions that recur frequently or are sustained over significant periods of time. Damasio, 
however, distinguishes between the two in his terminology; “a particular background emotion 
can be sustained over time to create a mood.” 207
The aspect of time is another helpful indicator of differences between emotions: certain 
primary emotions (fear, anger, surprise and disgust) have a rapid onset, a peak of intensity, and 
rapid diminishment. Other emotions, such as sadness, and all of the background emotions have a 
more “wave-like” pattern of gradual onset and gradual diminishment. Identifying the temporal 
pattern of emotions allows actors to relate them to the temporal components of Laban’s Efforts, 
“sudden” or “sustained”, and thus to integrate them into a vocabulary of action.  For example, 
the gestural action of “punch” (sudden, direct, and heavy) is easily associated with anger, and 
can be used as a metaphorical action applied to speech.  
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Another intriguing feature of the distinctions between primary and background emotions 
is the source of the immediate inducer of an emotion. In the primary emotions, this is usually 
external, or a representation of an external event. In background emotions, it is internal, 
frequently the result of mental conflict. Being aware of this distinction can help actors with 
understanding the emotional life of their characters. For example, Hamlet can legitimately be 
said to be melancholic at the beginning of the play as he broods over the death of his father and 
the rapid remarriage of his mother (internal, sustained process), but when he encounters the ghost 
of his father (external event provoking sudden responses) his emotional state evidently changes, 
and he is propelled into action. 
All three categories of emotion are expressed physically. Primary and social emotions are 
mostly expressed through differentiated, explicit facial expressions, and although background 
emotions initially target the internal milieu and viscera, they also have effects on the 
musculoskeletal systems which are evident to observers: “We detect background emotions by 
subtle details of body posture, speed and contour of movements, minimal changes in the amounts 
and speed of eye movements, and in the degree of contraction of facial muscles.” 208
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 It is 
important to remember that Damasio demonstrates that the conscious experience (feeling) of 
emotion (using the word in its everyday sense) is actually dependent on physical symptoms. The 
implications for the actor are that consciously controlled physiological actions, such as altering 
the rate and tempo of breathing, changing muscular tension, adjusting body posture, controlling 
eye movements and facial expressions not only communicate emotion to the audience (through 
the activation of mirror neurons) but can also generate an emotional experience for the 
performer. These findings challenge the conceptual foundation of one of the perennial dualities 
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in acting theory – does the actor have to feel an emotion in order to express it, or does he or she 
simply reproduce the physical signs of the emotion? It is clear from Damasio’s research that it is 
not an either/or situation. Since physiological indicators are the stimulators of feeling in many 
emotions, the willed reproduction of those symptoms can provoke the affective experience of 
emotion in the actor. 
Damasio’s findings are confirmed by Joseph LeDoux, who offers a clear account of the 
relationship between perception and emotion. In The Emotional Brain: The Mysterious 
Underpinnings of Emotional Life,
that emotion and cognition are best thought of as separate but interacting mental 
functions mediated by separate but interacting brain systems …. The perceptual 
representation of an object and the evaluation of the significance of an object are 
separately processed by the brain. 
 LeDoux describes his belief  
209
However, in the cases of some emotions, conscious evaluation is preceded by an automatic 
response: 
 
The emotional meaning of a stimulus can begin to be appraised by the brain before the 
perceptual systems have fully processed the stimulus. It is, indeed, possible for your brain 
to know that something is good or bad before it knows exactly what it is. 210
This explains the phenomenon that most of us have experienced of physically starting in 
response to a potential threat before consciously realizing that the stimulus is not a threat - a 
snake in the grass that turns out to be a stick, an intruder in the house who turns out to be an 
unexpected family member. Generally the lag time between the physical response and the 
conscious appraisal is minimal, a matter of microseconds. Obviously, not all stimuli of emotional 
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responses are as dramatic as this, and this phenomenon is more apparent in the evolutionarily 
earlier emotions (fear, anger, surprise, disgust). But these examples demonstrate an important 
principle: 
The linkage of appraisal mechanisms with response control systems means that when the 
appraisal mechanism detects a significant event, the programming and often the 
execution of a set of appropriate responses will occur. The net result is that bodily 
sensations often accompany appraisals and when they do they are a part of the conscious 
experience of emotions. Because cognitive processing is not linked up with responses in 
this obligatory way, intense bodily sensations are less likely to occur in association with 
mere thoughts. 211
So Strasberg’s insistence on emotional memory as the actor’s sole pathway to emotion is 
further discounted; thinking of a past event is less likely to produce the sensations that are 
identified as feelings when they are consciously perceived. Given that many of these sensations 
occur in physiological mechanisms that are subject to conscious control as well as involuntary 
impulse, such as breathing and the level of muscular tension, it would seem to make sense for the 
actor to use these as pathways to emotion. The viability of such an approach has reliable 
empirical backing in the work of Paul Ekman. 
 
Ekman has proved that consciously chosen muscular actions affect emotional state. While 
researching the configuration of facial muscles used in expressions of emotion, Ekman and his 
assistant discovered that they began to experience the conscious affect of the emotion as they 
controlled the arrangements of their facial muscles to denote primary emotions such as fear, 
anger and surprise. Following this experience, Ekman devised a set of experiments to see if the 
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phenomenon could be reliably reproduced. In a paper published in 1990, Ekman, Wallace 
Friesen, and Robert Levenson reported the findings of experiments conducted to determine 
“whether voluntarily produced emotional facial configurations are associated with different 
patterns of autonomic activity.” 212
Although it is now twenty years since this paper was published, there is little evidence to 
suggest that its findings are being employed on a consistent basis in actor training programs. 
Lecoq’s training program, which consistently places focus and attention on the body, does not 
specifically address facial expression or emotion. Popular acting texts, such as Robert Cohen’s 
 Subjects were invited to create facial expressions through 
muscle-by-muscle instruction and then were asked to report on their feelings as well as having 
their autonomic activities monitored. These included heart rate, skin conductance, finger 
temperature and muscle activity. The facial expressions were ones that had previously been 
identified by Ekman and Friesen in their Facial Action Coding System in the late seventies. 
These muscular configurations each represented a universal emotional facial expression based on 
cross-cultural studies of both the recognition and expression of emotion. The configurations 
indicated emotions of anger, fear, hatred, surprise, happiness, and sadness, but when the subjects 
were invited to produce particular muscular configurations, they were not told what emotion was 
being targeted. The experiments showed that the subjects did indeed experience the emotion 
associated with the facial expression as a result of simply organizing the muscles of the face in a 
certain way. 
Acting One, Uta Hagen’s Respect for the Actor, and Jean Benedetti’s The Actor at Work
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 do not 
offer any exercises for the recognition or generation of facial expressions. Most practitioners 
agree that the emotions cannot in general be consciously controlled. Muscular activity, however, 
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can, and so it would seem to make sense to incorporate Ekman’s findings into actor training 
programs. The simple task of consciously arranging one’s facial muscles in certain 
configurations would not only develop facility with facial expressions, but also offer a route 
towards the generation of the experience of emotions. The process would seem to be more time-
effective and specific than Strasberg’s affective memory exercise, and could be linked with other 
controllable features such as breathing patterns and levels of muscular tension – activities that 
will be addressed later in this chapter. In the same way that repeated practicing of scales gives a 
pianist increased dexterity through confirming neuronal patterning, practicing the controllable 
physiological features of specific emotions would increase the actor’s ability to express emotion 
in response to fictional circumstances, either through conscious choice or through a response to 
an imaginative stimulus. 
Ekman, in common with Damasio and other psychologists, initially identified six primary 
emotions: happiness, sadness, fear, anger, surprise, and disgust. Over a long career, his research 
has shown that these emotions are identifiable in a variety of different cultures, concurring with 
Damasio’s view that they are biological in origin, and not culturally determined. His Facial 
Action Coding System identifies the different muscular configurations that are associated with 
each of these primary emotions. For example, anger is expressed by the pressing and narrowing 
of the lips, the inner corners of the eyebrows going down towards the nose, the eyes opening 
wide with the upper eyelids pushing against the lowered eyebrows, and the chin being pushed 
forward. In some cases the lips may be open, and attempts to suppress the emotion may result in 
only some of the signs being present. This specificity of description offers one the opportunity to 
experiment with the generation of emotion through the conscious arranging of the muscles in to 
this configuration. 
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In a number of experiments, Ekman has demonstrated that this activity produces the felt 
experience of emotion. For example, in working with the facial expression of enjoyment that 
communicates happiness, Ekman found a distinction in the brain activity that is provoked by 
related but different expressions. He proposes that spontaneous enjoyment is expressed by a 
smile activated by the zygomatic major muscle that extends from the cheekbones to the corner of 
the lips, and also by the contraction of the muscle that surrounds the eye, the orbicularis oculi. 
Part of this muscle is hard to contract voluntarily, and therefore its lack of contraction in an 
expression of enjoyment generally demonstrates that the subject is consciously attempting an 
expression of enjoyment, rather than involuntarily expressing enjoyment. These differences are 
visible in the patterns of brain activation provoked by the expressions. Smiling with both the eye 
muscle and the lips activated the left temporal and anterior regions, while smiling only with the 
lips did not. 213
In addition to the primary emotions mentioned above, Ekman identifies a number of other 
distinct emotions, such as contempt, pride in achievement, embarrassment, and sensual pleasure. 
These correlate with Damasio’s category of secondary or social emotions. Valuable information 
for the actor lies in a particular set of findings that suggest that many of these emotions can be 
thought of as groupings or “families” of emotions:  
 One can test the phenomenonal experience of the distinction oneself, by smiling 
with the lower part of the face only (raising the corners of the mouth), and then by smiling in a 
way that involves the upper part of the face (cheeks and eyes) as well as the mouth. The 
difference in affective experience of the two types of smile is often quite significant. 
[O]ur findings suggest that all of the positive emotions (amusement, sensory pleasure, 
pride, etc.) share a single expression, a particular type of smile … An observer 
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distinguishes which of these positive emotions is evident, not so much from the 
expression itself (although the timing and intensity of the expression may provide clues), 
as from the context, from knowledge of what emotion is likely in a given situation for a 
given person.  214
Similarly, there is an “unhappiness” group of emotions - disappointment, sadness over loss, 
remorse, shame and guilt - that share an expression, which Ekman describes as one in which “the 
corners of the eyebrows are raised, the cheeks slightly raised, and the lip corners are pulled 
downward.” 
 
215
This level of empirically derived specificity about the facial expression of emotion gives 
the actor the ability to confidently research emotion and its expression in training, so that the 
activities of expressing emotion in performance can be fluid and responsive to the imagination. It 
would seem to make sense for actors to develop facility in voluntarily creating the facial 
expressions of each of the six primary emotions. Given that many of the wider range of 
secondary emotions share the facial expressions of the primary expressions, the ability to create 
the primary expressions would also extend to a communication of secondary emotions.  
 
In addition to the potential for practical application that this information has for actors, 
cognitive science presents a significant challenge to the concept of “real” emotion that is used 
with such frequency by Strasberg and other practitioners. The research of Ekman and others 
shows that the brain activation patterns of emotions can be provoked in a number of ways, not 
just by memory. Most of us would consider a spontaneous response to a real-life event as the 
most “real” experience of emotion, but neuroscientific research shows that emotion that is 
stimulated by memory, imagination, or by the conscious control of physiological processes uses 
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the same neural pathways to create activation patterns, but with less intense results. This suggests 
that, rather than attempt to define what is “real” or not “real” in the experience and expression of 
emotion, it is a more useful approach for actors to consider the origin and pathway of an 
emotion-inducing event. By doing this, and experimenting with different activities, they will be 
able to identify which pathway, or combination of pathways, works best for them in creating the 
expression of emotion. 
That actors should focus on the expression of emotion, and not on the idea of creating 
“real” emotion is supported by a comment of Antonio Damasio. He confirms that “we cannot 
control emotions willfully” 216
We can also control, in part, the expression of some emotions –suppress our anger, mask 
our sadness –but most of us are not very good at it and that is one reason why we pay a 
lot to see good actors who are skilled at controlling the expression of their emotions… 
 and, as mentioned earlier, that we are often unconscious of what 
events or images have provoked an emotional state. Aspects of the emotional process that we can 
control include whether an emotion-inducing image remains the target of our thoughts once 
noticed, and also, to some extent, the expression of our emotions:  
217
What seems especially significant here is that Damasio talks about actors controlling expression, 
rather than experiencing “real” emotion.  
 
Identifying which aspects of emotional expression are controllable, and therefore of 
interest to the actor seeking to create authentic expressions of emotion in performance is assisted 
by another feature of Paul Ekman’s research. Ekman identifies nine pathways that generate 
emotion. 218
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scanning of the environment for events that are relevant to our survival. Our identification of 
what these events are is developed through a combination of biology, evolutionary natural 
selection, and individual experience. This process continues through life, with new stimuli that 
seem relevant to what we care about added to an unconscious database. 
The next pathway is reflective appraisal. This “deals with ambiguous situations, 
situations to which the automatic appraising mechanisms are not already tuned.” 219
The seventh pathway that Ekman identifies is being told what to be emotional about, and 
this tends to occur in early life in response to a caregiver or significant person. Violation of social 
norms is the eighth pathway – the emotions that we might feel in response to different violations 
will vary, of course, in type and intensity according to our individual opinions about the norm 
being violated. Ekmans’s final pathway derives from his experience of creating facial 
expressions –voluntarily assuming the appearance of emotion. While Ekman focuses on the 
facial expressions of the primary emotions, Damasio’s work shows that breathing patterns, eye 
movement, and musculoskeletal activity are also involved in the expression of emotions. 
 At the point 
where the reflective appraisal results in the recognition of an emotion-inducing event, the 
automatic appraisal mechanism takes over to generate feelings. Ekman then identifies 
remembering an emotion-inducing event as a pathway to generating emotion, followed by 
imagining an emotional event, talking about past emotional experiences, and empathy – the 
provocation of one’s own emotions by witnessing someone else’s emotion. This occurs in real 
life situations, but also in response to fictional representations, using the mechanisms described 
in the previous chapter.   
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Of these nine pathways, three would seem to be of especial practical use to the actor in 
the intentional generating of emotion – memory, imagination, and voluntarily assuming the 
physiological signs of emotion. The topic of memory has been addressed earlier in this chapter, 
and imagination in the previous chapter, although it is probably valuable to reiterate that when an 
emotion is stimulated by imagination, it follows the same neuronal pathways as one that is 
stimulated by an event in lived experience. As Shaun Nichols points out in his introduction to 
The Architecture of the Imagination: New Essays on Pretence, Possibility and Fiction; “research 
suggests that the affective response to imagining a scenario closely tracks the affective response 
that would occur if the subject came to believe that the scenario was real.” 220
 The data reviewed here show that in the anterior insula, visual information  
 The neural 
scaffolding of this phenomenon is described by Vittorio Gallese: 
 concerning the emotions of others is directly mapped onto the same  
 viscero-motor neural structures that determine the experience of that  
 emotion in the observer. This direct mapping can occur even when the  
 emotion of others can only be imagined. 221
This phenomenon seems to be true for the six basic emotions, and recent research indicates that 
it is also true for social emotions. In a recent fMRI experiment, a group of Italian neuroscientists 
conducted a study to “investigate whether the same neural mechanism is activated both when 
experiencing and attending complex, cognitively-generated, emotions.” 
 
222
 …observing the regretful outcomes of someone else's choices activates the same 
 The emotion that they 
focused on was regret and their results showed that:  
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 regions that are activated during a first-person experience of regret, i.e. the  
ventromedial prefrontal cortex, anterior cingulate cortex and hippocampus. These 
results extend the possible role of a mirror-like mechanism beyond basic emotions.223
Linking the two sets of findings suggests that a mirror-like mechanism for the activation of 
emotion through imagination is in operation for both primary and social emotions. 
 
The ways in which actors are involved in imaginative responses to the fictional world of 
a drama are varied; a response to reading a script; an intentional act of the imagination such as 
Chekhov’s visualization exercises; an imaginative engagement in an improvisation. In all these 
processes, however, the material about the cognitive aspects of emotion that I have surveyed here 
strongly suggests that physical activity intensifies and particularizes the way in which the 
imagination can stimulate emotion. 
As described in the previous chapter, Stanislavski’s Method of Physical actions sought to 
provide the actor with a physical pathway into the fictional world. Jean Benedetti, his 
biographer, describes the aim of the Method of Physical Actions as follows: 
What Stanislavski wanted to provide was a method for actors to explore the play, the 
events as they unfold, in terms of what they would do in the various situations the author 
provided, using exercises and improvisations. It is active analysis on the rehearsal-room 
floor, as opposed to the reflective, formal analysis that takes place in the study; it first 
asks what happens, rather than what the dramaturgical structure is. 224
Vasili Toporkov, reflecting on his work after Stanislavski’s death, wrote; 
 
Stanislavski drew our attention to what is most tangible, most concrete in any human 
action: its physical aspect. In his directing and teaching, especially in his 
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final years, he laid the greatest significance on this aspect of the life of a role when 
organizing the beginning of the work. Splitting off the physical aspect of human behavior 
from its other elements is, of course, artificial, but he used it as a teaching strategy. By 
diverting actors’ attention away from feelings and the psychological, and directing them 
towards the fulfillment of ‘purely physical’ actions, he helped them gain access to their 
feelings in an organic, natural manner as they performed them. 225
As described in the previous chapter, Stanislavski worked with his actors through close and 
detailed stimulation of the imagination through constant insistence on features of the fictional 
environment and their physical behavior in response to it. The “organic” nature of the results that 
Toporkov describes would seem to arise through the stimulation of emotion by a combination of 
imaginative engagement and physical behavior – the “symptoms” of emotion that provoke 
feeing. 
 
The final part of this chapter gives examples of practitioners from different traditions 
who can be seen to have employed these principles in their work. I should stress that most of 
them have arrived at their exercises through trial and error in the rehearsal studio, and that their 
work precedes the cognitive research that I have outlined. The exception is the work of 
experimental psychologist Susan Bloch, which originated in experiments conducted in the 
Universidad de Chile from 1971 to 1973. 
Jerzy Grotowski is probably the best-known successor of Stanislavski’s physical 
approach to training and directing. While Grotowski’s work is widely recognized as 
“experimental”, with the many connotations that this has in twenty-first century Western theatre, 
the rigor of his approach, and its close connection to Stanislavski’s Method of Physical Actions 
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is perhaps less widely understood. The different phases of Grotowski’s work have been well-
documented by Richard Schechner, Lisa Wolford, and others, and have aroused their fair share 
of controversy, but in citing examples of Grotowski, I’m going to focus on the legacy of the 
actor training that he developed in the 1960’s, and introduced to American theatre practitioners 
in the latter part of that decade.  
In his book At Work with Grotowski on Physical Actions
When I was a student in the school of dramatic arts, in the faculty for actors, I founded 
the entire basis of my theatrical knowledge on the principles of Stanislavski. As an actor, 
I was possessed by Stanislavski. I was a fanatic. I retained that it was the key that opens 
all the doors of creativity. I worked a lot to arrive to know all possible about that which 
he said or what was said about him.” 
, long-time collaborator Thomas 
Richards quotes from an essay that Grotowski wrote about his studies at the State Theatre 
Institute in Poland: 
226
Richards goes on to describe his own experience in a workshop with Ryszard Cieslak, the actor 
who Grotowski felt most understood his approach. In an exercise where Cieslak was working 
with a student to discover the way that he touched his (visualized) girlfriend’s face, Richards 
observes Cieslak continually direct the student to focus on the physical details: “Don’t act. What 
was the touch of her skin like? At what moment precisely do you touch your girlfriend’s face? Is 
her face warm or cold? How does she react to your touch? How do you react to her reaction?” 
 
227
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The process echoes Toporkov’s descriptions of Stanislavski’s work, and Richards recognizes this 
as his “first insight into Stanislavski’s ‘method of physical actions.’” 
227 ibid. 13 
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Richards also describes a moment in the workshop when Cieslak asked if any one could 
cry like a child:  
A girl lay down on the floor and tried. He said ‘No, not like that,’ and taking her place on 
the floor, transformed himself into a crying child before our eyes. Only now after many 
years, do I understand the key to Cieslak’s success in the transformation. He found the 
exact physicality of the child, its alive physical process which supported his child-like 
scream. He did not look for the child’s emotional state, rather with his body he 
remembered the child’s physical actions. 228
This concentration on physical activity is also emphasized by Stephen Wangh, who, like 
Richards, studied with Grotowski, and now trains actors at the Experimental Theatre Wing of 
New York University. Wangh describes how, when he first encountered Grotowski at a 
workshop at NYU, he thought that “his approach was baffling, for he seemed to work differently 
with every actor in the group.” 
 
229 Wangh details the work that Grotowski did with a pair of 
actors on a scene from Antony and Cleopatra
he led Tom through a long exploration of two sides of himself, le petit Tom and le grand 
Tom, an exploration that depended on Tom’s control of his facial  
, indicating his amazement at the attention to 
physical detail: 
muscles! The requisite emotions, Grotowski explained, would arrive on their own 
if Tom would just pay attention to physical details. “Emotions come; they happen to us; 
they are not voluntary.” … Making a technical, physical choice, Grotowski insisted, 
could produce emotional truth. 230
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Familiarity with the findings of Damasio and Ekman indicates the physiological way in which 
emotions arise from facial expressions; to actors in the sixties habituated to the Method, the 
process must have been very startling. Wangh has since developed a training program based on 
Grotowski’s work, (described in An Acrobat of the Heart
Another example of a theatre practitioner approaching the physiological symptoms of 
emotion lies in the work of Jacques Lecoq. As described earlier, Lecoq’s approach to training 
actors is fundamentally physical, and much of the work that a student encounters in his school is 
likely to stimulate emotion for that reason. One specific example demonstrates the way in which 
his training can assist the actor in developing control of a feature of emotional expression. This is 
a group of exercises known as the Seven Levels of Tension, which identify and discriminate 
among different levels of muscular tension. The initial concept is introduced in a single session, 
and returned to and elaborated on throughout a student’s training. In the initial session, students 
are instructed to progressively adjust their muscular tension to each of the successive levels listed 
below. At each level, they are invited to experiment with the dramatic potential of the seven 
states through improvised movement and vocalization, and also to briefly reflect on their sense 
of self after each period of improvisation.  
); he recognized that a gap existed 
between his physical training exercises and their application to a script. 
The following table describes the seven levels, together with the acting style most 
commonly associated with it. These links are not proscriptive, and the characterizations of each 
different state varied over the years that Lecoq taught –for example Level two was for a time 
referred to as “Californian.” The term “Focus” was used variably to describe both visual and 
mental targets of attention. This information is not recorded in any of Lecoq’s writing, but is 
drawn from my own training experience and conversations with Lecoq graduates. Given the 
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variable nature of oral transmission, and the evolving nature of Lecoq’s teaching, students of 
different eras might take issue with some of the descriptions, but the principle should be evident 
–that different levels of muscular tension have definable application to dramatic activity. 
Although Lecoq did not mention emotion specifically in relation to this exercise, the specificity 
of physical behavior that it engenders can assist the actor in making voluntary choices that affect 
the physiological symptoms of emotion.  
Table 4. Lecoq’s Seven Levels of Tension 
LEVEL I  “WITHOUT CONTRACTION” 
MOVEMENT:  As if you had no spine, falling down, trying to get up, staggering. 
FOCUS:  None. 
VOICE:  Groan, grunt. 
LEVEL II  “RELAXATION WITH A SMILE” 
MOVEMENT:  Arms swinging, feet as if gently kicking a soccer ball with each 
step. 
FOCUS:  Wandering. 
VOICE:  Slang, minimal energy.  “Hey.” 
LEVEL III  “ECONOMY OF MOVEMENT” 
MOVEMENT:  Just enough energy to accomplish a task, no more, no less.  
Minimal swinging of arms when walking. Efficient, but not robotic. 
FOCUS:  On the goal. 
VOICE:  Efficient and complete.  “Hello.” 
LEVEL IV  “DECISION” 
MOVEMENT:  Deliberate.  Urgent. 
FOCUS:  Intensely on the task. 
VOICE:  Command.  “Go!”  “Stop!”  “Move!” 
LEVEL V  “ALERT” 
MOVEMENT:  A quality of Suspension.  Symmetrical.  Arms suspended away 
from body.  Even stride. Grounded.  Responding to the empty space as if it were 
another player.  Awake.  Hyper-aware. 
FOCUS:  The space, the horizon, the emptiness. 
VOICE:  Questioning.  Listening to the echo.  Calling out to the empty space.  
“Hello?” 
STYLE:  Neutral Mask. 
LEVEL VI  “COLORFUL ACTION” 
MOVEMENT:  Asymmetrical.  Unpredictable.  Impulsive.  Cartoonish.  
Intensity.  Surprise.  Quick changes of rhythm. 
FOCUS:  Intense.  Quickly changing. 
VOICE:  Extreme.   
STYLE:  Commedia Del Arte, Italian Comedy, Farce 
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LEVEL VII  “ASPHYXIATION” 
MOVEMENT:  Maximum muscular tension. 
FOCUS:  Intensely fixated on one target for a sustained period. 
VOICE:  Beyond speaking. 
STYLE:  Tragedy. 
 
The links to dramatic styles are not intended to mean that all action in this style must 
have this specific level of tension, but to indicate connections. As mentioned above, the 
identification of the different levels is the foundation for ongoing work in different styles, both 
conceptually and physically. In the context of this discussion on emotion, an actor who can 
adjust his or her level of muscular tension with facility has the ability to control one of the 
physiological features that both stimulates feeling and communicates emotion to an onlooker.    
These features have been investigated in a more explicit fashion by Susana Bloch, an 
experimental psychologist whose experiments on the effector patterns of emotions led her to 
propose a psychophysiological process to teach “acting behavior”. 231
Bloch defines the effector pattern of an emotion as “a particular configuration of 
neurovegetative, hormonal and neuromuscular reactions” 
 Her earliest experiments 
were conducted in the 1970’s and therefore preceded the majority of cognitive research 
referenced here, but have a congruity with Ekman’s findings on the reflexive relationship 
between facial expression and emotion, and with Damasio’s explanation of the way in which the 
subjective experience (feeling) of emotion arises from physiological symptoms.  
232
…each basic emotion can be evoked by a particular configuration composed of:  
 from which she extracts those 
elements that can be consciously controlled; breathing, muscular tension and activity, and facial 
expression. She proposes that:  
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(1) a breathing pattern, characterized by amplitude and frequency modulation;  
(2) a muscular activation characterized by a set of contracting and/or relaxing groups of 
muscles, defined in a particular posture; (3) a facial expression or mimicry characterized 
by the activation of different facial muscle patterns. 233
The subjects of her experiments were a group of actors who had recently completed their training 
at the Theatre School of the Universidad de Chile and who, prior to the tests, were trained in 
techniques of controlling aspects of behavior such as tension in different muscle groups, 
respiratory rate, facial expression, and physical and vocal inhibition. Once this training was 
complete, subjects were asked to voluntarily adopt the breathing patterns, muscular 
configurations and facial expressions of emotions without being told which emotion was being 
targeted. Electrocardiogram (ECG), pneumogram, and electromyogram (EMG) recordings were 
used to identify physiological changes and for comparison against control recordings of what 
Bloch calls “natural” emotions. The scope of Bloch’s work in these experiments was ambitious, 
and several aspects of her approach would probably be considered questionable by other 
experimental psychologists; for example, the control recordings of “naturally” occurring 
emotions were derived from subjects under hypnosis, and there is no description in her article of 
how the effector patterns were originally defined. There is no clear single hypothesis that is 
being tested, and the measurement of the degree of success of the training is unclear. There is 
mention of self-reporting from the subjects, and also of a test where a group of directors were 
asked to rate two performances of a scene, one prepared using a Stanislavskian approach, the 
other using a “melody” of effector patterns. Additionally, Bloch’s definition of the six “basic” 
emotions is different from the current consensus; she substitutes “tenderness” and “eroticism” for 
 
                                                 
233 ibid. 221 
 175 
surprise and disgust in the group described earlier. While these are undoubtedly useful for the 
actor, there is a lack of procedural rigor in making these substitutions without explanation or 
justification. 
Given these, and other methodological issues, the standards of proof in these experiments 
do not come anywhere near the other cognitive data that I have described. Consequently, it 
seems best to consider Bloch’s work as theatrical practice that is informed by a scientific 
perspective, rather than as empirically derived data. Viewed in this light, there is much that is of 
use to theatre practitioners, and Bloch’s motivating impulse is certainly in accord with the central 
argument of this dissertation: 
What in our opinion is lacking in the curricula of most drama schools are  
instrumental techniques for learning how to express emotion. While the Gnostic- 
verbal (literary) and the body –expressive (physical) aspects of acting behavior  
are quite well covered pedagogically, the emotional expressive 
(psychophysiological) aspects are almost entirely left to the intuition, life 
experience or “emotional memory” of the student actor, with little or no technical  
support. 234
The idea that technical training in communicative behavior is desirable is certainly something 
that I agree with, but as the information in the preceding chapters has indicated, the potential 
scope of such a training is far greater than emotion alone. 
 
Bloch designed a training system (now known as “Alba Emoting”) that instructs actors in 
the physiological expressions of emotion. Many of the aspects of this system resonate with the 
work of other practitioners that I have described. For example, the spatial expressions of 
                                                 
234 ibid. 220 
 176 
different emotions are charted on “approach/avoidance” parameters, and postural expression in 
terms of muscular “tension/relaxation.” Bloch contends that the configurations that she describes 
are more effective in triggering subjective emotional state than the use of Ekman’s findings on 
facial expression. This assertion rests on the fact that these configurations incorporate breathing 
patterns and postural activity in addition to facial expression. Given the consensus of opinion 
among current research about the way that emotions create feelings, this would seem to be true, 
but the comparison with Ekman’s work points up a major flaw in Bloch’s approach that is 
apparent in the description of the configurations.  
This flaw lies in Bloch’s conflating of different levels of emotion into one pattern. For 
example, the configuration of behavior that she associates with happiness is described as follows: 
Happiness –laughter. The breathing is characterized by a deep and abrupt  
inspiratory movement followed by a series of short saccadic expirations which  
may even invade the expiratory pause. The posture is relaxed; the distribution of 
the phasic muscular tonus is quite particular, with a tendency to diminish in the 
extensor muscles, especially in the antigravitational groups. As a consequence, 
during laughter, the subjects tend to sit or even fall. The mouth is open, and the  
contraction of the musculus caninus and m.zygomaticus results in the exposure of  
the upper teeth. The eyelids are relaxed, and the eyes are semi-closed. 235
As is evident from experience in daily life and in performance situations, the emotion of 
happiness can exist at lower levels of intensity than those that provoke laughter. By proposing 
the behavior of laughter as the expressive configuration of happiness, Bloch ignores the concept 
of progression and scale in behavior. It would obviously be inappropriate for an actor to laugh on 
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every occasion that a character feels happiness –at some moments the facial expression alone 
would suffice. 
Similar inconsistencies exist in the other configurations, and arise both from conflating 
different levels of intensity (for example, sadness does not always entail crying), and from 
combining primary and background emotions (fear and anxiety are generally considered to be 
distinct from one another). Bloch also makes a distinction between “real” emotion and that 
provoked by her configurations. As described earlier, this distinction does not have much 
significance in affective experience since the neurological pathways of emotion seem to be the 
same no matter what the origin of the inducing event is. The significant distinction that arises 
from different types of inducing event seems to be that of varying intensity levels.  
Despite these inconsistencies, Bloch’s work offers valuable pointers about the ways in 
which the conscious control of behavior to communicate emotion can be integrated into actor 
training. A particularly useful feature is the “step out” technique, in which subjects assume a 
neutral posture and facial expression and adjust their breathing to reduce the affective experience 
of the emotion that they have been working on. This offers actors who may feel apprehensive 
about experiencing emotion reassurance that the effects are temporary and within their control. It 
also facilitates rapid transitions from one emotion to another, something that is often required 
within performances, and which might be delayed if an actor were to await the organic 
diminishment of subjective feeling. Bloch observes that “by the systematic repetition (initiation 
and interruption) of the effector pattern, the subject may retain the expressive components of the 
emotion with very little of the subjective involvement.” 236
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A description of the co-existence of Alba Emoting with Method Acting is offered by 
Pamela Chabora, an actor who has attained a “level 3” certification in Bloch’s licensing system 
of the technique. Her article in Method Acting Reconsidered
Alba Emoting provides an additional tool, a physiological and organic one, for 
 is largely descriptive –first of her 
work with Lee Strasberg and his assistants, and secondly of Bloch’s approach. Chabora uses both 
Emotion Memory and Alba Emoting in her work, but sees the two approaches as significantly 
different and does not identify any links between them. Indeed, there is an implicit favorable 
comparison in some of her remarks: 
creating genuine feeling onstage. Knowing how to express a specific emotion and 
which emotion it is brings actors one step closer to ideal self-use with an informed  
response to expressive use. Actors have a firmer grasp on the outcome of a role  
instead of having to depend on the director’s guidance and/or the caprice of their 
feelings. 237
The passage suggests that Strasberg’s technique does not provide this level of specificity or 
control. Chabora also points out that sustaining emotion over extended periods is more easily 
achieved by using the Alba configurations: 
 
The role demanded that I portray high-pitched emotions for the entire day .… Had 
 I relied solely on my Method training (ie., emotional memory and  
personalization), I probably would have collapsed halfway through the day.  
However, because I was able to utilize Alba Emoting patterns for fear, anger and 
sadness, I was able to sustain genuine emotional commitment for the duration of  
the performance and suffer no emotional hangover. 238
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Chabora also considers the Alba technique useful in her teaching, enabling her to offer accessible 
and achievable methods of inducing emotion to student actors.  
The final practical activity that I will describe involves the movement of the eyes and 
their role in expressing thought and feeling. These exercises are ones that I have developed 
myself and taught over the last fifteen years in a variety of training courses in England and 
America. In common with most of the other exercises that I have mentioned, they were first 
developed without knowledge of the cognitive research that I have described, and in response to 
a practical training need. As I have learned more about eye movements through studying the 
work of cognitive researchers, I have adapted and refined the exercises. Their inclusion here will 
hopefully demonstrate how it is possible to integrate studio techniques with scientific knowledge 
to provide effective training in the specifics of psychophysical behavior. 
The eyes occupy a unique position in the body’s cognitive mechanism. As psychologists 
Daniel Richardson, Rick Dale & Michael Spivey describe: 
Eye movements are uniquely poised between perception and cognition.  They are 
central to the function of the visual system, but for such scanning to be efficient, it 
cannot be simply a random sample of the visual world. To be useful, eye 
movements must be related to an organism’s memories, expectations and goals. 
 Consequently, eye movements are driven equally by bottom-up perceptual  
properties of the world and top-down cognitive processes. 239
In considering the eye’s expressive qualities, this knowledge equates with the everyday 
understanding that eye movements respond to both the external physical environment and to the 
internal environment of thought. Additionally, Richardson and his colleagues refer to a number 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
238 ibid. 241 
239 Richardson 2 
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of experiments that demonstrate that we create a form of spatial indexing of information, 
whether that information is present in the physical environment or not:  “Eye movement data 
thus reveal a powerful demonstration of how language about things not co-present is interfaced 
with perceptual-motor systems that treat the linguistic referents as if they were co-present.” 240
The importance of eye movement in communicating thought is further highlighted by the 
findings of an fMRI study that were published in 1998. 
 
For the actor, this information confirms the usefulness of the common practice when speaking 
monologues of “placing” imagined people and events in the physical environment.  
241
Prior to discovering the information above, I had recognized that many of my students 
made unconscious eye movements that were contradictory to their intended meaning, and also 
that that eye movements were significant communicators in interpersonal status interactions. I 
sought to identify different types of eye movement so as to have a vocabulary that would enable 
students to make conscious adjustments, and was aided in this by Phelim McDermott of 
Improbable Theatre, who mentioned the term “The Five S’s” as a mnemonic for different eye 
 These experiments investigated the 
relationship between eye movements and attention. This has long been a contentious topic, since 
eyes move in response to objects of attention in the physical environment, but it is also possible 
to pay attention to something that is at the periphery of one’s visual field. This behavioral 
information suggests that different parts of the brain are used in the two activities, while other 
data suggested that the two activities are linked in the brain. The study conducted by Corbetta 
and his colleagues showed that visual attention and eye movement systems share the same areas 
of the brain and probably use similar neural mechanisms, indicating that common processes are 
involved in moving the eyes and shifting attention. 
                                                 
240 ibid. 13 
241 Corbetta et al. 
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movements. I have not been able to find any documented source for this way of categorizing eye 
movements, so it needs to be considered acting lore. The mnemonic refers to the following 
activities: 1) “Search.” In this movement, the eyes move constantly, not resting on any one 
location any longer than another. 2) “Select.” In this movement, the eyes come to a rest on one 
particular point. 3) “Shift.” This involves moving the eyes directly from one Selected point to 
another, without any intervening Searching. 4) “Sustain.” Here, the eyes sustain their focus on 
one point. 5) “Shut,” in which the eyelids close briefly. 
Exercises that isolate these movements of the eyes give students a vocabulary for 
movements that are generally conducted unconsciously in daily life. Like other activities of the 
body such as breathing and muscular tension, they are also subject to conscious control. For the 
actor, awareness and control of the eye’s movements are an invaluable part of the 
psychophysical process, since they are not only expressive features but would also seem to 
provide neurological feedback, assisting the intentional evocation of affective state. Despite the 
crucial importance of the eyes in a performance, I have not discovered a specific approach to 
training actors in eye movements in any published acting text. 
Students are introduced to these activities in a session in which groups execute the 
different movements in response to instruction, while others observe, so that each student has the 
experience of making the controlled movements, and also seeing them in action. This stage 
identifies the terms, and allows the students to correlate the terms to the activities both in action 
and through observation. I explain that these are all activities that we carry out unconsciously in 
daily life, and that by becoming aware of them, actors can gain greater control over their non-
verbal expression and give greater definition to their acting. For this preliminary step, the 
students should concentrate on moving the eyes only. They will notice that it is instinctive to 
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move the head to increase the range of vision. I ask them to resist this impulse for the moment, 
so as to place attention on the eyes alone, explaining that subsequent stages of the exercise will 
incorporate the movement of the head. This part of the progression is designed to focus the 
students’ attention on individual experience, to achieve clarity in definition of the activities. 
Discussion after the exercise can lead to the simple observation that movement of the 
eyes indicates mental activity as well as responding to external stimuli. For the onlooker, 
determining which of the two is in operation generally depends on correlating the eye 
movements to the physical environment. If there is no visible reason for the eye movements, the 
onlooker assumes that thought is prompting the movement, or that the individual being observed 
is deranged in some way. Thus a pattern of “Search,” “Select,” “Switch,” if not related to events 
in the subject’s physical environment, can suggest the searching of thoughts, a decision, and then 
a change of mind. “Sustain” tends to suggest focused mental attention, and “Shut” can suggest 
several things, depending on the duration of the closing of the eyelids. If this is slightly longer 
than a blink, it can suggest a pause for thought, or disagreement. Held a bit longer, it can suggest 
the thought “I can’t believe my eyes,” or intensify the expression of an emotion. 
In the second stage of the sequence of exercises, I set up improvisations that demonstrate 
the application of the eye movements in relationship to other people and space.  In the first part 
of this stage, pairs of students are invited to have an “eye conversation” with one another, 
experimenting with turn-taking, proposition and response. This is done seated, and the students 
are encouraged to allow expression of other physiological processes that are stimulated by the 
interaction – breath, gesture, posture –but not language. This step introduces the effects of social 
interaction, and alerts the students to the potential for communication through direction of eye 
movement. For example, A might “Sustain” on B’s eyes, while B “Switches” rapidly between 
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A’s gaze and his own hands.  Following reflective discussion of the experience of this activity, 
students are invited to move in the space in response to the impulses generated by consciously 
chosen eye activities. For example, three players might enter the space “Searching”, allowing 
their physical activity to follow the eye movements, and their imaginations to provide the 
fictional circumstances that have prompted this activity. If two players then “Select” the third 
and “Sustain” on him or her, an interpersonal narrative dynamic is established that provokes the 
imaginations of the players and observers alike. This frequently has an effect on the subjective 
affective states of the players. In reflective discussion after the exercise, students that 
“Sustained” often reported that they felt accusatory, suggesting a low intensity of aggression, 
while students who were the object of the “Sustain” frequently felt intimidated, suggesting a 
low-intensity level of fear. 
This stage of the sequence of exercises is purposely conducted without language so as to 
heighten the students’ awareness of the communicative potential of eye movements and nvc in 
general, and also to assist them in identifying their subjective affective states without distraction. 
The example described above is just one of many potential activities and scenarios. 
The third stage moves on to incorporating language, initially in improvisations that are 
prompted by consciously chosen eye activities, and then in short scripted “open” scenes (scenes 
without identifiable given circumstances in which dialogue can be interpreted in a variety of 
ways). As in the second stage, I invite the players to use consciously selected eye movements 
from the Five S’s as the initial impulse when working with the script, and to improvise their 
interpretation of the dialogue in response to the imaginative impulses generated by the eye 
movements, and in response to the actions of their scene partner. The developmental progression 
of these activities is intended to demonstrate the potential of consciously chosen eye movements 
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to communicate meaning and affect feelings, and to gradually integrate them into the more 
familiar processes of choice-making in the acting progress.  In classes I stress that this process is 
complementary to the work of identifying objectives and choosing actions. Depending on the 
time available, improvisations can also be used to demonstrate aspects of interpersonal status and 
also to demonstrate the relationship between mental focus, visual focus, and dramatic focus. 
Clearly, the self-reported changes in affective state that I have described do not have the 
status of scientifically derived information about emotional process. However, given the 
empirically proven relationship between physiological symptoms of emotion and subjective 
feeling, it is not unreasonable to suppose that consciously chosen eye movements, like 
consciously chosen facial expressions, can stimulate affective states.  
The fact that practitioners from varied backgrounds have each arrived at ways of using 
physicality to stimulate emotion underlines the biological foundation of the process. When 
viewed in the context of the neuroscientific information and the performance practices 
mentioned, Strasberg’s insistence on emotion memory as the actor’s sole path to authentic 
feeling seems limited in the extreme. It is evident that the actor can use control of respiratory 
patterns, muscular tension, facial expressions and eye movements to evoke specific affective 
states. It is also clear from the examples of the practical activities that I’ve described that it is 
possible to integrate these activities into training, rehearsal, and performance in ways that 
stimulate and strengthen the actor’s imaginative engagement with fictional circumstances. There 
is some indication that over time, habituation with the conscious control of the physiological 
symptoms can lead to their embodiment without the subjective affective experience for the actor. 
If the expressive components are well judged, however, they stand a good chance of evoking 
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emotion in audience members through mirror mechanisms, whether or not the actor experiences 
feelings. 
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7.0  CONCLUSION 
All acting is embodied. The actor uses his or her body to communicate meaning to an audience. 
This is accomplished by language, by nonverbal communication (nvc), and by mirror 
mechanisms that support empathy. However, most actor training programs in the West offer little 
or no explicit tutoring in the techniques of behavior that communicate embodied meaning. 
Dualistic concepts of mind/body, self/character, reason/emotion, and knowledge/imagination 
have led to a situation in which approaches to acting are characterized as either physical or 
psychological. The notion that meaning is expressed through language alone is predominant, and 
influences both training approaches and theatrical styles. However, a focus on the structure of the 
body, its actions, and its cognitive mechanisms identifies principles that underlie a variety of 
training methods and performance styles. When this understanding is allied to the perspective of 
cognitive science regarding the way that the body and its activities shape conceptual meaning, it 
is possible to identify foundational principles of activity that link the three elements of theatre; 
Story, Space, and Time. The three meet in, are defined by, and expressed through the actor’s 
body, since bodily experiences in space provide the source domains of metaphors that shape our 
concepts, including those of time and narrative.  
The material that I’ve presented offers empirically derived descriptions of the cognitive 
activities involved in key aspects of the actor’s process; non-verbal communication; the 
relationship between thought, speech and gesture; self and character; empathy; imagination; and 
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emotion. In all of these areas, cognitive science shows that dualistic concepts of process are 
inaccurate. Approaches to acting that are based on those dualistic concepts reduce the potential 
of the actor rather than expanding it, and narrow the possible scope of meaning in performance. 
An approach that acknowledges the holistic and inter-related nature of the expression of meaning 
would support the actor in integrating all the cognitive and expressive features of the body.  
A training course based on such an approach could be integrated with current script-
based programs by incorporating a foundational phase prior to the approach to play texts. This 
phase could start with games and ensemble activities that alert the student to the communicative 
potential of nvc, and offer training exercises that would develop expertise in Kinesic 
communication (facial expression, eye behavior, gesture and posture), Proxemics (the use of 
space, distance between individuals, and the idea of territory) and Vocalics (the gestural features 
of vocalization). Following this, some of Lecoq’s exercises could be used to heighten awareness 
of the physical source domains of primary and complex metaphors, and the relationship between 
thought, speech, and gesture. By developing an awareness of, and facility with the sensorimotor 
origins of certain words, actors can strengthen and define the links between thought and physical 
expression. Depending on time, work with the Neutral mask could be incorporated to increase 
the range of available source domains, and develop skill in physical expression and 
characterization. 
As students begin to work with text, the following model of the dramatic act could 
complement the widely practiced process of identifying given circumstances, objectives, and 
actions: 
Drama depicts change 
Change is effected through action  
Action is expressed through words and gesture  
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Words and gesture arise from impulse  
Impulse is a neuronal process  
Neuronal processes follow the same pathways for fiction as for daily life 
 
Words and gesture are the bridge between thought and action, between the invisible and the 
visible. Since words are the end result of impulses, reading a script is reverse- engineering, 
discovering the impulses that provoke communication. The process by which an actor does this 
is more likely to engage the imagination and emotions when it incorporates physical action and 
gesture. Stanislavski’s Method of Physical Actions, and Michael Chekhov’s character work offer 
coherent and accessible ways of doing this.  
Within this phase of work, students can be introduced to concepts of performance that are 
holistic and integrative, rather than oppositional dualities. For example, action can be seen to 
have different, but connected expression, ranging from behavioral (push, pull, stroke, dab, wring, 
etc.), through conceptual (persuade, intimidate, seduce), to narrative (events that change people, 
relationships and situations). The eight Laban efforts provide a good example of defined 
behavioral actions that can have metaphorical expression. An actor can punch a line, for 
example, as a way of expressing the conceptual action of “intimidate”, or stroke it as a way of 
expressing the conceptual action of “persuade”.  Concepts such as balance, or rhythm can be 
used to describe interconnecting features of the drama. In narrative, for example, the status quo is 
metaphorically in balance, which could be visually depicted on stage by compositional balance. 
The inciting incident tilts the balance. The tilt causes a narrative chain reaction of cause and 
effect, a concept that is based on the source-path-goal schema. The events of this narrative have a 
temporal pattern that can be thought of as rhythm. 
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Students would be encouraged to think of character in terms of situation and action, 
rather than in terms of identification with the “essential self”. The process of characterization 
would be conceived of as forming a temporary situational self through the stimulation of the 
imagination, with feelings that arise through a combination of physical actions and empathetic 
stimuli in the fiction. This is achieved by discovering a range of expressive behavior that; a) 
expresses action in pursuit of a goal, b) is credible in the fictional circumstances and c) is 
congruent with the theatrical style. The accumulation of specific action choices defines the 
personality of the character. The discoveries of behavior can arise both from spontaneous 
responses to the imagination and from voluntary control of muscular activity, acknowledging the 
reflexive relationship between the two. This concept of character provides a coherent model that 
supports the activity of characterization in a range of styles. It is accurate for the actor who 
adopts the traditional posture and mannerisms of Pantalone in Commedia. It is also accurate for 
the actor who plays a character close to herself in age, experience, and personality in the style of 
psychological realism. The model is also applicable to both scripted and improvised material. 
A similarly holistic understanding of emotion would inform this cognitive approach to 
actor training. Students would learn about the current neuroscientific understanding of emotion 
as a physiological activity that, when consciously registered, produces feelings. Information 
about the three categories of emotions (primary, social, and background) would help to define 
both behavioral and narrative action as well as character. Information about the nine pathways to 
emotion would inform exercises that developed facility with the three most controllable of those 
pathways; memory, imagination, and consciously chosen muscular activity. The latter would 
include work on eye movements, facial expression, muscular tension, postural attitudes, and 
respiratory patterns. Empathetic links between the actor’s imagination and the character could be 
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established through the use of the physiological configurations of relevant primary, social, and 
background emotions in the context of the fictional environment. 
I hope that these brief examples illustrate how actor training can be conducted in a way 
that is consistent with the relevant findings of cognitive science. The information that I’ve 
described undercuts some of the basic dualities that have informed acting theory in the twentieth 
century, and offers a new approach to training that can nevertheless integrate some existing 
practices. A significant part of the goal of this dissertation is to adjust actors’ conceptual 
understanding of their bodies. This is an important issue –one’s conceptual understanding of the 
body defines what one believes it to be capable of, and this has implications for theatrical style. 
The ubiquity of the style of psychological realism in Western theatre leads to a literalism that 
encourages actors to “type” themselves in order to gain work, which is necessarily restricting. I 
hope that, as more practitioners become aware of the ways in which meaning can be 
communicated through embodied metaphor, a greater diversity of styles can flourish. 
 When I began researching the material that I’ve described, I feared that cognitive science 
would remove the magic from theatre. But now, I think that it will enable theatre practitioners to 
be better magicians. One way of describing magic is to say that we experience a result without 
being aware of the mechanisms that produced it. The actor’s job is to understand and employ the 
mechanisms that create embodied life on stage. Given that at least 90% of the mental operations 
that create embodied life are unconscious, cognitive science gives actors valuable information 
about processes that are not available to conscious reflection. Transformation of the actor occurs 
when she engages with a fiction to the extent that it affects unconscious neural patterns of 
empathy, of imagination, of emotion. When audience members, through empathic processes, 
experience the actor’s emotional state, it is a lived experience because of a mirror mechanism 
 191 
firing in one part of the brain. At the same time they know with another part of the brain that 
they are witnessing a fiction. This is an embodied paradox, a sensually experienced paradox, a 
paradox that feels magical.  
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